http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1097534.html

We can offer several arguments for and against the demand to recognize Israel as a Jewish state. The reasons in favor seem clear: On the tactical and strategic level, the demand puts to the test the willingness of the Palestinians, the Syrians and the countries of the Middle East in general, to make a quantum leap when it comes to accepting our existence. They would do so by recognizing the unique character of Israel and accepting it as a fact that should no longer be questioned. This is psychologically significant, with diplomatic-security implications whose importance should not be downplayed.

There is also the hope that formal recognition of Israel’s Jewish character will check the demand to implement the refugees’ “right of return”; clarify to the minorities in Israel their status as citizens, while drawing a red line that will emphasize the pointlessness of aspirations to undermine the Jewish character of the state, and reinforce global legitimization of the existence of Israel as a Jewish state.

However, it is impossible to ignore the suspicion that Israel’s demand for recognition also stems from an unconscious, collective factor that is very problematic. We may still be suffering from the exile-induced fear that a Jewish state will not last a fear accompanied by expressions of a lack of confidence in our strength or a surfeit of such confidence.

This is speculation, but it can explain patently irrational diplomatic-security viewpoints, on both the left and the right, which are hard to understand otherwise. If this assessment is correct then we are talking about a dangerous phenomenon that distorts our judgment. In that case, demanding Arab recognition of Israel’s Jewish character replaces purposeful action on our part to strengthen this character on our own.

And here I come to considerations for opposing the demand. It is not accepted in those parts of international law that deal with the recognition of states: A country is recognized de facto or fully without any determination regarding its essence as a secular, Catholic, or Muslim country et al. Moreover, the demand to recognize Israel as a Jewish state implies that our character depends on such recognition, which our opponents can also withdraw.

Nor is there necessarily a real connection between recognizing the Jewish character of Israel and the refugee issue. One can recognize Israel as a Jewish state and yet demand the return of a large number of refugees. On the other hand, even in the absence of such recognition Israel can and must refuse adamantly to absorb a significant number of refugees. Anyone who is willing to conduct negotiations with us in good faith will understand that, even if they do not admit it.

A particularly important consideration is one derived from the assumption that Israel wants, in good faith, to progress to as stable a peace as possible. To the extent that this assumption is correct, the demand for explicit recognition of Israel as a Jewish state adds a grave and even fatal difficulty. Because even Arab rulers who want to recognize Israel and to normalize relations with it will be unable to permit themselves to explicitly recognize Israel as a Jewish state in order to avoid undermining the stability of their regimes.

Added to the considerations for and against is the fact that our character as a Jewish state depends on us and us alone. Tactics to reinforce and deepen this character include demographic policy, a new arrangement of the status of religious institutions in Israel, accelerated conversion, genuine changes in the education system, a strengthening of pluralistic Jewish symbols combined with additional steps to consolidate Jewish identity and identification among the youth.

There is no connection between the future of our Jewish character and

recognition of this character by Arab countries. While the hope that such recognition will strengthen the stability of the peace agreements, it will be offset by nearly killing the chances of reaching an overall agreement that includes such explicit recognition.

The question therefore is whether it is possible to create a synthesis that combines the advantages of recognition without the drawbacks of the demand for recognition. I think it is. I would recommend legislating a “basic law on a constitution” that would be passed by a special majority of the Knesset, with a higher status than the other basic laws, including immunity from judicial appeal. This law will assert that Israel is a Jewish state and the state of the Jewish people as a whole, while at the same time being a democratic state of all its citizens.

Recognition of a State of Israel that has such a constitutional law means recognition of its character as a Jewish state, without any need for an explicit statement to that effect. Therefore by means of such legislation it would be possible to benefit from all the advantages involved in a demand to recognize Israel as a Jewish state and to avoid all its drawbacks. In addition, the proposed basic law on a constitution and the discussion of it, will make it clearer to us that the responsibility for our character is ours and ours alone.

Yehezkel Dror is a professor of political science at Hebrew University in Jerusalem. His most recent publication, “Political-Security Statecraft for Israel: Memorandum for Policymakers” (in Hebrew), can be downloaded at http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/docs/BM3.pdf .