As an early Israeli supporter of unilateral disengagement, I admit
that this plan, like the earlier Oslo “peace process,” has failed.
Hopes that the unprecedented move, including the dismantling of all
Israeli military bases, checkpoints and even civilian houses in Gaza
would reduce the violence and promote mutual accommodation were
naive. Almost a year after the exit, attacks against Israelis
continue to escalate, Palestinian society is in a state of advanced
anarchy and the security pledges from Egypt and Europe, brokered by
the U.S., have proven worthless.

The murder and kidnapping of Israeli soldiers by Palestinian
terrorists, who launched the attack from a tunnel dug from a house in
Gaza under the border, was the last straw. Even before then, the
dozens of rockets raining down on houses and schools every week, and
numerous other terror efforts, had already signalled the approaching
end of this unique experiment in conflict reduction. Instead of
taking advantage of the opportunity for progress, Palestinians moved
their rocket launching teams into the most densely populated
neighbourhoods, goading Israel into responding. And whenever a
Palestinian was killed, even when Israel was not involved, they could
count on political groups such as Human Rights Watch to condemn the
Israeli Defense Force, regardless of the evidence.

The role of the Palestinian population in supporting terror is
central, but the international community also bears considerable
responsibility for the latest disaster. For years, the Europeans, the
UN and others had provided massive support — financial as well as
political — to PLO leader Yasser Arafat in the hope that he would
make peace. After that proved to be a mirage and Arafat died, the
members of the Quartet (the European-inspired framework designed to
push hopes for peace co-operatively) pressed numerous schemes to
prop-up Arafat’s successors. These failed to achieve anything of significance.

Without skipping a beat, as soon as the Israelis left, the
Palestinians extended the terrorist infrastructure to encompass the
resources they had gained. A few months later, the entry of Hamas
officials, pledged to radical Islam and the eradication of Israel,
sped up this process.

As the attacks accelerated, and no evidence for a change for the
better was forthcoming, Israelis also rediscovered the mistake of
giving responsibility for their survival to outsiders. The security
arrangements negotiated with Egypt and Europe, which accompanied the
withdrawal of Israeli military forces from Gaza in August 2005, have
all collapsed.

The first agreement was signed with the Egyptians, after former prime
minister Ariel Sharon overruled many advisors, and agreed to remove
Israeli troops from the 13-kilometer border strip between Gaza and
Egypt. The IDF had been very active in stopping Palestinians from
smuggling explosives, terrorists and various anti-tank and
anti-aircraft missiles under the border. Although turning over this
responsibility to Cairo was a calculated risk, the hope was by making
this move, Israel would be seen to have ended the occupation of Gaza.
And perhaps the Egyptian presence along the border and inside Gaza
would encourage the Palestinians to turn their energies from war to peace.

In parallel, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice brokered a
separate security arrangement covering the Rafiah crossing. On Nov.
15, 2005, Rice pressed then prime minister Sharon to agree to a joint
Palestinian-European Union arrangement in this very sensitive area.
The U.S. was responding to pressures from the Europeans, who
desperately wanted a major role in what was seen as the latest “peace process.”

A short time after the agreement was signed, Palestinians bulldozed a
breach in the barrier along the Philadelphi corridor and moved freely
into and out of Egypt. The 70 European “observers” were shunted aside
and chased away by various Palestinian gunmen. As a result, the
smuggling of weapons and terrorists has grown into a torrent, and
these agreements have joined many others in the dustbin of Middle
East peace efforts.

After paying a high price for these hopes, Israelis have rediscovered
the fundamental need for direct control over their own security. This
lesson has been learned on many occasions — in 1948, when no one
protected them from a mass invasion that almost crushed the nascent
country; in 1967, when the UN suddenly removed the peacekeepers
stationed in the Sinai following the previous war; and in 1973, when
Egyptian forces were able to use weapons that the American-brokered
cease-fire was supposed to have kept far away from the front. But
after a few years, the combination of international pressure on
Israel and the hopes that perhaps there will be changes this time,
have led to another round of Palestinian attacks and a reluctant
Israeli return to responsibility for its own security.

It is still far too early to know how the return to Gaza will end.
But even if the kidnapped soldier is released, the Israeli forces
cannot simply turn around and leave Gaza, waiting for the next
attempt. Israel is unlikely to reoccupy the poor and hate-filled
cities, but the days when Palestinian groups could simply drive from
Egypt into Gaza with weapons and terrorists are over. Reliance on
outsiders — particularly Egypt and the European Union — for
security is over, and Israel has no choice but to resume control over
Gaza’s borders. This will at least help to prevent more terror and
kidnappings, and perhaps eventually convince some Palestinians that
the only option they have is to take control over their own society,
and finally make the compromises necessary for real peace.

– Prof. Gerald M. Steinberg is the director of the Program on
Conflict Management at Bar Ilan University in Israel.