Foreword

In mid-December 2009, Member of Knesset Tzipi Livni, Israel’s former foreign minister,

was due to arrive in London and make a speech at a Jewish National Fund (JNF) event,

held at the Hendon Hall Hotel in London. Having had a warrant issued for her to be

arrested for alleged war crimes while serving as a minister during the Second Lebanon

War and Operation Cast Lead, Livni canceled her plans and never came to Britain. A clip,

still available on YouTube,1 shows two and a half minutes of a demonstration held in front

of the hotel. This is a rather small demonstration; the few dozen protesters chant slogans

such as “Zionists are terrorists” and “Free Palestine.” They are holding signboards referring

to “Apartheid in Palestine,” and calling to bring “war criminals” to justice and to boycott

Israeli goods.

A closer look reveals that these signboards either carry the logo of the British Muslim

Initiative (BMI), a main Muslim Brotherhood front in Britain, or of the Palestine Solidarity

Campaign (PSC) and its Boycott Israeli Goods (BIG) Campaign. Despite the small number

of participants, top UK Brotherhood (Hamas’s parent movement) figures are featured

such as like Dr. Kemal Helbawy, Muhammad Sawalha, and Zaher Birawi, alongside top

PSC figures such as Betty Hunter. In the clip, Hunter says they will pursue “these people”

wherever and whenever they can. She also tells the crowd about a decision taken the

same week by the British government for supermarkets to label Israeli-settlement goods,

and says they have to ensure that “this small step…is turned into a huge movement of

boycotting all Israeli goods.”

Both the warrant for Livni’s arrest and this demonstration, organized by the same

coalition, tell in a nutshell the story of the last decade, in which Britain has become the

main leader of an international effort to deny Israel’s right to exist in its current form.

This campaign is rooted in a network that includes rather strange bedfellows: hard-line

Islamists, mainly led by Muslim Brotherhood members and supporters, along with far-left

socialists, each having their own splinter groups that cooperate in the struggle against

the Jewish state. For many years Britain has been a stronghold of the Brotherhood; its

main publications, as well as the main publications of its Palestinian branch, Hamas, have

been issued there, instead of in locales such as Cairo or Amman where doing so would be

prohibited. Far-left movements have also been active in Britain for many years.

By taking advantage of Britain’s political freedoms and legal system, which allows

designated “war criminals” to be brought to justice there, by working through both the

country’s civil-society system and politics, these groups have been able to mobilize an

anti-Israeli campaign in the country. Furthermore, by joining forces against the War

on Terror proclaimed by President Bush after the 9/11 events, and against the British

participation in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, they have succeeded to elevate and

“mainstream” their efforts. In the process, a focus has been placed on the media based in

Britain, whether electronic media outlets such as the BBC or Sky, or print media such as

The Guardian, which today is read globally in the English-speaking world on the internet.

London, it should be noted, is also a hub for major Arabic media outlets with influence

across the whole Middle East, such as Al-Hayat and Asharq Alawsat. Thus, this campaign

also functions on a global scale. Hence, it is imperative to scrutinize the British hub of

delegitimization in order to understand its sources and how it reaches out to the rest of

the world.

This article will first consider the background of both the Islamic and leftist camps, then

map the main organizations active in the delegitimization efforts, and finally focus on

those who help “mainstream” these efforts.

Before beginning, I would like to thank a few friends and colleagues: Michael Ezra and

Paul Bogdanor for guiding me through the tangled history of British socialism in the last

decades; and Dave Rich for his great help in various matters. The British political blog

Harry’s Place also served as a most useful source of information. To them and others, I am

grateful for helping me put the pieces of the puzzle together.

Part I: The importance of ideology

Part of the problem with understanding the phenomenon of delegitimization, even after

the organizations promoting it are mapped out, is that most political observers are not

fully acquainted with the groups that are involved. The Muslim Brotherhood, for example,

has been at the center of a large debate in policymaking circles in both the United States

and the UK over whether it should be regarded as a moderate Islamist alternative to

Al-Qaeda and other violent groups or as a precursor for all modern Islamic terrorism.

Therefore, any effort to map out the sources of delegitimization must first examine

the ideologies and background of its constituent elements. Subsequently this paper

will consider how these groups, which were never at the center of British politics, have

managed to “mainstream” these efforts and acquire the impact that is being witnessed

today.

1. The Society of the Muslim Brothers (Brotherhood)

I. General introduction

The Society of the Muslim Brothers (Brotherhood) was established in Egypt in 1928 by

the young schoolteacher Hasan al-Banna. Banna sought to reunite the Muslim nation

(ummah) following the fall of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, the division of the

lands of the Middle East between the Western empires, and the abolition of the caliphate

in 1924. In the process of constructing a new society, Banna took inspiration from both

Islamic and Western ideologies.

Banna viewed Islam as a comprehensive order (nizam shamil) that encompasses all

aspects of life. His vision aspired to mobilize a gradual sociopolitical and militant process,

with Islamic revival implemented initially by individuals and families, and then by the

entire nation; this would be followed by political participation, which, in turn, would

facilitate militant jihad, thus enabling “Western imperialism” to be driven out from Muslim

and Arab lands.2 The basis of the revival was a return to the salaf (the early period of

Islam, which incorporated the Prophet and the four “rightly guided Caliphs”) and to Islam

through the Quran and hadith. The Quran and hadith, however, were to be reinterpreted

using modern, “reformist” terminology, in order to suit the modern era. For Banna, the

route to Islamic revival passed through active proselytization (da’wah), mainly focused

on middle-class and lower-middle-class youngsters and students. His followers were

recruited into da’wah groups and study circles comprising small numbers of activists (up

to forty), who developed loyalty to the group, the Society, and its leader.

