Yasser Arafat’s reputation as a survivor notwithstanding, his judgment and timing have always been badly flawed.
In 1970, his attempt to overthrow King Hussein of Jordan failed and he was unceremoniously exiled to Beirut, from where he fled in 1982 following the Israeli invasion and siege in response to PLO terror attacks.
In 1991, Arafat’s embrace of Saddam Hussein following the invasion of Kuwait and prior to the US attack was a disaster, leaving the PLO isolated and close to bankruptcy.
After using the Oslo process to recover, Arafat’s stonewalling at the Camp David summit in 2000 and his gross miscalculation of Israeli resilience resulted in the terror campaign that rolled back all the political ground that he and the Palestinians had gained in the previous decade.
Since then, for more than two years “the chairman” has been confined to the ruins of his headquarters in Ramallah, surrounded by Israeli forces, while Palestinian society has spun out of control.
In response to this situation, and the absence of a serious Palestinian negotiating partner, the Israeli government under Prime Minister Ariel Sharon conceived of the unilateral separation plan and has fought tenaciously to gain political approval.
Beyond limiting opportunities for terror attacks, this policy reflected the recognition that Israel needed a third option, one that would change the status quo but was not dependent on Arafat’s cooperation.
The “land for peace” formula, developed after the Six Day War, ended in catastrophic failure under the Oslo framework, and Sharon understood that a different approach was necessary to separate the Israeli and Palestinian populations and to maintain Israel’s Jewish and democratic society.
After wrenching debates in the government, the Likud and, last week, the Knesset, the stage seemed to be set for implementing the disengagement from Gaza, albeit amid continuing opposition, and perhaps requiring a major political alignment.
BUT IMMEDIATELY after the Knesset vote another instance of Arafat’s terrible sense of timing has threatened to stop this process in its tracks. With the long-time Palestinian leader in a Paris hospital and perhaps on the verge of death, the disengagement process has suddenly been thrown open for reconsideration.
As soon as Arafat made his dramatic exit, Israelis who bitterly oppose the plan to remove settlements voiced the hope that it would be frozen.
On the other end of the political spectrum, opponents of the unilateral approach, both in Israel and outside (particularly in Europe), raised claims that with a new Palestinian leadership, negotiations could resume and a peace agreement might be possible within a short time period.
But a close look reveals the critical flaws in these arguments and the importance of continuing with plans to implement unilateral removal of settlements from Gaza as quickly as possible.
Even if the Arafat era has finally come to an end, his legacy of terrorism and rejectionism will not disappear quickly. Palestinian society may descend into even greater chaos and violence among the different factions, preventing decision-making on such core issues.
And if a stable and pragmatic leadership emerges under Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), for example, he will not instantly be able to erase the history of rejecting compromise on major issues such as refugee claims and Jerusalem.
After four decades of incitement and fictitious history, gaining broad Palestinian support for a fundamental change in these policies that recognizes Jewish claims will be very difficult. Even under the most optimistic assumptions, negotiations on a stable peace agreement will not take place for many years.
Under these conditions the logic of disengagement and the painful exit of Israeli civilian communities from the densely-populated cities and refugee camps of Gaza remains as valid as ever.
Arafat’s illness and his dramatic departure have not altered the basic conditions and analysis that have led the Israeli consensus and Prime Minister Sharon to understand the need for this fundamental change in policy.
With very limited prospects for a negotiated solution, even with a new Palestinian leadership, the concept of unilateral separation is still the least bad option for Israel – notwithstanding the risks of weapons smuggling, continuing terror attacks, and the prospect that Hamas will proclaim victory.
Arafat’s condition does not change the cost-benefit calculations.
Having gone this far down the road to gaining political support for this historic decision, a move by Sharon to suspend disengagement would be a major mistake.
Regardless of Arafat’s medical condition and the prognosis for the emergence of a stable and nonviolent Palestinian leadership, leaving Gaza is still in Israel’s vital national interest.
The writer directs the program on conflict management at Bar-Ilan University.He is member of the Board of Directors of Scholars for Peace in the Middle East.