There is near universal consensus that the passing of Yasir Arafat provides an historic opening for the resumption of peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians that could lead to a peace accord. For this opening to remain wide enough until a democratically elected Palestinian leadership emerges, it is absolutely critical that groups like Hamas and the Islamic Jihad halt all violent attacks against Israel. And it is equally imperative that the Sharon government reciprocate by ending all targeted killing of Palestinians militants and incursions into Palestinian territories.

What might persuade Hamas and Jihad to agree to suspend their attacks on Israel –a condition for resuming the peace talks –on which the Sharon government will insist? I believe that the current leaders such as Mahmoud Abbas, Ahmed Qurei, and Muhammad Dahlan and others are in a position to convince Hamas and Jihad to forgo for now a permanent and formal agreement and accept instead a voluntary, temporary, and informal ceasefire. The value of such an approach for Hamas is that it requires the least justification to its constituency; it can be taken without the constraints inherent in a formal ceasefire and the intense scrutiny that goes with it. The way would be made easier too because Hamas would not have to be seen as making any apparent concession. Moreover, a voluntary halt to violent attacks could be accomplished immediately, without the prolonged negotiations and the elaborate series of agreements that go with them, which neither time nor circumstance permit. Although Hamas spokesman al-Masri said that it will continue to resist, the organization has also indicated a strong desire to participate in any future election. Indeed, if Hamas wants to be part of the newly emerging leadership, its members must take their case to the public through such participation. As most Palestinian factions, including Hamas, are seeking a unified approach–at least during the preparations for the election–Hamas’ leaders see that they will not be permitted by the current moderate leaders, especially Muhammad Dahlan, Gaza’s de-facto security chief, to be part of the elections while terrorizing Israel. In addition, they understand that the political winds have changed and although they can resume violent attacks, they cannot recapture a political opportunity that they throw away. A voluntary cessation of violence by Hamas will make it extremely difficult for Prime Minster Sharon not to make a similar gesture in response, especially if the Bush administration demands it. Ending Israeli targeted-killing and incursions into Palestinian territory will certainly strengthen the moderate Palestinians’ voices and help consolidate their power base. Indeed, by acceding to Mahmoud Abbas’ request that Arafat be buried in Ramallah, releasing $40 million in frozen funds, and permitting some Palestinian security forces to carry guns, Sharon has already strengthened Abbas’ hand. In any case, during and after the election campaign for a new Palestinian leader, as long as a temporary ceasefire continues, negotiations for a permanent ceasefire, which have been conducted on an on-and-off basis between Hamas and Egypt for the past year, will also continue.

This temporary cessation of hostilities will allow Palestinians to prepare for national elections in a calm environment that would benefit all factions, including Islamist groups. Some measure of calm will also make it possible for Israel to facilitate considerably freer movement of Palestinians within the West Bank and Gaza and in between so that they may conduct a fair and free election. To avoid undermining the popularity of moderate Palestinians leaders, the Bush administration also must be careful not to embrace publicly one Palestinian leader over another and instead simply let the political process to run its course. Nor should the United States attempt to prevent the candidacy of individuals from any Islamist group. Although Hamas gained popularity in the past few years, recent polls conducted in the West Bank and Gaza by the respected Palestinian pollster Shikaki indicate that moderate voices will have the upper hand. A democratically elected Palestinian leadership committed to the peace process remains the prime prerequisite for a positive outcome for both sides. Ending the violence will be the first critical step toward rebuilding the trust that the second Intifadah virtually shattered.

For the voluntary cessation of hostilities to endure, the United States, as the president recently stated, must play a direct, active, and continuous role to keep both parties on course before and after the Palestinian elections. There are a number of steps the administration must take in preparation for the difficult negotiations that lie ahead.

First, the Bush administration must continue to support Sharon’s withdrawal plans from Gaza and part of the West Bank and encourage the Palestinians, immediately after their elections, to embrace them, as a first step to ensure an orderly transfer of power. The administration, however, must be careful not to exert overt pressure on Sharon while he is in a difficult and delicate position with his own party over implementing the Gaza withdrawals. For example, it must understand that any additional measures by Sharon to ease the movement of Palestinians, although necessary, must not unduly risk the lives of Israeli soldiers, for this would stiffen opposition to the planned withdrawal.

Second, President Bush should quietly caution the emerging Palestinian leadership that a solution to the Palestinian refugees must be found in the context of rehabilitation and resettlement of the refugees in their current localities or in the future Palestinian state. Whatever strategy the new Palestinian leadership chooses to deal with this sensitive issue, they should not fall into the same trap as Arafat did, insisting on the repatriation of the refugees. This demand wrecked the peace accords in the summer of 2000 at Camp David because no Israeli government, regardless of its political orientation or composition, will accept a demand with the potential of changing the demographic make-up and thereby the national identity of the Israeli state.

Third, the United States must also insist that the Sharon government stop building new settlements and expanding existing ones (a) because they are inconsistent with the road map for peace, (b) raise doubts about Sharon’s and Mr. Bush’s ultimate intentions, and (c) demonstrate to the Palestinian and the Arab States that the Bush administration is not seriously committed to a genuine and evenhanded approach to finding a real solution.

Finally, once the Bush administration plunges into the negotiations, it must demonstrate absolute commitment to a positive outcome regardless of seemingly insurmountable difficulties. Only a steadfast America can navigate the long and treacherous road ahead, helping both parties to deal with the uncompromising opposition groups on each side that will do every thing in their power to torpedo progress.

In sum, a voluntary cessation of violence may be the only practical way to facilitate orderly, democratic Palestinian elections with Israeli cooperation. American, Israeli, and Palestinian leaders must do everything to achieve this modest goal if peace negotiations are to resume in earnest.

Alon Ben-Meir is professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU and is the Middle East Project Director at the World Policy Institute in New York. He is member of SPME.