Alon Ben-Meir is professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs and is the Middle East Project Director at the World Policy Institute, New York alon@alonben-meir.com www.alonben-meir.com . He is a member of Scholars for Peace in the Middle East.

For the first time, Israeli demands for ending the violence as a precondition for any progress in negotiation with the Palestinians converge with Hamas’ interests in ending the violence in order to survive politically following its overwhelming victory in the recent elections. This is why Hamas will not only extend the ceasefire, perhaps indefinitely, but also rein in other militant groups. Ironically, Hamas may find itself compelled to implement President Mahmoud Abbas’s slogan: “One gun, one law, and one authority,” helping Israel to go forward with its disengagement plans, and so further the prospects for a two-state solution.

As Hamas assumes governing authority, both its leaders and Israel’s must examine their real choices. Those who advocate letting Hamas fail on its own do not appreciate certain facts that make it impossible for this to occur without the total isolation of Hamas, an unlikely event, considering the devastating effect this will have on the Palestinian people. Whereas Israel can withhold tax monies from Hamas, supplies of foodstuffs, medicine, electricity and scores of other cooperative activities, involving economic, monetary, and security levels, must continue to flow in both directions. The European Union, after painful deliberations, will find a way to channel money to the Palestinian Authority to prevent a humanitarian crisis. And, although the United States by law cannot continue direct financial assistance (having declared Hamas a terrorist organization), the Bush administration will seek other avenues, including NGOs, to provide indirect help to the Palestinian people. In addition, the Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, have already stated that they will continue to support the Palestinians, fearing that more Palestinian suffering will provoke greater political instability and violence in the region. Finally, Syria and even more so, Iran, will not sit idly by, watching the collapse of an entity they helped create. Even though Hamas, as the governing authority, may not be allowed to handle some finances directly, it will, nevertheless, benefit because none of the donors and supporters of the Palestinian people want a further deterioration in their already dismal conditions. Another factor is that every player, Israel as well, hopes to avoid renewed violence on a large scale because it could pave the way to a third Intifadah. Therefore, Hamas is not likely to fail on its own, and may not be allowed to fail under virtually any circumstance, due to realistic fears among all the players that a considerably worse scenario would unfold. In sum, whereas Hamas on its side recognizes that resumption of violence will severely undermine its efforts to govern and may even precipitate its collapse, Israel, on its side, will have to soon conclude that, in the absence of a viable alternative, any systematic efforts to choke off Hamas could lead to anarchy and raging violence.

Given the present situation and the level of understanding, ending the violence clearly offers both sides the strongest rationale to take unilateral initiatives that will move the conditions on the ground toward, the by now, mutually desirable goal of a two-state solution. From the Israeli perspective, while ending the violence is absolutely essential to any progress in the peace process, the truth is that Israel does not care who makes up the Palestinian Authority as long as violence ends. As one top Israeli official explained to me: “We will not ask for an ID card as long as they are not known to have blood on their hands… But once Hamas form a new government, we will hold it responsible for every act of violence against Israel, regardless of its source.” By the same token, many of Hamas’ grievances against Israel can also be addressed, once the violence is ended. For this to happen, Hamas must disabuse itself and the Palestinian public of the notion that Israel will withdraw from the West Bank only under the gun. This kind of thinking has always been misguided, and it is even more so now that Hamas is in power: Under no circumstance will Israel withdraw its forces and remove settlements while violence is raging.

I believe that Hamas’ leaders understand this fundamental reality and also that, from where they sit now, similarly understand that the rules of the game have changed. Even though there is an on-going discussion within Hamas’ leadership between the hardliners and moderates about how to deal with Israel, a clear consensus is that continuation of violence must be ruled out. Otherwise, Hamas’ entire political agenda and ability to govern will be jeopardized. Because of this recognition, Hamas will (and should) most likely focus on four measures that will help it succeed in governing the Palestinian people, and to gradually move closer to opening more formal channels to Israel. These four measures are:

First, Hamas should do everything in its power to persuade Fatah to join Hamas in a coalition government. Accomplishing this will allow Hamas to implicitly accept prior agreements with Israel, expand the government’s popular base, and give Mr. Abbas a more credible voice in dealing with foreign policy matters, especially regarding Israel.

Second, Hamas should consolidate all security forces, incorporate its militia into the main Palestinian security apparatus, and impose the “one-gun law.” Other militant groups, such as Islamic Jihad and al-Aqsa Brigade, should not be allowed to operate; their weapons must be confiscated and their infrastructure dismantled.

Third, Hamas must deliver on its promises to the public by providing social services, insuring internal security, eradicating corruption, and initiating development projects that offer gainful employment to tens of thousands of Palestinians.

Finally, Hamas needs to speak in one language. Its leadership must end its habit of saying one thing to its constituency in Arabic and then twist what it said when speaking in English to suit foreign representatives or the media. No one is fooled by this practice, which only undermines Hamas’ credibility, as happened to Arafat, who was a master of such duplicity.

It is more than a little ironic that Israeli and Hamas’ interests at long last converge in a manner that could lead to a considerable progress without direct negotiations. The ending of hostilities will encourage both governments to make concessions without officially changing, for now, their public posture toward one another. In the end, a nonviolent atmosphere, absent so long, is precisely what will change the dynamic of the Israeli-Palestinian relations.