With the publication of a joint study (with the Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace) of Palestinian schoolbooks (read it at www.ajc.org ), AJC takes a stand on one of the basic and pervasive problems that have beset the Israeli-Palestinian peace process from its inception: namely, the fundamental asymmetry of perceptions and “narratives.” On one side, there was the belated but firm recognition in Israel, by all but the far fringes of the Zionist camp, that the Palestinian people, as such (regardless of the complex historical background that led to their emergence on the world stage) is a legitimate national entity, and in this struggle of justice against justice, a compromise two-state solution is the key. On the other, as the study reveals, there remains a systemic refusal to accept the legitimacy of the Jewish national movement. The Palestinian narrative of guiltless victimhood is predicated on the “colonial” nature of the Zionist endeavor. True, the textbooks showed marginal signs of improvement, and at least the acceptance of Israel as a reality, in the brief period when Mahmoud Abbas’s administration worked on new texts -but no dramatic changes took hold, and whatever was done was reversed, or far worse, once Hamas came to power.

This is not just another a peripheral issue, to be put aside to make room for “top-drawer” questions like Jerusalem, borders, refugees, and security arrangements. At the very root of the tragic and violent breakdown of the peace process, after 2000, lies this tragic gap in historical perceptions. And the case has been made, more than once, that well-meaning people in the U.S. and Europe, who see themselves as friends of the Palestinians, actually bring upon them harm and woe, by feeding their one-sided sense of grievance and injustice-rather than urging them to read their own history, and look to their future, as responsible players. The Palestinians are not the worst offenders, though: In Egypt, after thirty years of peace, the public domain is still poisoned by vile and vitriolic hatred of Israel and the Jews. The situation, again documented by AJC and CMIP, in Saudi Arabia is even worse. The time has come for those who are engaged in dialogue with the moderate Arab powers to speak to them, firmly and effectively, about the consequences of these attitudes for their own future, as well as for ours.

This specific set of questions is added to a long list of complexities and dilemmas created by the unique nature of the Palestinian Authority: simultaneously foe (in the national struggle) and friend (against the surge of totalitarian Islamism); a state-in-being, yet whining about “life under occupation”; a semi-sovereign entity, yet with a built-in mechanism for explaining away irresponsible behavior; cops often acting as thieves. (The man who served for a few days as the PA’s interim president after Yasir Arafat’s death, then-Palestinian Legislative Council Speaker Rawhi Fattouh, was caught last week running thousands of cellular phones illegally from Jordan.) The same design flaws of the Oslo Process, which left the public domain and education almost unattended, are felt time and again when there is a need to build mutual trust-which is not to say that some Israeli policies, by deed or by neglect, are free of blame for the present impasse.

To go forward, we need to make daily choices, navigating in a landscape marked by heavy shades of gray-in which Hamas and Hezbollah represent the dark side, while the relationship with Jordan shows us just how different things can and should be. The complexity of these decisions is now compounded by the growing pressure from the U.S. administration, and in particular, the generals-James Jones, William Fraser, Keith Dayton-charged with monitoring the Road Map and the Annapolis obligations of both sides. They, too, have learned to deal with “yes, but” in all too many ways:

• Yes, the PA has committed itself to a course of action “restraining” and containing the terrorists (which may, to some extent, account for the reduction in penetrations from the West Bank; the main reason for the reduction, however, is still the combined effect of the physical barrier, actionable intelligence, and IDF operations). But a closer examination by the U.S. observers revealed a lack of consistency in carrying out full-scale counterterrorist operations-arrest, investigation, indictment, and punishment-which could signal a robust deterrent stand.
• Yes, Palestinian “policemen” (soldiers) have done relatively well restoring law and order to Nablus and Tulkarm, and more will soon be deployed in Jenin and some of the smaller West Bank towns, and ultimately in Bethlehem and areas adjoining Jerusalem; but among their numbers, some were recently involved in acts of murder and others double as terror activists or common criminals.
• Yes, weapons need to be supplied to the PA. If they are to be expected to carry out their duties and to impress their own people as figures of authority, we need them to be well-armed and well-equipped. Hence the decision, which met with much criticism in Israel, to allow Russia to provide the PA with twenty-five armored vehicles as well as guns and various nonlethal weapons. But few in Israel are willing to forget the many cases in which such weapons have been diverted for use against us in the past, and the first incidence of such abuse would greatly complicate the Olmert government’s fragile standing (let alone the tendency of the far right to regard it as “enemy collaborators” and increasingly ignore the authority of state institutions).
• Yes, President Mahmoud Abbas, and even more so Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, are trying to create a new pattern in terms of the attitude toward cooperation with Israel at the practical level; and the talks continue, more regularly and at higher levels than ever, even at the height of the Oslo Process. But the public domain and the educational system are still poisonous, and some harsh words need to be spoken, demanding change, or else there will be little prospect of real progress beyond local practicalities.
At this time, moreover, this “yes, but” reality is probably the best we can hope for. Israeli political dynamics, Palestinian divisions and weaknesses, as well as the strategic orientation of the region as a whole, all hang in a precarious balance-which may account for the strange sense, in recent weeks, that nothing is “really” happening. The turbulent financial markets; the strange, suffocating heat wave that marked last week’s Purim celebrations; various crime chronicles; and the bizarre debates over “reality” TV-all have kept us busy, while a relative calm descended in the south for a while (probably the result of indirect understandings, brokered by Egypt) and the tensions of the previous month began to dissipate.

But this could be, as often in our past, a misleading quiet zone in the eye of a storm. Iran defies the world, now more than ever; in the West, voices are rising in recognition that this is a danger that cannot be ignored. The Arab League Summit in Damascus, hosted by Iran’s ally, is set to become a spectacle of disunity and division, and the Lebanese presidency is still up for grabs. At any moment, now that the forty days of mourning for the dead murderer Imad Mughniyah are over, Hassan Nasrallah may launch a revenge attack against an Israeli or a Jewish target abroad-although his awareness of the post-9/11 rules of the game may make another AMIA bombing less likely. After all, unlike Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah presumes to be a legitimate political party in a (semi-)sovereign country. He might, instead, try to go after a senior Israeli figure, with all the consequences that might flow from that. The slow “yes, but” process with the Palestinians may be all that we have at this time, and it is useful in its own way-but it is no guarantee against grave events that may overtake us at any time, and no substitute for the tough decisions we may yet need to make.