Israeli Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Giora Eiland served as head of the Israeli National Security Council from 2004 to 2006. He is the author of a new paper, “Rethinking the Two-State Solution” (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), in which he argues for exploration of two other alternatives: the “Jordanian option” and a “regional approach.” Regarding the latter, Eiland writes:
Because Israel and the Palestinians have to share a parcel of land that is too small for both of them, neither can make substantive concessions, creating a zero-sum game that could lead to a true dead end. The only real contribution that the Arab countries can offer is exactly what the Israelis and Palestinians need-more land. The regional approach proposed in this paper involves a multilateral swap that would produce net gains for all relevant parties. For example, this solution would triple Gaza’s size-the only way to offer a real prospect for the poor population of that area, and the only way to shift public opinion away from Hamas and toward a plan with real hope.
Eiland’s idea is not new. MESH has already featured a discussion of an even more ambitious regional land swap, and another on a trilateral swap involving Israel, Egypt, and the Palestinians. But until now, land swaps have been championed most vigorously by geographers. Eiland may be the first ex-official to propose them, even providing a map of a three-way scenario. (The map may be enlarged by clicking on it.)
Update:There are comments on this post by Nabil Fahmy, former Egyptian ambassador to the United States, and Marwan Muasher, former Jordanian foreign minister and ambassador to the United States, as well as by MESH members.
Comments are limited to MESH members and invitees.
Creative solutions to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict should focus upon and expand the points of agreement rather than conflict. The problem between Israel and the Palestinians is not the lack of space but the lack of political will. Settlement expansion has eaten up far more territory than all the suggested land swaps, and it continues. Are the Arab countries supposed to continuously accommodate Israel with land swaps as its settlement requirements grow?
The idea of territorial swaps with neighboring countries such as Egypt has already been broached before and rejected. Any serious student of the Egyptian-Israeli Taba negotiations over border markers-a dispute which ultimately went to court-knows that Egypt won’t get into land swaps. Consequently, one wonders whether retreading this idea is a diversionary tactic. in light of the low expectation that the Israelis and Palestinians will successfully conclude their negotiations this fall.
The real difficulties for these two parties lie in the West Bank, and trying to solve them through land development in the Sinai is rather disingenuous. These proposals are nonstarters which will not lead to a solution of the critical issues on the West Bank, and consequently will not provide Israel with peace or security in the long term. The so-called Jordanian option suffers from the same flaws. It creates problems for the Jordanians and does nothing for Palestinian nationhood. It may appear to serve Israel, but since it will bring neither peace nor security, it really doesn’t serve anybody.
The best lesson to be drawn from the Egyptian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli agreements is that agreements have to be based on a balance of interests, not a transient balance of power which may shift like the hot sands of the Mideast. The Egyptian-Israeli agreement survived years of difficult pressures because it provided Egypt with all its territory, so that it was never tempted to be drawn back into conflict. That reality precluded an all-out Israeli-Arab war, which has not occurred since then.
Internal Palestinian conflicts are tragic and detrimental to their cause of statehood and peace with Israel. However, many opportunities were missed before matters reached their present state. Comprehensive peace has not been achieved because Israel has gone back to “balance of power” rather than “balance of interests” politics.
It actually may be time to look at a “true” regional approach to solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict-by embracing the Arab peace initiative, which brings forward all the players and would put tremendous pressure on the nay-sayers on both sides, provided Israeli and Arab peacemakers truly stood behind it.
Nabil Fahmy was Egyptian ambassador to the United States from 1999 to 2008, and is a former political adviser to the foreign minister of Egypt.
Gen. Giora Eiland argues : “Because Israel and the Palestinians have to share a parcel of land that is too small for both of them, neither can make substantive concessions, creating a zero-sum game that could lead to a true dead end.” This argument assumes that land is at the heart of the Palestinian-Israel conflict, and that if the Palestinians had sufficient land, they would be quite happy to live alongside Israel.
Amb. Nabil Fahmy appears to agree that land is the critical issue: “The Egyptian-Israeli agreement survived years of difficult pressures because it provided Egypt with all its territory, so that it was never tempted to be drawn back into conflict.” The lesson for Israel, according to Fahmy, is that the Palestinians must get all of their land back.
The flaw in both of these arguments is that for the self-defined “Palestinians” to get “all” of their land back, Israel would have to disappear entirely, and the Jewish population either leave or agree to revert to dhimma status as subservient to Muslim rule. The state of Israel is, of course, entirely illegitimate from the point of view of Muslim Arabs. The Arab view is that, on the one hand, no land once part of the land of Islam may be alienated from Muslim control; on the other, the despised Jews must be returned to their proper place as subservient dhimma.
This is the view of Palestinians and has always been their view, both before the establishment of Israel and prior to Israeli control of the West Bank. Olmert could no more get his Palestinian “partners for peace” to agree that Israel must be recognized as a Jewish state, than he could lead a successful war or insure that Gaza did not become a terrorist territory.
