Israel-and, in a sense, the Middle East region as a whole, albeit for very different reasons-can be said to be currently locked into waiting mode: Big things are about to happen; their outcome may well change the present patterns in dramatic fashion, and carry us in new, unexpected directions-but not just yet. This is a not a good time for clever but cautious leaders to take bold decisions, leaping into the unknown. But it is a window of opportunity for reckless radicals to move into the open, stake out positions, and take actions that they hope will soon shape the political agenda. Their impact needs to be contained, but there are no sure-and-easy ways to do so.

In Jerusalem, the political arena is seething with rumors about an impending crisis-and will continue to do so for the next few weeks, at least. One thing is certain: Ehud Olmert’s cabinet will soon be transformed and may, indeed, be either broken or re-vitalized by the outcome of the Labor Party primaries. Its present party leader, Defense Minister Amir Peretz, has already announced that he will relinquish his current post, and demand the finance portfolio (which stands to be vacated as Avraham Hirschson, Prime Minister Olmert’s close confidant, is caught in the coils of an embezzlement case). Olmert will resist: After all, the main reason he offered Peretz the Ministry of Defense was to keep a man he saw as a populist trade union leader away from the public purse.

A more likely scenario, however, would see Peretz unseated within his own party by a general-former prime minister Lt.-Gen. (res.) Ehud Barak-or an admiral, MK Ami Ayalon, a former commander of the Israeli Navy, and later head of the Security Service (the Shin Bet), who are presently neck and neck in the polls, with Peretz trailing well behind. In that case, Olmert would have a very different political partner-and possibly, a different public climate-as a point of departure for future initiatives.

All this should be further qualified by the possible verdict of the Winograd Commission, which is almost certain to find fault with Peretz, but might also go so far as to disqualify both him and Olmert from their present positions. Then there is bound to come the report written by the comptroller-general, Judge Micha Lindenstrauss, on the so-called “abandonment of the rear” during the war, and the poisoned atmosphere between him and Olmert probably indicates that the findings will fault the government for serious failures. Finally, there are legal cases that may lead, at any moment, to a decision by the attorney general, Menahem Mazuz, to indict the prime minister, with all that this could entail.
Amid these gnawing uncertainties, those who feel certain in their causes are aggressively pursuing them, pulling at the fabric of common purpose and raising internal tensions. In recent weeks:

• The settlers’ movement, at one end of the spectrum, organized a symbolic return to the ruins of Homesh (a mountaintop village in Northern Samaria evacuated in August 2005). They chose not to stay-it was freezing, without proper shelter-but they made their point: “Nashuv lekol yishuv” (“we shall return to every settlement”). Now comes a new confrontation, over a large housing unit in Hebron, legally purchased, but provocatively located. Peretz ordered its evacuation-and now the settlers accuse him of pandering to his left-wing base, rather than obeying the law.”
• At the other extreme, trouble is brewing among the political leadership of the Israeli Arab community. The spate of radical documents denying Israel’s legitimacy as a Jewish state – the “vision” paper, the Adalah “Constituition,” and the “Haifa Covenant” (which is still unfinished)-all serve as dangerous background as the drama unfolds. The most outspoken and intellectually accomplished-and the most radical-voice among them has been MK Azmi Bishara, whose reason for refusing to return to Israel from his present stay in Jordan are well known to him, to the Shin Bet, and to a good number of journalists in Israel, but may not be published or even hinted at in Israel. Whether this leads to an indictment or exile is unclear; it is almost certain that it will stir up a storm.

This would be sad, and ironic: It may well be that at the grass roots-in both communities-there are, in fact, conciliatory trends hidden by the heated rhetoric. The settlers, after the war, found that their qualities of commitment and courage were once again embraced, and their heroes, such as the late Major Ro’i Klein-who threw himself on a live grenade, saying the Sh’ma, to save his soldiers-honored and revered. They are not keen to return to pariah status. Among young Arabs, the number of volunteers for public service (in lieu of military service, which they are not obliged to do) is steadily on the rise: in the Galilee; signs of coexistence are everywhere. All the more reason, perhaps, for radical politicians to buck these positive trends and escalate the conflict.

In the broader picture, similar uncertainties crowd the horizon. As Iran once again defies the world-with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announcing the activation of a 3,000-centrifuge cascade in Natanz-it remains to be seen how the world will react, and regional tensions are rising, complete with rumors (fanned by French warnings to Iran) of an American attack and another round of violence this summer. Again, it is the radicals who push ahead:

• Hamas is raising the stakes for Gil’ad Shalit to an unreasonable level, feeling perhaps that Olmert is negotiating from weakness;
• Hezbollah openly defies both the UN and the Lebanese government, refuses to disarm, and may seek a confrontation with the “March 14” camp in Lebanon;
• Syria, while offering an olive branch in public, continues to sustain both Hamas and Hezbollah, and almost succeeded in tying together (through a well-intentioned offer of U.S. congressional mediation) the cases of Shalit and the abductees in Lebanon.

In all, a dangerous time, well used by those who operate under Iran’s wings-while the moderate camp is torn and often inflexible. And yet, all transitions are by nature uneasy; as has already been said, within a few months, the balance may well change in ways that at this point can barely be foreseen.