At first, the Brotherhood mainly concentrated on establishing educational, welfare, and

religious institutions. The Brotherhood, however, also developed a “secret apparatus”

that came to engage in political assassination and terrorism against senior Egyptian

officials. Starting in 1936, after the outbreak of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, the

Brotherhood launched a campaign that included anti-Zionist/anti-Semitic incitement

in mosques, the collection of zakat money, and more. It introduced its “Ten Thousand

Volunteers” campaign in 1947-1948, which enlisted volunteers to participate in the

fighting in Palestine and ended after Banna’s death (in 1949) with the 1953 international

Islamic conference in Jerusalem. Focusing on Palestine, the conference’s resolutions

stated that the issue “should be considered the inescapable and immediate duty of all

Muslims to the limit of their capabilities,” adding that peace or any dealings with Israel

should be considered “punishable treason.”3 Ever since then, those who grew up in the

Society’s circles have seen themselves as the Islamic spearhead working for Palestine.

The Brotherhood’s main ideologue in the early 1960s, Syed Qutb, further increased the

revolutionary dimension of the Muslim Brotherhood, making the revolution part of Islam

itself. He gradually developed a theory under which the whole world is in a situation

of a new jahiliyyah (ignorance), where neither the rulers in Egypt nor the religious

establishment could be called real Muslims and even the Western world had realized

that Western civilization was unable to present any healthy values for the guidance of

mankind.4 Qutb maintained that only a place where an Islamic state is established, shari’a

is the authority, Allah’s rules are observed, and all the Muslims administer the affairs of the

state through mutual consultation can be considered the Land of Islam (Dar al-Islam); the

rest of the world is the Land of War (Dar al-Harb).5

II. The internationalization of the movement

Branches of the Brotherhood were opened in several countries in the early stages

of the Society’s existence (1928-1954). However, the main catalyst in the process of

internationalizing the movement was Nasser’s “ordeal” (mihna) in 1954, which occurred

despite the assistance they gave him in seizing control of Egypt. Many were arrested,

killed, deported, or fled Egypt. Today the Brotherhood claims to be represented in more

than eighty countries around the world. Many of those who fled relocated to Saudi

Arabia,6 where they played a key role in establishing two leading Islamic universities, The

Islamic University of al-Madinah (1961)7 and the King ‘Abd al-’Aziz University (1967), as

well as several international umbrella organizations aimed at spreading the da’wah, such

as the Muslim World League (MWL, founded 1962) and the World Assembly of Muslim

Youth (WAMY, founded 1972). Many current Islamist leaders either graduated from the

two universities or took part as youngsters in WAMY’s activities around the world. Both

the MWL and WAMY came under investigation in the United States after the 9/11 terrorist

attacks. Government officials believe they have helped to spread Islamic extremism

around the world as well as sponsor terrorism in places such as Bosnia, Israel, and India.8

Saudi Arabia also provided shelter for Syed Qutb’s brother Muhammad, who both taught

and published the important works written by his brother and by himself. Some of the

prominent followers of the Qutb brothers went further to create the “Qutbist trend,” which

gave birth to terrorist organizations in the Middle East during the 1980s and brought

about the foundation of Al-Qaeda toward the end of the decade. Today the “official”

Muslim Brotherhood itself includes both Banna and Qutb camps, with the relatively

new Supreme Guide (al-Murshid al-’Am) Muhammad Badie, elected in January 2010,

representing the latter camp. However, Banna still remains the most important historical

theorist of the movement.

Another large group of Brotherhood members went to Qatar where they laid the

foundations for the Education Ministry, teaching at all stages of schools and awakening

the Islamic trend in the country until the early 1980s.9 Today the Qatari Brotherhood plays

a major role in the structure of the Society’s affiliated bodies worldwide, mainly through

its leader, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who has been living in Qatar since 1961. Qaradawi,

who joined the Brotherhood in Egypt at an early age, was able to raise himself to the

level of an international leader. He is supported by the Qatari emir and by wealthy Gulf

businessmen, thanks to his major efforts in developing the field of Islamic finance and the

religious validation he provides to Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and others committed

to jihad against Israel and Western “occupation.”10 Today Qaradawi enjoys worldwide

exposure via Al Jazeera TV, which he oversees, and in which he has his weekly program

Shari’a and Life (al-Shari’a wa-al-Hayat); until recently he also oversaw the prominent

Islamist portal IslamOnline. Both outlets were established by the Qatari emir in 1996 and

1997, respectively.

The great success of the “Qatari Islamists” even prompted a famous Kuwaiti Islamist

thinker, ‘Abd Allah al-Nafisi, to write an article in 2007 in which he called for them to take

the lead. In his view the Egyptian mother organization, which had become a “burden,”

should disband altogether.11

A third, much less organized group of Brotherhood activists moved, as students or

refugees, to the United States and a number of European countries, including West

Germany. It was this group that sparked the critical phase of the dissemination of the

Brotherhood ideology on a global scale. Their status as students provided them with

the environment to meet each other, while Western liberties gave them the freedom

to cultivate and nurture their worldview, first among fellow-Muslims and later among

non-Muslim scholars and leftist oppositionists. Thus, according to Muhammad Mahdi

‘Akef, the recently retired Egyptian Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide, the Brotherhood

“established itself in Europe” in the 1950s.12 Gradually members and followers of this

ideology joined forces to spread the spirit of the da’wah in the West. Sometimes they

were joined by the Brotherhood’s main facilitators who were supported by Saudi Arabia

and other wealthy Middle Eastern countries, such as Sa’id Ramadan, Hasan al-Banna’s

son-in-law. In several cases they also cooperated with members or followers of similar

Islamist ideologies. For several decades they opened and developed educational, welfare,

and religious institutions in the United States and Europe that followed the teachings

of the Brotherhood’s ideology. Step by step, constituting the “visible” face of Islam, they

became the “natural” engagement partners for officialdom. Official engagement gradually

endowed them with the aura of being the “mainstream” trend of Islam in the West, to the

extent that they have now, over a relatively short time, assumed the guise of the Muslim

“establishment.”

