In the five years in which he served as Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon completely altered Israeli politics and the complex relationship with the Palestinians. In early 2001, when Sharon brought down what remained of Ehud Barak’s Labor government after the failed Camp David summit, Israel faced a well-planned terror campaign. Moving deliberately, even after mass terror bombings in busses and cafes, Sharon kept Israeli society united, while isolating and eventually defeating Arafat, both militarily and politically. This was Sharon’s second major success (the first was in the 1973 war), and completed his comeback following the disastrous Lebanon campaign.
But Sharon also understood the inherent instability of a stalemate, and the growing dangers, particularly from Europe, to impose an illusory “quick solution”. He recognized that it will take years or decades for Palestinian society to accept the type of compromises necessary for a negotiated settlement of the generations-old conflict. Unless Israel took major steps unilaterally to alter the gridlock that had existed since the 1967 War, it would either disappear in a growing Palestinian population, or be forced back to insecure and indefensible borders. In the past two years, Sharon who spent over thirty years building Jewish settlements took Israelis out of Gaza. Only a leader with Sharon’s credentials could have taken the traumatic step of dismantling houses without a peace treaty, and without leading to civil war. (Critics in Likud noted that Menachem Begin at least received a peace treaty with Egypt in exchange for the Sinai). This move was the Israeli parallel to Nixon’s trip to China.
Sharon did not invent the unilateral disengagement strategy, which also includes the construction of a north-south physical barrier which demarcates the de facto border in the West Bank. In fact, it was forced on him by a wide Israeli consensus that recognized that no better alternative was available. The Israeli public had become more pragmatic and centrist than its leaders, and Sharon understood that he could either accept this reality, or be swept away in its wake. He wisely chose the former approach, losing his political base in a fractured Likud, but finding a bigger foundation in the center.
And it is this large pragmatic and centrist political consensus that will continued to propel Sharon’s final political legacy for many years. Like Sharon, most Israelis have abandoned faith in grand peace processes (including the latest incarnation, known as the “roadmap”) that end in catastrophe. And, as public opinion polls have shown consistently, the majority of Israelis favor separation to the maximum possible extent, depending on security and stability details. Not enthusiastically, but as the least bad option.
However, without Sharon to lead this process, the political realignment based on pragmatists from the center-right and the center-left will probably take longer. The centrist party (Kadima) that Sharon founded when he could no longer pull the Likud with him has no visible alternative candidates for Prime Minister. Instead of the “big bang” that seemed ready to propel Sharon quickly into a new era of Israeli politics, the process is likely to proceed much more slowly and with hesitation. In the long term, the process and “facts on the ground” are stronger than personalities, but to get there, new political leaders will have to emerge and gain public support. This is bound to happen politics abhors a vacuum — but not for two or three years, unless Netanyahu finds a way to follow Sharons route.
Even if Sharon had remained healthy and done well in the Israeli election scheduled for March 28, further separation moves in the West Bank would have been much more difficult than the Gaza withdrawal. Instead of the hoped-for Palestinian moderation and emphasis on vital economic development (based on huge aid packages channeled via the World Bank), the reality is chaos and more terror. Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) is barely a figurehead, while Hamas appears set to gain power if the Palestinian elections take place as scheduled on January 24. And along what remains of the border with Gaza, Egyptian guarantees to prevent the smuggling of weapons and terrorists have disintegrated. As a result, even the most pragmatic Israelis will be far more cautious about withdrawal from areas that would bring Tel Aviv and Jerusalem into rocket-firing range.
In the meanwhile, Israelis can be expected to look hard for appropriate successors to Sharon (model 2001-2006). A strong security background is essential Israel is still at war, not only against Palestinian terror and rejectionism, but also Iranian threats of nuclear genocide. But a successful Israeli leader must also demonstrate political skills, to work closely with the Americans, and, when possible, even with Europe. Like Ben Gurion, Begin, Golda Meir, and Rabin, Sharon will leave an enduring legacy in both dimensions.
Prof. Gerald M. Steinberg teaches politics and is the director of the Program on Conflict Management at Bar-Ilan University, Israel. He is a member of the Board of Directors of SPME