Europeans, Americans, and some Israelis like to delude themselves, indulging in deep but dangerous wish-fulfillment, that Palestinians want peace and development. But Westerners all suffer from interviewer’s bias; they believe what is told to them, rather than what Palestinians say to each other. Chairman Arafat was notorious for saying one thing in English, and the absolute contrary in Arabic. But Westerners and some Israelis dismissed the Arabic pronouncement as no more than local politics. Well, they got it backwards; the English-language promises were never carried out, and the Arabic assertions proved to be action guidelines.
Of course, it is impossible to forecast the future. Past events may fit future conditions only inexactly. The future may not resemble the past. Some Israelis want to “bet the farm” that the future will be different. But weren’t those the same Israelis who told us that Gaza was going to become the new Hong Kong of the Mediterranean? Wishful thinking did not bring a bright present, and I venture to say it will not bring a bright future.
Philip Carl Salzman is a member of MESH.
Amb. Nabil Fahmy’s comment is a sad reflection of the realities of the Middle East, and his claim that “the problem between Israel and the Palestinians is not the lack of space but the lack of political will” is only partly true. The simple fact remains that even with the best of intentions and political will, the space available for Palestinians and Israelis is minute and grossly insufficient. With rapidly growing populations, every inch of territory is of vital importance for both. At the “Two-Seas Observatory” in the Galilee, a spectator can easily see the the entire breadth of the State of Israel with the naked eye-from the Mediterranean to the Sea of Galilee-and way beyond, deep into the Golan. In the “finger” of the northern Galilee, Israel is five miles wide, in the center of the country, 8.7 miles. Gaza is already one of the most densely populated regions in the world and its population doubles continually! Experts doubt whether it could ever support its population, even under the best of circumstances. In the West Bank, the land constraints are only somewhat less dire.
The idea of land swaps and even unilateral territorial contributions to the Palestinians by their Arab neighbors is thus not an outlandish one at all, but a creative attempt to “get out of the box,” in this case almost literally. The problem, however, is that it will never happen, at least not for decades, precisely because of the mindset reflected in Amb. Fahmy’s comment. The simple truth is that neither Egypt nor any of the Arab countries has ever truly cared about the Palestinians. Yes, the Palestinian issue is a very sensitive one for Arab and Muslim countries; yes, it is the rallying point for whatever residual elements of Arab unity still exist. But this is only as long as verbal support for the Palestinians costs the Arab states nothing. Pride and self-interest subsume any practical desire to assist the Palestinians.
The tiny speck of land required for the land swap ideas-an infinitesimal percentage of Egyptian territory-would be a radical boon for Gaza. Indeed, it might make the difference between its guaranteed doom as a socio-economic entity and the possibility, limited as it may be, of becoming a viable one. But Egypt will not agree to make any contribution, even of a tiny strip of barren desert and even if offered Israeli territory in compensation. Egypt simply will not do it, not for the sake of regional peace, not for its “Palestinian brethren.”
Hope, however, is eternal. Maybe some time in the future Egypt will reconsider. Positions rejected in Israel twenty years ago are mainstream today. Egypt certainly has an interest in a settlement of the Palestinian issue. As things stand now, a breakthrough does not appear to be in the cards for many years to come, at best. But Gaza will continue to boil and it will inevitably spill over into Egypt. We saw the first sign of this last year, when Gazans broke through the border wall and Egyptian troops opened fire. The rise of Hamas in Gaza-which may soon take over the West Bank as well-is as much a threat to Egypt as to Israel, in some ways more so if it continues to stoke the flames of Islamism in Egypt. Egypt will not be able to hide forever behind its wall along the Gaza border. Inshallah, it will show greater interest in contributing to a regional peace.
Chuck Freilich is a member of MESH.
The solution that Gen. Giora Eiland suggests does not address the key needs of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. The problem is not solved through giving Palestinians an added chunk of Egypt and Jordan, but rather establishing a viable Palestinian state on Palestinian territory with a shared solution to Jerusalem that would bring back East Jerusalem to Palestinian sovereignty.
Before we become too eager to dismiss the two-state solution, let us remind ourselves of the alternatives. They are all less plausible:
• One-state Solution. Bi-national state with equal rights for Arabs and Jews. It destroys the nature of the Israeli state, and is therefore a non-starter for Israel.
• Indefinite occupation. This would fuel frustration and violence, and will not be acceptable to the international community.
• Unilateral withdrawal. Israel would leave areas of the West Bank that it does not want, leaving open the issues of Jerusalem, borders and settlements. This has already been tried in Lebanon and Gaza, and did not result in the weakening of organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah. This solution will further strengthen the radicals, weaken the moderates, or force them to take still more radical positions.
• Relinquish security/political control to Egypt and Jordan. This assumes Egypt and Jordan are willing to cooperate in a solution that would serve Israel’s needs but leave Palestinian and Arab needs unaddressed. It also ignores two basic facts: (1) It ignores the needs of 3.5 million Palestinians who want to exercise self-determination and not be controlled by any other party; and (2) it ignores the wishes of all Jordanians, from the extreme right to the extreme left of the political spectrum, both East Jordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origin, who have no desire for such a solution, albeit for different reasons. Jordanian thinking on this issue has evolved dramatically since 1967, while Israeli thinking among many on the right has not.