III. Adaptation of Islamic jurisprudence to life in the West

From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, Brotherhood leaders developed an interest in the

Muslims living in the West. Gradually the theologians’ perception of the West changed; it

was no longer perceived as Dar al-Kufr (the Land of Unbelief ) or Dar al-Harb (the Land of

War). Instead the West was viewed as Dar al-Da’wah, and sometimes even Dar al-Islam,

where Muslims have the right to live under shari’a law.13 A new legal concept of fiqh alaqaliyyat

(the minorities’ jurisprudence) was introduced by both Sheikh Qaradawi and

the U.S.-based Sheikh Taha Jaber al-Alwani, focusing especially on aspects of daily life

of Muslims residing in the West.14 European umbrella organizations started to emerge,

mainly under the religious patronage of Sheikh Qaradawi, placing under their wing

educational, cultural, religious, economic, and political lobbying organizations that adhere

to the Brotherhood’s ideology. In 1989, the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe

(FIOE) was established. Today it lists twenty-eight member organizations based in many

of the EU countries, but also in non-EU ones such as Kosovo, Turkey, Moldova, Ukraine,

and Russia.15 In 1997, Qaradawi also established the FIOE’s Dublin-based theological wing,

the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), with the aim of “issuing studies

and fatwas on the problems facing the Muslims in Europe, either directly or indirectly.”16

Several times Qaradawi expressed his belief that Islam will take over Europe not by war

but, rather, by its da’wah efforts.

Qaradawi went a step further in 2004 and also established the International Union of

Muslim Scholars (IUMS), which includes around five hundred Islamist scholars from across

the world. It was launched in London in July 2004, when Qaradawi was invited by thenmayor

Ken Livingstone to speak at County Hall. The founding conference was attended

by the secretary general of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Ekmel

Eddin Ihsanoglu. In his opening address Qaradawi stressed that the fall of the Islamic

caliphate had ended any unified reference for all Muslims, and the IUMS was therefore

intended to create “an international Islamic reference for all Muslims that oversteps local

juristic assemblies.”17 From an examination of the writings of Banna to those of Qaradawi,

it becomes clear that the Muslim Brotherhood did not envision Islam taking part in a

multicultural society in Europe but instead hoped to become the dominant force on the

continent. Qaradawi stated in 2002, for example, that Islam would “return to Europe as

a conqueror and victor, after being expelled from it twice….” He qualified this by adding:

“Perhaps the next conquest, Allah willing, will be by preaching and ideology.”18

IV. Palestine, Hamas, and the Oslo agreements: A new phase

As noted, the Muslim Brotherhood has long been involved in the Palestinian issue. In 1987,

Hamas was established as a “branch of the Muslim Brotherhood chapter in Palestine.”19

A step forward seems to have been taken in light of the signing of the Oslo agreements

in 1993. In October 1993, less than a month after the public signing of the accords,

approximately twenty members of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestinian Committee20

gathered together in Philadelphia to discuss how best to proceed.21 The meeting paved

the way to channeling money to Hamas by using Brotherhood-affiliated charities around

the world, the most famous of which was the Texas-based Holy Land Foundation (HLF),

whose trial recently ended in the full conviction of its heads and their long imprisonment.

In late 2000, shortly after the outbreak of the Second Intifada in Israel, Sheikh Qaradawi

himself established the Union of Good (Itilaf al-Khayr), a coalition of European Islamic

charities, now also designated in the United States for transferring funds to Hamas.22 Most

of these charities, however, still operate. Qaradawi’s connections with the Qatari emir are

best viewed by the American wording of this designation, which states that the Union was

“an organization created by Hamas leadership,” failing to include his name in it.

In February 2010, the Qaradawi Students Forum, led by several prominent Brotherhood

and Islamist leaders, was launched in Qatar to promote his ideas and works around the

world,23 and help establish his wasati (“middle way”) approach as a whole new trend. In

his speech, Qaradawi expressed his thanks to the emir and the people of Qatar “for having

accepted me and allowed me to do my work on an international scale.” He further thanked

the emir in person for his “firm support” and a “committed and bold stand,” stating that

without this, “the U.S. authorities would have included my name in the list of persons who

support terrorism.”

