The Syrian civil war is already in its sixteenth month with 13,000 casualties and no end in sight. Clearly, the developments in Syria indicate that while there are features in common with the political eruptions in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria, known collectively as the ‘’Arab Spring”, there are also major differences, which reflect the demographic, social, political conditions specific to each country.
MAIN FEATURES OF THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR;
A regime which has no genuine political legitimacy, due to its traditional inferior religious status, cannot reach any lasting, democratically-based dialogue with its adversaries. In the absence of such a dialogue, the regime is totally dependent on its military might in order to pacify the rebellion. In Syria, a civil war is taking place between a regime that formally professes to represent a Nationalist and Socialist ideology, — the Ba’th Party, — but is in reality a coalition of minority sects, mostly of Alawites, but also Druze, Ismailli, Shi’ites, Christians, and members of the Sunni Arab majority. The Syrian armed forces, unlike those of Egypt, do not form a real national army, but rather a sectarian-dominated force, used by the regime as an instrument for preserving minority domination. This is why the Army remains loyal to the regime and is ready to commit atrocities against the Sunnis, whom they do not consider to be their true brethren. In fact, the army units used are heavily composed of minorities, and according to credible reports, about 70% of the Syrian armed forces, composed mainly of Sunnis, are locked in their barracks, preventing them from participating in the fighting, simply because the regime does not trust their loyalty. Still, there are massive defections of Sunni soldiers, less so of Sunni officers and they are the ones who form the Free Syrian Army. This is a force which operates in small formations, and its ability to wage a full-scale battle against the units loyal to the regime is very limited, though there are persistent reports that the rebels are being supplied with some advanced arms, mainly by Turkey and Saudi-Arabia.
Smuggling of arms is very significant also from Lebanon, Iraq (by Sunni tribesmen) and Jordan. The rebels seem to have changed their tactics recently, and have engaged in terror attacks, mainly on the two centers of power in Syria, the cities of Aleppo in the North and the capital, Damascus. They have picked targets which to them represent the oppression of the Sunni population, such as intelligence centers and the offices of the Ruling Ba’th party. Their most dramatic success seems to be the assassination of General Asaf Shawkat, Assad’s brother-in-law and the main figure, alongside Assad’s brother, Maher, in the brutal anti-rebellion campaign. The level of sophistication demonstrated in these attacks, leading to hundreds of fatalities, led some observers to state erroneously, that the Syrian uprising has been taken over by Al-Qa’ida, which is a serious mistake. Al-Qa’ida operatives may be involved in some of the incidents, and some may have crossed the border from Iraq, but as an organization, Al-Qa’ida does not possess a basis of popular support in Syria, and also the states which back the rebels, mainly Saudi-Arabia and Turkey have no interest in strengthening Al-Qa’ida. Also, the alleged support of Libyan elements known to be associated with Al-Qa’ida is not verified, and, at any rate, their ability to overcome obvious logistical difficulties is very limited. The Assad propaganda machine has an interest in claiming that Al-Qa’ida is the enemy, thus trying to weaken western, particularly American, resolve to help the rebels. It is worth noting, that the Ghadafi regime also used the Al-Qa’ida bogy, but to no avail. So, while Al-Qa’idais are always on the lookout for opportunities, Syria does not seem to be a fertile ground for them. Another factor to be emphasized is that there is no evidence of any meaningful Al-Qa’ida presence in the massive popular demonstrations against the Assad regime which relentlessly continue all over Syria. Unlike Libya, where members of fundamentalist movements were influential in the political leadership of the anti-Ghadafi rebellion, the Syrian National Council, the main representative body of the Syrian rebels has members of the pro-Saudi Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, but not Al-Qa’ida sympathizers.
THE QUESTION OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION;
The Syrian uprising caught the other Arab states, as well as the leading world powers completely by surprise. If we bear in mind that the regime itself, with all its sophisticated intelligence apparatus and other instruments of repression was caught unprepared, this is no wonder. The various parties interested in the Syrian situation took their time to monitor the evolving situation, believing for some time, that it was a containable crisis, which the regime would put in order, a regime which for many years made political capital by claiming that stability in Syria depended on its staying in power.
Some weeks after thebeginning of the turmoil, Secretary of State Clinton even stated in an unfortunate interview to CBS, that Bashar Assad was a man of reform, and implied that he will weather the storm. Since then, things have changed, as the regime failed to make good on its long-held claim to be the guardian of stability. Yet the regime astutely conducts itself in a way that is designed to make it ever more difficult for others, namely the US and Turkey, to intervene in the civil war. The regime made some noise on occasions about involving Israel in a full-scale war if attacked either by the United States, Nato, or Turkey, thus injecting an element of uncertainty into the overall regional equation. The ability of the disintegrating Syrian army to attack Israel is very doubtful, but the Israelis and Americans are justifiably worried by the existence of a large cache of chemical warheads in Syria. Assad’s ally, the Hizballah in Lebanon, may not have an interest in attacking Israel, regardless of its rhetoric, but the potential and capabilities are there and should be taken into account.
The Syrians are in close contact with Iraq, a country where the US has a major stake. The Syrian-Iranian-Iraqi – Hizballah axis seems to be intact and is clearly a possible deterrent to any foreign intervention, serving notice that any such intervention could very well develop into a full-scale regional conflict, and with Russia’s continuing support to Syria, a possible global conflict. This is far cry from the situation which existed in Libya prior to the decision of US/NATO to intervene there.
Elections in France, which brought in a new government, whose foreign policy is yet to be determined, as well as elections in the US , coupled with war-fatigue, something which is clearly having a crucial impact on the decision-making process of the Obama Administration. In addition, there is another player: Turkey which is very hesitant to go it alone, and in the absence of US/NATO and also Arab League specific green light to intervene, is watching the situation from the sidelines, and while helping the Free Syrian Army, also keeps eyes open on the Kurdish Population of North-East Syria.
In perspective, the situation in Syria has not yet come to the point, where the risks of intervention, as viewed by the interested parties, outweigh the potential risks of the current situation. So long as this applies, the Asad regime has a continued lease of life, while the Syrian people continues to suffer and shed blood.
Dr . Josef Olmert teaches Middle East Politics at the University of South Carolina .He publishes on Middle Eastern Affairs.
