The Gaza withdrawal has changed the political landscape in Israel and the Palestinian territories.
The political fortunes of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the course of economic and political development in Gaza, the prospect of Hamas participation in the Palestinian elections, the outcome of those elections, and, especially, the question of the continuation of the cease-fire, all will test the will of the players involved to build on this new development. If they fail to do so, they will squander another momentous opportunity.
Sharon has staked his entire political future on the withdrawal. His rival in the Likud party, Benjamin Netanyahu, is determined to unseat him. Sharon’s speech at the UN last week was seen by the right wing of his party as a bill of divorce. Should Netanyahu succeed in wresting the party leadership from Sharon, an early election will be called, and several things could happen. Likud may split into two, one faction led by Sharon and the other by Netanyahu; Shimon Peres’s Labor party may try a new political stunt to strengthen its shattered political base, perhaps to no avail; or other small right-of-center parties may combine to create a strong block with a Likud splinter party to stop Sharon.
But even if any of these political configurations arise, Sharon will remain the most popular leader, and he could win reelection through a new political realignment, by forming a centrist party composed mainly of Labor, Shinui, and other centrist Israelis that are in the majority.
Sharon is committed to the Road Map for Peace, and he is the only Israeli leader who can make further territorial concessions in the West Bank while actually increasing his public support. Only the resumption of violence can undermine Sharon’s position now or his prospects for reelection. For this violence not to happen, the Palestinians, Hamas particularly, must remember that traditionally and, especially since the 1993 Oslo Accord, Israelis have elected their leaders on the basis of Palestinian behavior, that is, the level of violence.
In the post-Gaza withdrawal world, violence will give Sharon’s political nemeses, Netanyahu, in particular, the ammunition they need to make a convincing enough case against him to push Israelis to the right. Violence will not only be to Sharon’s political detriment, it will damage the Palestinians politically too. As prime minister, Netanyahu will be a disaster for both sides. Only the Palestinians can prevent this.
As for the Israelis, it is important that they should understand the Palestinian political and social dynamic. There is no doubt that Hamas is a terrorist organization and as such has damaged the Palestinian people and the peace process more than any other factor in the long and painful Israeli-Palestinian struggle. It is also true that in any democracy one authority should represent the majority of the people: there cannot be separate armed militia, regardless of need and circumstance.
That said, Hamas today is not simply a bunch of hoodlums, assassins, and pillagers. Its members represent a strong constituency, more than one-third of the Palestinians in the territories. They have their own schools, health clinics, and many other institutions offering social services that the Palestinian Authority under Arafat failed to provide. They have largely adhered to a cease-fire, are full participants in municipal elections, and have for the first time opted to participate in national legislative elections, in January. They may end up constituting one-third or more of the legislative body, but then, how else but by allowing their participation in the political process can Sharon really moderate Hamas’s behavior? In fact, by this participation, Hamas implicitly accepts a two-state framework. That its members must first disarm and renounce their intention of destroying Israel are not things Israel can demand as preconditions to Hamas’s participation in the elections. Not only is this interference in the Palestinian political process, it is impractical and certainly counterproductive in the current political atmosphere in the Palestinian territories. Palestinian Authority President Abbas is correct in trying to co-opt Hamas into the political process, not simply because he cannot disarm its members without risking civil war, but because he must first exhaust all political options to gain the political and moral high ground if it then becomes necessary to do battle.
For these reasons, Sharon must now demand that Hamas should continue to honor the ceasefire, enforcing his demand by showing that without this cooperation there will be no further withdrawals or progress on easing Palestinian mobility. The reality of this threat should be evident, considering Sharon’s political struggles within his own party. Let’s also remember that notwithstanding Sharon’s repugnance for Hamas, his objections to its participation in the Palestinian elections are also for home consumption. If there is no violence, Sharon will be under tremendous international pressure to facilitate elections in which the Palestinians will vote as they see fit. Should Hamas become part of the Palestinian governing authority, Sharon could then demand that it disarm and accept a two-state solution as a precondition for political engagement and future negotiation.
Members of the Palestinian Authority would be wise to temper their criticism of Sharon and not to try to outdo Hamas in anti-Sharon rhetoric. The Authority’s focus must be on building up Gaza and providing ordinary Palestinians there with jobs and social services, creating a civil society while enhancing internal security, controlling the border crossing with Egypt, and making genuine efforts to eradicate corruption. These are the things that will enhance its standing in the polls and possibly enable it to secure a solid majority in the Palestinian Council.
Above all, the Palestinian Authority must demonstrate zero tolerance for violence. Otherwise, it will force current or future Israeli governments to continue unilateral political and territorial disengagement, with ever-diminishing prospects for a viable Palestinian state any time soon.
Alon Ben-Meir is a professor of international relations at the Center for Global Studies at New York University, and the Middle East Project Director of the World Policy Institute. The views he expresses here are his own and do not necessarily reflect the standpoint of “Globes”. He is a member of Scholars for Peace in the Middle East spme.org
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Published by Globes [online], Israel business news – www.globes.co.il – on September 21, 2005