In the past few months, it seems Qaradawi is getting closer to the Turkish government

as well (the AKP ruling party represents the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey). On 31 May

2010, the same day the flotilla was raided by Israel, the IUMS issued a declaration that

included a message of blessing to President Erdogan, and called on the Arab and Islamic

countries to support Turkey’s tourism and divert their investments to the country.24 Finally,

Qaradawi is also thought to be close to the Kuwaiti emir Sheikh Sabah, who in May 2010

hosted the 25th anniversary of the International Islamic Charitable Organization (IICO), an

international, Kuwaiti-based charity founded by Qaradawi.25

Similarly to Nafisi’s suggestion, the process of the Europe-based, Qaradawi-leaning

Brotherhood organizations taking the lead from the Middle Eastern Brotherhood seems

to have de facto taken place in the last two decades. European countries as well as EU

organizations, eager for dialogue with Muslims living in their countries, often perceive

these organizations as the authentic voice of Islam, a nonviolent counter-option to Al-

Qaeda. Hence these organizations engage in official dialogues and positions, whereas

the Middle Eastern Brotherhood continues its decline. A good example of this process

can be seen in a long article by Muhammad al-Hazmi, the Yemeni MP who was pictured

carrying a dagger on the Mavi Marmara. Hazmi, a member of the Brotherhood-aligned

Al-Islah party, was one of those sent to represent the party. One of his recollections,

before the flotilla’s departure from Istanbul, is that they were taken to celebrate the FIOE’s

anniversary.26

2. The British far left

The history of the far left in Britain is complex, murky, and includes the establishment

and splitting of many groups and subgroups. It has not yet been properly explored. The

following pages note the most important historical developments relevant to the subject.

I. The Socialist Workers’ Party (SWP)

The most important and relevant group is the Socialist Workers’ Party (SWP), which

began in September 1950 as a splinter- group of thirty-three members expelled from the

Revolutionary Communist Party because of their opposition to Stalinism. They started

publishing a duplicated paper called Socialist Review, and in 1951 held a founding

conference of what was called the Socialist Review Group (SRG). The group adopted as

its essential theoretical basis three documents written by its founder “Tony Cliff,” which

regarded Russia as a “bureaucratic state capitalist regime.”27 Tony Cliff is the pen-name of

Yigael (later Yig’al) Gluckstein, who left Palestine in 1943 after being active there in the

illegal Palestine Revolutionary Communist League. In 1953, Gluckstein’s brother-in-law

Mike Kidron arrived in Britain from Israel and became responsible for the group’s political

agenda, serving as the editor of the paper.

Because of their small number they decided to adopt an entryist approach and work

within the Labour Party, which they considered a source of recruits, especially the young

members of the Labour League of Youth. “The SRG was, throughout the fifties, a purely

propaganda group,”28 so it reached the beginning of the 1960s with not many more

members than it had in 1951. However, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND,

see part II), which was begun in 1958, grew rapidly and in 1960 and 1961 organized

marches with about a hundred thousand participants, many of them young working-class

people. The SRG saw this as a chance to find new audiences for its message; its supporters

were active in the CND actions, took part in the demonstrations, and in 1964 it attained

a membership of two hundred. A new journal, International Socialism, was launched in

1960, and once again the party took its name from the paper and the SRG became, at the

end of 1962, the International Socialism Group (IS).

During the 1960s, two of the founding members of the anti-Zionist, anti-imperialist

Israeli Matzpen movement came to London, Akiva Orr (1964) and Dr. (now Prof.) Moshe

Machover (1968). The Matzpen movement called for the “de-Zionization” of Israel, stating

that Zionism is not the right solution for anti-Semitism and persecutions against the

Jews29 but rather a colonialist and racist movement, which provides the basis for the

expulsion of the Arabs from their lands and depriving them of their national rights in

Palestine. Israel, therefore, was perceived as an “agent” of imperialism, serving as its

watchdog in the region.30 Both Orr and Machover became acquainted with prominent

left-wing intellectuals, and their book (with Haim Hanegbi) The Class Nature of Israeli

Society was published in 1971 by Pluto Press, at the time the publishing arm of IS.31 The

Socialist Worker (IS’s paper) also published articles by the two: “Racist Israel heading for the

apartheid camp” (30 June 1973) and “Middle East War: the blame lies at the Zionists’ door”

(13 October 1973, titled as a “statement” by their Israeli Revolutionary Action Committee

Abroad, ISRACA). The Soviet Union, which supported the establishment of Israel in 1948,

changed its attitude toward it quite soon and began to regard it as an agent of American

imperialism. Following the 1967 war, it broke its relations with Israel and launched a

zealous anti-Israeli propaganda campaign.

A similar view is reflected in a 1986 pamphlet titled Israel: The Hijack State, America’s

Watchdog in the Middle East. It was written by John Rose, one of the leading members of

the group, which was finally renamed the Socialist Workers’ Party (SWP) in 1977 “for purely

internal reasons, to give members a sense of progress, the better to conceal the fact that

there had actually been a retreat” in membership throughout the 1970s.32 In any case, by

the early 1970s, “opposition to Zionism had become one of the axioms of correct left-wing

anti-imperialist thinking.”33

II. The International Marxist Group (IMG)

The International Marxist Group, the official Trotskyist section of the Fourth

International, Unified Secretariat, emerged in the mid-1960s, after a number of

phases. It started off as a splinter-group from the British Communist Party, which

adopted the entryist approach and joined the Labour Party around the journal The

Week. In early 1968, after several splits, the group, now named the Internationalist

Group, renamed itself the International Marxist Group (IMG). Throughout the

late 1960s and early 1970s, the IMG established a certain base among radicalized

students, often coming into violent conflict with the police. Its newspaper,

Socialist Challenge, first appeared In 1977. In 1981, it reverted back to entryism and

submerged itself within the Labour Party, supporting its left wing. In December

1982, the Group changed its name to the Socialist League and in 1983 the name of

its associated newspaper changed to Socialist Action.