• Rename Jordan and call it Palestine. This option has always amused me the most, because it assumes the Jordanians, Palestinians, Arabs and the Muslim world are so naïve that they would accept a state outside Palestinian borders, as if the 3.5 million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza do not matter, not to mention the 5.5 million Jordanians, the status of Jerusalem, etc. What about renaming California as Mexico because of the large number of Hispanics there?
• Time. Rabin was the first major Israeli politician to speak candidly about this in his speech before the Israeli Knesset when Oslo B was passed shortly before his assassination. If the two-state solution is made impossible, the radical argument is that time will take care of the problem. In 2025, Israel will be surrounded by 380 million Arabs, and it will have a majority of Arabs in the area under its control. Its future is clear. If the Arabs are pushed towards accepting solutions that only address Israel’s needs and ignores their own, I assure you the “time” solution will be adopted not just by the radicals, but by everyone in the Arab world.
A two-state solution is not only in the best interests of Israel, it is also possible. It is possible not through a separate Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, in which organizations such as Hamas are major players, but between Israel and the Arab Peace Initiative. It is perhaps useful to remind ourselves of what the Arab Peace Initiative offered Israel in return for full withdrawal by Israel from Arab territories occupied since June 1967 and the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.
• A collective offer to end the conflict with Israel. As a former ambassador to Israel, I witnessed firsthand the importance of this clause to the average Israeli, who remains concerned that Palestinians or Arab states might make further claims on Israel or its territory even after Israel withdraws to its pre-1967 borders and a solution is reached to the refugee problem.
• Security guarantees for all states in the region, including Israel. This is a significant offer because for the first time, Israel is assured that its security would be guaranteed not only by neighboring Arab states but by all Arab states.
• A collective peace treaty and normal relations with Israel. This signaled full recognition of Israel and normal relations similar to those between an Arab state and any other state in the world.
• An agreed solution to the refugee problem. For the first time, the Arab world committed itself to an agreed solution to the refugee problem, addressing Israel’s concern that Arabs would demand that four million refugees would be sent to Israel.
A political solution already exists to the conflict. It has been already negotiated among the parties. Despite all the violence and political impasse of the last six years, not one Arab state has withdrawn its signature from that initiative, a testament to its resilience.
Today, the gradual approach to peacemaking has exhausted its possibilities, simply because it has allowed the opponents of peace ample time to derail the peace process, something they have done repeatedly and effectively. The time has come to abandon this gradual approach, and go for a comprehensive settlement whose parameters have been largely defined through a number of frameworks starting with the Clinton parameters. Separate peace agreements between Israel and the Palestinians or the Syrians might not satisfactorily address key issues such as the positions of Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran regarding such agreements. A comprehensive agreement with the Arab world, in which the Arab Peace Initiative serves as a key term of reference, would address all Arab aspirations, including an end to the occupation and the establishment of a two-peace solution, as well as all Israeli security and other needs.
Marwan Muasher served the government of Jordan as deputy prime minister, foreign minister, ambassador to the United States, and first Jordanian ambassador to Israel.
Amb. Marwan Muasher, speaking with great experience and authority on the Palestine issue, makes a strong case for the two-state solution and the Arab Peace Initiative as a guarantee of regional security. In doing so, he dismisses alternatives to the two-state solution. For example, he rejects “indefinite occupation,” which “would fuel frustration and violence, and will not be acceptable to the international community.” And he dismisses unilateral withdrawal, which “has already been tried in Lebanon and Gaza, and did not result in the weakening of organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah. This solution will further strengthen the radicals, weaken the moderates, or force them to take still more radical positions.”
However, a related possibility, much favored by doves of many colors, is “containment,” often recommended as an alternative to harsher measures-for example, in response to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, the coming nuclear Iran, and the once-again expansionist Russia. Yet this alternative is never mentioned as a legitimate and viable option for Israel. Why not? True, containment might drive Palestinian moderates to more radical positions-if there were any Palestinian moderates in reality rather than in our dreams.
But let us say, for a moment, that Israel is prepared to consider a leap of faith, giving up its control of the West Bank and accepting statehood for the Palestinians, in exchange for security guarantees from the Arab states. Now the attitudes of the Arabs states toward Israel have never been all that friendly, and the actions of the Arab states have been relentlessly rejectionist and hostile. On what basis could Israel have faith in guarantees from Arab countries? How is Israel to know that the Arabs are sincere and can be counted upon? The practical question, then, is what concrete and serious confidence-building measures would the Arab states undertake, prior to any Israeli concessions, to establish their good faith bona fides?
I have a few constructive suggestions. The Arab states could:
• agree to peace treaties with Israel, following the good example of Jordan;
• act to control and undermine annihilationist forces such as Hezbollah and Hamas;
• establish free trade with Israel;
• accept Israel as a Jewish state, just as there are Muslim states, and insure the Palestinians to do the same;
• and admit Jews as residents and equal citizens in Arab states, including Palestine.
These confidence-building measures would reduce the long-existing atmospheric contamination in the region, defang the Palestine conflict, and contribute to a two-state solution.
Philip Carl Salzman is a member of MESH.