On the 20th of September, the German Bundestag voted to dispatch 2400 German soldiers toward Lebanon. The mission has a “historical dimension,” Chancellor Angela Merkel emphasized, referring to the destruction of European Jewry that began some 73 years ago in Germany. Nowhere else, she explained, would “the special responsibility of Germany for the lessons of German history be so clear” as in the case of this mission in the Middle East. “We are not neutral,” she exclaimed to the applause of all the parties represented in the Bundestag but the post-Communist “Left Party”: “and we also have no desire to be neutral.”
The next day the Naval force put out to sea, in order to prevent the smuggling of arms to Hezbollah along the Lebanese coast as mandated under UN Resolution 1701. The rules of engagement for this mission were the subject of long discussions. Henceforth, they permit suspicious ships to be inspected not only against the will of their occupants, but also against the will of the Lebanese government. In order to demonstrate a “spirit of cooperation,” there will indeed be Lebanese liaison officers aboard the German ships. But it is “important for us,” as Chancellor Merkel put it, “that the Lebanese officers have no veto.”
Such mistrust of the Lebanese Army is justified: almost half of the Lebanese soldiers are Shiites. As late as August of this year, 84% of Lebanese Shiites rejected the disarming of Hezbollah. The head of the Lebanese forces, Michel Suleiman, makes no secret of his sympathy for Nasrallah. In July 2006, he explained that only the “continuing good cooperation” between Hezbollah and the Army could guarantee the country’s unity. According to the annual report of the Lebanese Army, support for Hezbollah is a “national and moral obligation.” Giving a veto to the Lebanese naval officers would have facilitated the re-armament of Hezbollah and again left the destiny of Lebanon in the hands of Iran. On this issue, the German government got its way.
On the 22nd of September, Hezbollah struck back – rhetorically for the time being – holding a mass rally in southern Beirut reminiscent in its staging of the Nuremberg rallies. The ostensible purpose was to celebrate the “holy victory” over Israel. In front of some hundred thousand ecstatic Shiite followers, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah first excoriated Angela Merkel for aiming “to protect Israel.” Secondly, he called for the overthrow of the Lebanese government and declared in particular Druze leader Walid Jumblatt persona non grata. Thirdly, he demonstratively rejected the UN demands for Hezbollah to disarm. No army in the world, he remarked jeeringly, is strong enough to disarm Hezbollah.
How did Germany respond to Nasrallah’s defiance? “The government does not want to respond to the verbal attack of the Hezbollah leader on Chancellor Merkel,” the government spokesperson declared: “She has no comment on the matter.” Likewise, the trio of leaders – Chirac, Putin, and Chancellor Merkel – who met at the French-German-Russian summit in Paris on September 23 said nothing. Did at least Javier Solana, Kofi Annan or Condoleeza Rice denounce Nasrallah’s threats? Not a word.
This silence speaks volumes. If Nasrallah is not even combated politically, then all the rest will be futile. It signifies: no statement of support for the critic of Hezbollah Walid Jumblatt; no expression of solidarity with the Lebanese cabinet of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, for whose overthrow Nasrallah openly calls; no defense of the Lebanese state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of violence; no reaffirmation of Lebanese sovereignty, which Iran via Hezbollah so massively threatens; and no defense, finally, of UN Resolution 1701, which Nasrallah subjects to ridicule.
The international community is keeping quiet – like a scared rabbit in front of a snake. The origin of this fear has a date: on October 23, 1983 a Hezbollah suicide bomber blew himself up in Beirut taking 214 American soldiers with him to their deaths. Twenty seconds later a second holy warrior detonated killing 58 French paratroopers. Since then, fear is always in play in discussions concerning Hezbollah. The controversy over UN Resolution 1701 makes this especially clear.
The preamble of the resolution correctly identifies Hezbollah’s attack on Israel as the cause of the recent war. Accordingly, Article 8 of the resolution demands, above all, concessions from Hezbollah: the complete disarmament of all paramilitary groups in all Lebanon, the expulsion of foreign (Iranian) military trainers acting in contravention of the will of the government; the prohibition and prevention of illegal arms imports. As soon, however, as it is a question of imposing measures on Hezbollah, the will of the International community fails. Here the fear-factor plays a role – remembering “1983” – as well as a question that derives from such fear: might one not be better off, after all, coming to a compromise with Hezbollah and its threats to destroy Israel? In short: should one cooperate with the terror militia or combat it?