In 1985, a minority split from it and formed the International Group, which later

became the International Socialist Group. The rest of the members split into two

groups, one of which eventually formed the Communist League while the other,

still defining itself as Trotskyite, became the Socialist Action (SA), called after

its publication. It numbered relatively few people, but its involvement in many

campaigns helped it exert larger influence than its size warranted. SA’s greatest

influence probably came through its loyalty to Livingstone, Labour mayor of

London from 2000 to 2008, who in 1985 took the group’s leader John Ross to be his

economic adviser, and throughout his tenure employed many of its members in

high positions.34

Another important figure in these circles is Tariq Ali. Born in 1943 in Lahore (now

in Pakistan), Ali became politically active at an early age. His parents sent him to

study in Britain, and in 1965 he became president of the Oxford Student Union. At

the time the Vietnam War was at its height, and he was involved in the movement

against it; on graduating he led the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign.35 In the late 1960s,

Ali left the Labour Party and joined the IMG, becoming one of its leaders. However,

since the group’s entry into the Labour Party in 1981, he devoted himself to writing

– books on world history and politics, novels, and screenplays; at the same time he

continued to take part in antiwar campaigns and speak and write against the United

States and Israel.

In the late 1990s, Socialist Action adopted the entryist approach again. One of their key

objectives was to put their people in positions of responsibility in other organizations.

3. Forming the “red-green alliance”

I. The Muslim Brotherhood in the UK arena

Islamist/Brotherhood-affiliated activities in the UK go back to the early 1960s, and are a

subject for a much wider research. However, as previously noted, theologically Britain and

the West were perceived as Dar al-Kufr or Dar al-Harb. Thus, most of the organizations that

operated in the Muslim arena concentrated on students and other temporary residents

in the country, aiming to provide them with “a home away from home” and focus on

educational and other da’wah activities. The situation changed in the late 1980s following

the “Rushdie Affair”, which marks the beginning of the visible stage in politicizing religious

identities in Britain. This coincided with the changing perception of the West and the

new focus on Muslim minorities living there; new organizations started to emerge, and

political Islamist organizations established the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs,

which in 1997 formed into an umbrella organization, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB).

In addition, the first half of the 1990s saw the arrival in Britain of top Middle Eastern

Brotherhood figures, under the policy later referred to by French intelligence as

“Londonistan.” As part of this policy, jihadi leaders and prominent Islamist scholars

and activists found shelter in the country. Such Brotherhood leaders were Rachid al-

Ghannouchi of Tunisia (who came to Britain from France), ‘Azzam Tamimi of Jordan,

and Kemal Helbawy, who in 1994 came back from Pakistan to become the “Muslim

Brotherhood spokesman to the West.” Helbawy (born 1939) joined the Muslim

Brotherhood in Egypt at the age of twelve. His rather extensive biography also includes

key roles in establishing main da’wah frameworks jointly with members and followers of

the Brotherhood and other Islamist trends, such as the World Assembly of Muslim Youth

(WAMY) in 1972, or the Institute of Policy Studies in Pakistan.36

At around the same time, however, major disputes took place in the ranks of the “official”

Brotherhood in Egypt, which was divided after the failure to form the Al-Wasat political

party. It was also unclear who exactly the “spokesman” should represent. Sheikh Qaradawi,

on the other hand, started to gain international influence through the newly established

Qatari-Islamist media outlets mentioned earlier. Thus, in 1997, Helbawy officially retired

from the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood37 and started to focus on the European arena.

Helbawy played a leading role in establishing the two main Islamist frameworks in Britain,

the aforementioned Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) and the Muslim Association of Britain

(MAB), set up that year. At this stage he could join forces with the younger generation

of Brotherhood activists in the country such as ‘Azzam Tamimi, Anas Altikriti (son of Dr.

Osama al-Tikriti, current head of the Iraqi Islamist Party, which represents the Brotherhood

in Iraq), Soumaya Ghannouchi (Rachid al-Ghannouchi’s daughter), and a few Hamas

activists who found asylum in Britain as well, the most senior of whom was probably

Muhammad Sawalha.38 In 2000, the now former head of the Syrian Brotherhood, Ali

Sadruddin al-Bayanouni, also arrived in London as a refugee and joined their activities.

Gradually, a stronghold of exiled Brotherhood leaders and their sons and daughters was

formed (sometimes referred to by the Arab media as the “London Ikhwan”), striving to

transform the Brotherhood into a de facto international movement. The Brotherhood acts

using different fronts and names, among them charities or ad hoc groups and websites,

mostly operated by the same set of people.

II. Early beginnings

From an early stage after World War II, British leftist elements tried to appeal to the new

groups of Muslim, Hindi, and Sikh immigrants, mostly unskilled laborers, who mainly

arrived from the Indian subcontinent. Gradually, Asian immigrants started to form their

own trade unions. The alliance between the white workers and the Asian trade unions

was “built on a secular basis, with religion regarded as a private matter and secondary

to the general struggle against the forces of capitalism.”39 Cooperation between the

left and newly formed Asian youth movements and other organizations remained on

a secular basis. The situation began to change, however, in the 1980s. As a result of the

multiculturalism policy initiated by the British government, the character of the political

struggle changed, and near the end of the decade its focus shifted from immigration to

faith schooling.40 In addition, as mentioned, the “Rushdie Affair” marks the beginning of

the visible stage of Islamic politicization.

