The survival of Israel depends on secrecy

  • 0

In the media, Mordechai Vanunu is hailed as a hero and a whistleblower, but for Israelis who live in the reality of the Middle East, he is reviled for attempting to strip their beleaguered country of its most effective defensive capability. As a result, Vanunu, the former technician at Israel’s nuclear reactor complex who sold information 18 years ago, has almost no support in Israel. For almost four decades, the untested and undeclared Israeli nuclear deterrent option has been the pillar of national security strategy. Polls show overwhelming support for this policy among Israelis, who believe that in its absence, threats posed by the countries in the region would have made Israel far more vulnerable to attacks aimed at national annihilation.

However, Vanunu and his supporters have erased the bitter reality of history, wars, terrorism and continuing threats of mass destruction that form the basis of Israel’s policy of nuclear deterrence. They claim that if Israel were to give up this option, the dangers posed by Iran, Syria, Egypt and other regional powers would suddenly disappear.

But there is no evidence for this belief. The threats from Saddam Hussein and from Libya may have vanished for now – but they have been offset by the accelerated Iranian nuclear program, and the continued political failures of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

This is by no means a uniquely Israeli perspective. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw recently acknowledged these threats “place Israel in a different security category from any other country in the world”. Similarly, US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld explained the exceptional nature of the Israeli case: “It’s a democracy, and it exists in a neighbourhood (where many) prefer it not be there. And Israel has arranged itself so it hasn’t been put in the sea.”

For almost four decades, the untested and undeclared Israeli nuclear deterrent option has been the pillar of national security strategy.Since the mid-1960s, when the Dimona reactor became operational, this policy has demonstrated its value. The threat of an unacceptable response forced Egypt and Syria to limit their attacks in the 1973 war; it brought Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem to make peace; and it deterred Saddam from using chemical warheads in the 1991 Scud attacks against Israel. And when Iran’s radical Islamic Government succeeds in acquiring nuclear weapons, Israeli planners will increase the reliance on deterrence.

By its very nature, a policy based on ambiguity – neither confirming the existence of a weapons capability nor denying it – can only be sustained by keeping the details out of the spotlight. But Vanunu’s tale and the accompanying photographs had the opposite impact. International attention suddenly focused on exposing “Israel’s nuclear secrets”.

Beyond the strategic issues of war, deterrence and stability, calling Vanunu a whistleblower is inappropriate and misleading. This concept refers to individuals who go public with information on corrupt practices and violations of the law, enabling the constituted authorities to take over and hold the culprits accountable through due process of law.

However, in deciding to impose his personal views on the elected officials and representatives of the Israeli Government, Vanunu violated due process of law and the core principles of democracy.

Vanunu never claimed that his former employer, the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, had violated any statutes or obligations, or acted illegally or without authorisation. Unlike the governments of Iran, Iraq, and Libya, which signed and exploited the 1970 Nonproliferation Treaty, Israel has not violated any such commitment. But for Vanunu, the only factor of importance was his disagreement with this carefully considered strategy.

Similarly, the efforts to turn Israeli nuclear policy into a conspiracy are dishonest. In reality, Israel has a consistent and clearly articulated policy of ambiguity, which requires secrecy on the details, but not on the existence of this policy itself and its principles.

On the important issues related to nuclear deterrence and the costs and benefits of ambiguity, there is a great deal of public debate and analysis. Israelis are well informed and overwhelmingly support the policy of the governments they have elected.

Indeed, of the thousands of Israelis who have been involved in the nuclear program since its inception in the 1950s, only one – Vanunu – has violated the rules of the game and gone public. This is quite remarkable, and as a result it makes the singular betrayal of this public trust all the more unacceptable to the vast majority of Israelis.

In this environment, this self-appointed saviour could still provide information not previously revealed, such as the names of his co-workers.

This is the basis for the decision to stop Vanunu from leaving the country or speaking to journalists or diplomats, and for restricting his freedom of movement in other ways. The Vanunu case will continue to vex Israel, but it will not lead to a sudden change in course or an embrace of his philosophy of naive nuclear disarmament. The implementation of this messianic vision will require the end of the threat of annihilation posed by Israel’s neighbours.

Gerald Steinberg directs the program on conflict management at Bar-Ilan University in Israel. He is member of the Board of Directors of SPME

The survival of Israel depends on secrecy

  • 0
AUTHOR

Gerald M. Steinberg

Prof. Gerald Steinberg is president of NGO Monitor and professor of Political Studies at Bar Ilan University, where he founded the Program on Conflict Management and Negotiation. His research interests include international relations, Middle East diplomacy and security, the politics of human rights and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Israeli politics and arms control.

NGO Monitor was founded following the 2001 UN World Conference Against Racism in Durban South Africa, where powerful NGOs, claiming to promote human rights, hijacked the principles of morality and international law.  NGO Monitor provides information and analysis, promotes accountability, and supports discussion on the reports and activities of NGOs claiming to advance human rights and humanitarian agendas.

In 2013, Professor Steinberg accepted the prestigious Menachem Begin Prize on behalf of NGO Monitor, recognizing its “Efforts exposing the political agenda and ideological basis of humanitarian organizations that use the Discourse of human rights to discredit Israel and to undermine its position among the nations of the world.”

Steinberg is a member of Israel Council of Foreign Affairs; the Israel Higher-Education Council, Committee on Public Policy; advisory board of the Israel Law Review International, the research working group of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), and participates in the Inter-parliamentary Coalition for Combating Antisemitism (ICCA). He also speaks at a variety of high-level government sessions and academic conferences worldwide.

Publications include “NGOs, Human Rights, and Political Warfare in the Arab-Israel Conflict" (Israel Studies); "The UN, the ICJ and the Separation Barrier: War by Other Means" (Israel Law Review); and Best Practices for Human Rights and Humanitarian NGO Fact-Finding (co-author), Nijhoff, Leiden, 2012.

His op-ed columns have been published in Wall St. Journal (Europe), Financial Times, Ha’aretz,International Herald Tribune, Jerusalem Post, and other publications. He has appeared as a commentator on the BBC, CBC, CNN, and NPR.


Read all stories by Gerald M. Steinberg