This key question led in Summer 2006 to what the New York Times (August 14, 2006) described as “one of the most dramatic bouts of diplomacy that the United Nations Security Council has witnessed in years,” with in particular the USA and France facing off against one another. Thus, on July 31, French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy flew to Damascus, in order to discuss with the Iranian Foreign Minister under what conditions Hezbollah would accept an international force. The effects of this goodwill mission were not long in coming. “France is a friend of Hezbollah,” the Lebanese Minister of Labor and Hezbollah-member, Trad Hamadé, declared three days later to the French daily Le Figaro.
Thereafter, New York became the principal arena for French diplomacy. France wanted to oblige Israel to withdraw its troops before an international force is ready. The US rejected this proposal. Moreover, France and the US also clashed over the character the international force should have. The US demanded the establishment of a new force with an offensive mandate. This is exactly what Beirut and Paris wanted to prevent. Thus on August 10, Lebanon and the Arab League made clear to the UN Security Council that a “robust” mandate on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter is unacceptable for them, since “Hezbollah, which is part of the Lebanese government, would not accept a resolution that appeared to directly empower foreign forces to disarm it” (New York Times; August 14, 2006). And they get their way! From now on, the Lebanese Army was designated as the principal party responsible for all the provisions of the Resolution concerning Hezbollah. In formal terms, 1701 maintains the demand to disarm Hezbollah. But at the same time Hezbollah is accorded a de facto veto power: a concession that is successively adopted by the Lebanese government, then the Arab League, and finally the Arab-friendly France in the name of the European Union. Yes to “disarmament” – so long as it is guaranteed that it will never in fact take place.
On the 10th of August, the West had decisively to reject the demand of the “Party of God.” But instead the opposite took place. France made Hezbollah’s demand its own: Europe and Islamism presented a united front against Israel and the USA. Two days later in an interview with Le Monde, French Foreign Minister Phillipe Douste-Blazy summarized the “successes” of French diplomacy as follows: “The first is that no one talks anymore of a [new] multinational force… And then no one talks anymore of a force that will be given an offensive mandate to disarm Hezbollah. These are two new elements. They were the red lines for us.” These two points demarcate precisely what Javier Solana would go on to celebrate as the “European handwriting” in 1701.
On August 10, the USA gave in. Inexplicably, from the start Washington renounced having even just a symbolic presence of American troops in the UNIFIL and thus delegated the Lebanese front – for the moment the most important theatre in the dispute with Iran – to the Europeans.
It was the military operations of the Israelis that had put a damper on Iranian ambitions in Lebanon. The concessions subsequently made by the Europeans gave Hezbollah new strength and first made Nasrallah’s victory celebration possible. Of course, the fear of suicide bombers is understandable. But such terror will only become stronger if one does not actively combat it.
Hezbollah, in any case, made good use of its chance. Shortly after the showdown at UN headquarters in New York, it was able to impose its point of view also in the Lebanese cabinet. Thus by governmental decision, the Lebanese Army will not in any way attempt to find Hezbollah’s weapons. Even if UNIFIL soldiers catch Hezbollah firing missiles, they are not authorized to intervene. Instead, they are supposed to inform the Lebanese government.
Weapons smuggling will also continue. Once Syria made clear that it would consider the stationing of UNIFIL troops on its border as a casus belli, the Lebanese government agreed to station only its own troops. The commander of the latter declared, moreover, his intention to forego weapons searches unless definite incriminating information was available.
Was the German government so serious about preventing arms smuggling, after all? Evidently not. Angela Merkel readily accepted the Lebanese decision to refuse the stationing of German police officers on the border. In this case, the veto of Lebanese officers was not an issue. Whereas Germany with great public bombast and thousand-strong naval units purports to be hermetically sealing the ancillary route for arms smuggling along the coast, it quietly leaves the gates wide open precisely where it would be most crucial to shut them.
In light of the Iranian threats to destroy Israel, Angela Merkel is right to recall Germany’s National Socialist past and to evoke the lessons that must be drawn from it. Whoever ignores Nasrallah’s speech and the threat of arm smuggling is hardly doing justice to these lessons – to say nothing of those who try to peddle caving in in the face of terror as Europe’s new virtue in contrast to the American approach.
So far, only one country has had an appropriate reaction to Nasrallah’s provocations. Thus Mark Regev, spokesperson of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, explained that in refusing to allow his militias to be disarmed, Hasrallah is defying not only the Lebanese government but the whole international community. But wait. Israel is the only country to take seriously the UN Resolutions on Lebanon? Haven’t we seen this before?