At the same time, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left room for the emergence

of radical Islamic groups internationally, and Muslim youth movements began to receive

support from those groups that were established in Britain.41 Over the coming decade,

both sides gradually realized they had common enemies: the capitalist-imperialist

United States, and Israel. Already in 1994, Chris Harman, one of the most significant of

SWP’s thinkers and for many years editor of its papers, wrote an essay, later published

as a pamphlet, titled The Prophet and the Proletariat.42 In this work Harman maintains

that “Islamism is the response to the ravages of Imperialism…”43 and also that “Islamism

has arisen in societies traumatized by the impact of Capitalism.…”44 Israel is described

as “what began as a European settler colony under British sponsorship…as the State

of Israel, an untrammeled dictatorship over the people of Palestine, continually

dispossessing people of their homes and land….”45 This work was later described as “a

pioneering Marxist study of political Islam that helped to arm the SWP for the debates and

struggles after 9/11 and thus preparing socialists to combat war and islamophobia.”46

III. 9/11 and the Stop the War Coalition

For many in the West, the 9/11 terrorist attacks marked the beginning of a new era, in

which Western countries are also subject to major attacks. For British far-left activists,

however, the reading was different. Al-Qaeda and the growth of terrorism were not

perceived as a “result of actions by uniquely evil people” but, instead, as

a symptom of major political problems in the world: the growing threat of a

new imperialism which walked hand in hand with neo-liberal global capital;

the injustices in Middle Eastern countries, stretching from the monarchies and

dictatorships which ruled virtually all of them (usually backed by the West) to

the occupation of Palestine by Israel; and the inequalities of the world which

led increasing numbers of young people to see the Western powers as their

enemy.47

The War on Terror, declared by President Bush soon after the 9/11 events was, for the first

time, a war “not against a state or an ideology…or even a religion, but against a method,”

and its definition and difference from legitimate resistance were not clear enough for

these activists.48 They wished to see the 9/11 events treated as a crime, whereas it was

clear to them that the War on Terror meant the opening of two fronts, in Afghanistan

and Iraq. Furthermore, unlike the times when the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, led by

Tariq Ali, had mobilized people around the country, this time British troops were directly

involved, and in the leftist activists’ view, the “well-known influence pro-Israeli groups

have on US foreign policy, played a major part in shaping Bush’s policy towards Iraq.”49

So, less than two weeks after the 9/11 attacks, a meeting took place in London, called

“Stop the war before it starts,” in which the main speakers were from the SWP, SA, and

CND along with Labour MP Jeremy Corbyn and Tariq Ali.50 Joint antiwar motions were

able to unite the ranks of the different bodies that took part in the meeting, and within

a very short time the Stop the War Coalition (StWC) was launched, gradually building

its short-term and long-term influence. The StWC’s rather extensive principles, such as

defending civil liberties and opposing any racist backlash, appealed to many sharing the

antiwar cause and attracted the Labour left, members of the antiglobalization movement,

formally nonpolitical campaigns such as the CND, and the trade unions, which were

gradually “swept” into the activism.51

The general public first became aware of the MAB in April 2002 when it organized a large

rally in central London “in solidarity with the Palestinian people…facing Israeli aggression

of epic proportions,”52 during which Helbawy, Tamimi, and other Muslim, Palestinian

activists and left-wing politicians involved in the StWC spoke. The demonstrators called

on the British government to “work ceaselessly to stop the war crimes of the Zionist

state of Israel against the unarmed and defenceless Palestinian people,” bring the then

Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon before the War Crimes Tribunal, and impose arms and

trade sanctions against Israel, referring to the “moral and legal obligation” the British

government had toward Palestine, “as it was the major contributing element which

facilitated the occupation of its lands by the Zionists.”53

The official connection between the two sides was made in September that year, when

both were planning demonstrations for the same day – the StWC against the forthcoming

war in Iraq, and the MAB to mark the anniversary of the Second Intifada. Despite many

hesitations, both sides agreed to come together and organize a significant march. The

rally was the first of over twenty, co-organized by the StWC and the MAB, in which the

slogan “No war in Iraq…Free Palestine” was created by the MAB.54 Over the years, the

slogan extended itself to include opposition to attacking Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Iran.

The alliance between the two sides, it should be noted, is tactical, not strategic. The MAB

refused to affiliate with the StWC, instead offering equal partnership, on the MAB’s terms.

According to Anas Altikriti: “MAB spoke to Stop the War and we said to them, we will

join you; however we will not become part of your coalition, we will be a separate and

independent entity but we will work together with you on a national basis as part of the

anti-war movement.” This also reassured the MAB that it retains its full independence, able

to shape the agenda while not letting the left take over.55 Nevertheless, much mutual

influence is seen on both sides, mainly by applying similar terminology to the subjects

of interest. Thus, the MAB slogan “Palestine must be free, from the river to the sea” is

now ubiquitous in anti-Israeli demonstrations in the UK,56 but the Palestinian situation is

described more as involving human rights and postcolonialism.

4. Expanding the alliance: The Cairo conferences 2002-2007

Originally titled “The Cairo Conference against the US Hegemony and War on Iraq and in

Solidarity with Palestine,” and later “Popular Campaign for the Support of Resistance in

Palestine and Iraq and against Globalization,” these annual conferences were organized

by the International Campaign against U.S. and Zionist Occupation, bringing together

participants from the far left, anti-Zionists, radical Arab nationalists, and militant Islamists.

Five conferences were held from 2002 to 2007; the sixth, scheduled to take place in March

2008, was called off by the Egyptian government. The leftist side was usually represented

by delegates from the SWP, the StWC, and the Scottish Palestine Solidarity Campaign,

together with delegates from British trade unions and the British antiwar movement (and

later the Respect-Unity Coalition). The Islamist side included, among others, delegates

from Hamas, Hizballah, the Muslim Brotherhood, and other radical organizations.

The atmosphere in all five conferences was extremely anti-Western and anti-Zionist.

