Prof. Steinberg directs the Program on Conflict Management at Bar Ilan University in Israel and is a member of the Board of Directors of Scholars for Peace in the Middle East spme.org
As an early advocate of Israeli unilateral disengagement, I admit to increasing nervousness as the actual withdrawal from Gaza and four settlements in the West Bank is drawing closer. The logic that was apparent five years ago, when some of my Israeli colleagues and I began to think “out of the box” on managing the Palestinian-Israel conflict, has not changed. I speak purposefully of “managing” the conflict because the broad support necessary to solve it and achieve real peace will take many years to develop — Arafat’s death not withstanding. As the status quo promotes endless violence and is therefore untenable, this leaves disengagement as the best or even only alternative.
The removal of Israeli civilians, the army, checkpoints and other sources of friction could change the atmosphere profoundly. And if this is accompanied by continued reduction in terror, Israeli society at large will press for further disengagement in the West Bank. The removal of the Israeli civilian presence in the small area around Jenin is seen as another step toward further reduction of friction, as is the route of the Israeli security barrier that places many small settlements on the “other side” of a potential future border.
But the uncertainty and risks are now far more visible than before, highlighting the possibility that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s plan might go badly wrong. For Israelis, many of whom bitterly oppose this move, disengagement and the removal of settlements is the most profound change since the 1967 war. But while the majority of Israelis see this as a modest step in reducing friction and managing the conflict, many Palestinians see the outcome as a great victory.
As a result, instead of less violence, the withdrawal might also trigger an escalation of missile attacks launched from Gaza, causing more destruction and casualties. Hundreds of Qassam missiles and other forms of short-range rockets have been fired at Israeli targets outside of Gaza in the past two years. A number have hit houses, schools, streets and cars and killed civilians. The Israeli withdrawal could well lead to Palestinian acquisitions of more powerful missiles, capable of striking strategic targets — including ports, power plants and chemical facilities.
This is known as the Hezbollah model and projects events in Southern Lebanon as the possible blueprint for Gaza’s future. Indeed, the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 served as inspiration for considering this approach on the Palestinian front as well. But despite the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon to the international border, as certified by the United Nations, Hezbollah was not disarmed. Instead, the Iranian-backed terror group took advantage of the departure of Israeli troops and the weakness of the international community to deploy 12,000 rockets and missiles, capable of hitting Israeli targets as far away as Netanya. An unsteady deterrence relationship has prevented all-out conflict so far. But this is certainly not the outcome most Israelis had expected. They were hoping for real quiet, if not outright peace, on their northern front.
In the Palestinian case, the outlook is even more troublesome. There is no controlling power in Gaza, and the leaders of the various Palestinian terror groups, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, compete for public support through attacks against Israel.
Furthermore, in the absence of a functioning Palestinian government, there is little basis for the hope that the Palestinian leadership will spend the generous funds from the international community to create jobs, provide stability and develop an economic and social infrastructure. Indeed, the record during the Oslo period is far from encouraging. Corruption is deeply embedded in the Fatah bureaucracy, which controls the Palestinian Authority. Call it the Arafat legacy.
And among many Palestinians, the commitment to violence (“the armed struggle”) remains as strong or even stronger than was the case in 1948. With numerous armed groups still preparing attacks, both in Gaza and the West Bank, Israel is not about to take additional risks, such as releasing jailed terrorists or opening air and seaports under Palestinian control. Similarly, the predictable demands for Israeli concessions on these critical issues are sure to resume, providing further “justification” for more Palestinian violence.
In this environment, diplomatic talk about disengagement “kick-starting” the peace process is unrealistic. Most Israelis no longer believe in the myths of the failed Oslo process. A negotiated peace based on the two-state model (as presented again in the “road map”) may eventually be achievable, but this will take at least a generation. Indeed, it was this realization and dissatisfaction with the status quo that led Israelis to support a “third way” — unilateral disengagement. For me (and the majority of Israelis, according to the polls) this is still the main reason to support the disengagement experiment.
It may yet reduce the level of violence and gradually provide the calm and trust necessary to allow for further withdrawals. This is not much to cling to, but in the long history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, a little realistic optimism is as good as it gets. Unilateral disengagement is a huge gamble, but one that is justified by the hope that it will make the lives of Israelis and Palestinians a little bit better.
