We can generally distinguish between two strategies for dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The first strategy assumes that conflict resolution is basically within reach if the right formula is presented to the warring parties. The concessions required on the part of each side in order to reach a comprehensive agreement on all issues under dispute can be negotiated during a relatively short period of intensive diplomacy in which third party involvement may prove necessary. The American “Brookings Plan” of the 1970s constitutes one example of such an approach, as does the ill-fated Camp David Summit convened by President Clinton in the summer of 2000.
The second strategy is more realistic in terms of its goals. This line of thought, associated with the Kissingerian “step-by-step” approach, assumes that conflict resolution is impossible because the differences between the two sides are so great as to be unbridgeable. It therefore advocates reaching a series of interim agreements on minor issues, thus delaying the need to deal with the more difficult issues. Such a course of action, it is argued, creates a political climate characterized by a sense of progress, lowering the incentives for violence among the dissatisfied Palestinians. Moreover, interim agreements may lead the protagonists to reassess their positions, potentially facilitating additional agreements on the more difficult issues. The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty seems to be the result of such a gradual process. The agreements between Israel and the Palestinians in the 1993-1998 period were also of an interim character.
Currently, the general evaluation both inside and outside Israel is that this gradual process, as well as the attempt to reach a comprehensive agreement in 2000, have both failed, and that the resulting situation is a severe political and humanitarian mess. This predicament has led to well-meaning suggestions to revive Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in an effort to bring about even a modest improvement by reaching an interim agreement.
While the step-by-step approach is indeed the more appropriate method of dealing with protracted ethnic conflicts such as we have in the Holy Land, progress within the framework of this more realistic strategy requires a reliable strategic “address”. This means that each side of the conflict must have a political leadership that can authoritatively negotiate and subsequently implement an agreement.
Unfortunately, the Palestinian political system lacks a strong and effective political center. As a matter of fact, the Palestinians are on the verge of civil war and it is unclear at this stage whether any party will succeed in establishing an effective monopoly over the use of force in the PA. The two largest political parties, Fateh and Hamas and their associated militias are too weak to constitute a strategic address for Israel. The chaotic situation in the PA is likely to continue for some time with the two movements at loggerheads.
Even if Hamas takes over the PA and is successful in restoring central authority, law and order, Israel should refrain from negotiating with its representatives since such a move would grant it legitimacy and a chance to stabilize its hold over the PA. Hamas is actually interested in an interim agreement and recently aired a proposal for a ten-year hudna (truce). This would buy Hamas time to strengthen its hold over the Palestinian polity and make adequate preparations for its struggle against the Zionist entity. Israel has no interest in providing Hamas with time to establish a Jihadist regime. Moreover, the entrenchment within the PA of Hamas, a probable ally of the Islamic Republic of Iran, runs contrary to the western interest in weakening radical Islamic forces in the region.
The remaining available strategy is simply to wait until the Palestinians put their house in order, which may take a long time. As depressing as it may sound, Israel and the international community cannot bring about any positive change among the Palestinians. Over a decade, territorial concessions on the part of Israel and generous international financial support have had no positive impact on Palestinian society, which has degenerated into chaos. Outside intervention has little chance of overcoming the political and social dynamics within the Palestinian entity.
Colonial history clearly indicates the resistance of Middle Eastern societies to attempts to ease their transition into modernity. Even America cannot “fix” Iraq. Only the Palestinians can extricate themselves from their dismal situation and eventually become a true partner for negotiations with Israel.
Efraim Inbar is professor of political science at Bar-Ilan University and the director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies.