Speeches and declarations were based on the theory that globalization, imperialism,

and occupation are the enemies of world peace, and that the United States and Israel are

chiefly to blame for most local and world problems. A central theme in every conference

was improving the tactics and strategies to boycott the state of Israel and Israeli products,

and each conference concluded with a declaration that usually included solidarity

with the Iraqi and Palestinian resistance; statements regarding the U.S. strategy aimed

at undermining the social, political, and economic progress of the Arab countries and

tightening its control over the world by democratic, economic, and military means;

strong condemnations of aggressive Israeli policies and its U.S.-enabled genocide in the

Middle East; building bridges between leftist and Islamist movements against imperialism

and globalization by organizing a variety of worldwide protests, demonstrations, and

campaigns against global imperialism and strengthening the antiwar movement;

spreading the culture of resistance; boycotting Israeli, American, and British products and

developing an economic and political boycott of the Zionist state.

The first conference, of December 2002, may have been the outgrowth of the Baghdad

conference that took place in May 2002, chaired by Tariq ‘Aziz, then Iraq’s deputy prime

minister and a close adviser of Saddam Hussein.57 Ahmed Ben Bella, leader of the

resistance to French colonialism and first president of independent Algeria, was elected as

the conference’s president, and John Rees of SWP and StWC became the European vicepresident.

58 As part of the efforts to gain popularity and unity, the conferences themselves

were followed by demonstrations in Cairo. Thus, as Rees notes, a demonstration held

after the first conference in front of the Qatari embassy to protest its decision to allow

American troops to deploy on its soil toward attacking Iraq, “helped raise the confidence

of the radical movement in the most important city in the most important country in the

Arab world.”

Soon after the first conference, and in direct response to it, a number of antiwar sibling

conferences were convened. They included the Japan Conference of May 2003, organized

by the International Solidarity Forum, which produced the Tokyo Declaration, the

Jakarta Peace Consensus that took place in the same month, and the Beirut-based,

Hizballah-run International Strategy Meeting of September 2004. In all these and

other antiwar conferences members of the StWC participated,59 and gradually, others

considering themselves part of the antiwar movement attended as well. Rees concludes:

“The Cairo conference remains a unique meeting point for those fighting imperialism in

the Arab world and the rest of the international movement that acts in solidarity with

them.” Today, many SWP members are proud of their achievement in “integrating Muslims

into political life.”60

5. Moving to politics: The RESPECT-Unity coalition

The RESPECT Coalition (standing for Respect, Equality, Socialism, Peace, Environment,

Community and Trade Unionism) was formed in 2004, after George Galloway, vicepresident

of the StWC since 2001, was expelled from the Labour Party following many

controversial statements he had made in opposition to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Respect

was formed as a broad-based leftist alternative to the Labour Party by Muslim and leftwing

groups in England and Wales, most prominently members of the MAB and MCB

together with the SWP.61 Respect was unique in bringing together not only secular

Muslims but also Islamists with the British left. Lindsey German, “convenor” of the StWC

and parliamentary candidate for the Respect Party, justified this alliance by referring to

the leftist principle of defending the oppressed, stating that after 9/11, racist attacks on

Muslims were far worse and Muslims in Britain were experiencing a witch-hunt.62

Respect’s founding declaration begins by referring to the antiwar movement, saying that

“the greatest mass movement of our age has brought us together.”63 It states further: “We

have marched in unprecedented numbers against war, against racism, and in defence

of democracy and civil liberties. Our views are shared by millions, often a majority

of the people in this country. Yet no establishment politician, and very few elected

representatives of any kind, will lend their voice to this movement.” Respect, however, as

also noted by Shain, did not focus just on the war but followed a similar agenda to Stalin

in the 1930s, who created the Popular Front. Respect sought to appeal to “pensioners,

students, trade unionists, Muslims and other faith groups, socialists, ethnic minorities

and many others who were deeply disappointed by the authoritarian social policies and

profit-centred, neo-liberal economic strategy of the government,” claiming a “crisis of

representation.”

Respects says it believes

that there is an alternative to imperialist war, unfettered global capital, and

the rule of the market. We aim for a society where wealth is created to meet

the needs of the people and not the profits of the corporations. We aim to

organise opposition to all forms of inequality and injustice, including the

increasing abuse of human and democratic rights. We aim to oppose actively

the destruction of the environment, inherent in the profit system, which

threatens the future of the planet.64

So far, Respect achieved its biggest success in the May 2007 local elections, when

it managed to enter eighteen councilors around the country. However, the months

to follow saw a split between Galloway and his loyalists and the SWP, and in the

2010 general elections Respect did not enter any MPs to the parliament, winning

altogether 33,251 votes or about 6.8 percent of the total vote in the country.65

As already referred to, the MAB and BMI also enjoyed good relations with London’s former

mayor Ken Livingstone. Toward the 2008 mayoral elections, they tried to mobilize the

Muslims in the city to vote for him, first by signing a public letter in The Guardian titled

“Give Ken a third term: The interests of London’s Muslim communities would be best

served by re-electing Livingstone as mayor,”66 and later by opening the Muslims4ken

blog,67 of which Anas Altikriti was proud for mobilizing the community and identifying

itself by the faith of its target audience.68

The StWC’s success in mobilizing the antiwar/anticapitalism movement has probably

caused some tension within the ranks of the SWP. In early 2010, after Lindsey German

had been asked by the Party’s Central Committee not to speak at a local StWC event in

Newcastle, and under the claim that the party was segregating itself, sixty members,

among them the main figures of the StWC resigned.69

Nevertheless, politicizing the Muslims in Britain is perceived as one of the SWP’s major

achievements in the last few decades. As explained by Arun Kundnani, editor of the Race

& Class journal: “The role of the anti-war movement and the coalitions it fostered between

Islamists and the Left have obviously been central to this [politicization] dynamic and

given a wide range of Muslim groups a level of confidence to speak out on issues such as

civil rights and foreign policy, despite the fear of being associated with terrorism.”70 Salma

Yaqoob, a close political ally of Galloway, says that:

The dominant character of Muslim radicalisation in Britain today points not towards

terrorism or religious extremism, but in the opposite direction: towards political

engagement in new, radical and progressive coalitions that seek to unite Muslim with

non-Muslim in parliamentary and extra-parliamentary strategies to effect change.

What is unique about British Muslim radicalism in the European context is the degree

to which it has overlapped, intertwined and engaged with indigenous non-Muslim

radicalism post-9/11…[a] sea change…has taken place in the transformation of Muslim

ideas of citizenship through participation in the anti-war movement.71

Part II: The main organizations involved in the

campaign

1. The Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) and the British Muslim

Initiative (BMI)

The subject of the MAB’s affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood was brought to

discussion in the British Parliament several times both by representative bodies of the

Jewish community, who highlighted its contribution to current Islamic anti-Semitism, and

by British politicians concerned about its role in shaping the lives of Muslims in Britain.72 In

November 2010, MP Alistair Burt, a parliamentary under secretary of state at the Foreign

and Commonwealth Office, stated that:

We are aware of reports which suggest that there are significant historic linkages

between the Muslim Brotherhood, its overseas affiliates and Hamas. Historically

the Brotherhood has presented Hamas as a legitimate resistance movement for the

Palestinian people. The Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) are the Brotherhood’s

representative in the UK. MAB in the UK publically [sic] rejects violence and state that

they work for wider Muslim integration into British society.73

Ahmad Sheikh, who served as the MAB’s president in the mid-2000s, says they are “not

ashamed” to admit that they share some of the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood,

but insisted: “We have no link with any international organization outside this country.”74

It was the MAB that invited Sheikh Qaradawi to his famous London visit in 2004, during

which the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) was launched. The leaders of its

offshoot, the British Muslim Initiative (BMI) denounced the British government’s decision

in February 2008 not to allow Qaradawi to obtain a visa to come again as “disgusting

and outrageous,” saying it was “carried out to appease a few high-ranking pro-Zionists in

the Department of Communities and Local Government and right-wing politicians and

media.”75

The MAB states that it is “dedicated to serving society through promoting Islam in its

spiritual teachings, ideological and civilising concepts, and moral and human values

– all placed in the service of humanity.” It “works hand in hand with sister Muslim

organisations, civic institutions, and political bodies to achieve the positive integration

of Muslims in the wider British society.” It “cooperates with others in tackling the complex

and intractable issues affecting our society like drug addiction, rising crime, failure in

education, the spread of racism and Islamophobia, and violence – whether organised

or individual, regardless of its motives,” and, like a typical organization based on Banna’s

working methods, “seeks to realise its goals through its various organisational units; most

importantly, Youth and Students, Women, Media, Public Relations, Education, Dawah, and

Scouts.”76

In reality, as already discussed, the MAB also played a major role in forming the political

alliance with the British left, mostly manifested by the younger generation of its

Brotherhood activists. Rajib al-Basil, an Egyptian journalist and blogger, explained that

the MAB has two main political goals: to guide the Islamic awakening in Britain, and to

raise the political awareness of the Muslims in Britain and make them more involved in

the political process.77 In one of the joint rallies with the StWC (27 September 2003), the

large numbers of participants, the high level of organization, and the media and political

attention received, as with a previous rally, prove that the Muslims in Britain are on their

way to becoming an active lobby in British politics, having reached the stage of being

able to influence the government and oppose its policy – peacefully – in matters where

they see British and Muslim interests contradicting each other.78

Al-Basil further praised the close cooperation with left-wing politicians and the slogan

linking Iraq and Palestine. Within the MAB, however, a generational divide emerged

with regard to political participation, with the older generation fearing it might harm

their da’wah work. Thus, in December 2005, a new president and executive board were

elected, to reflect the older generation’s regaining of its power. “Pitting the pious against

the political firebrands,”79 this led to the formation of the British Muslim Initiative (BMI) in

2006 by Sawalha, Tamimi, Tikriti, and a handful of others who wanted to ensure that their

political activism, particularly in the antiwar movement, did not die away.80 Although the

nature of this split is unclear, the MAB has since reverted to focusing on various aspects of

da’wah activities. Tikriti described the differences between the two organizations:

The MAB is a grassroots organisation established almost 11 years ago, and

I had the honour of being amongst its founding members. I am a member

of MAB and was its president in 2004, although I no longer hold a leading

post within it. BMI is a political organisation founded by a group of activists

in 2006. It does not have a membership, nor does it cover aspects of a British

Muslim’s life beyond politics (such as MAB does). I am one of the founding

members, and currently spokesman for BMI.81

The BMI adopts some of the far-left terminology, saying it seeks to “fight racism and

Islamophobia, combat the challenges Muslims face around the world, encourage

Muslim participation in British public life and improve relations between the West and

the Muslim world.”82 In order to put its name out, the BMI first initiated the IslamExpo,

a large cultural affair that was intended to introduce Islam to the British public as a

global culture and faith, shed light on the achievements of the Muslim civilization,

create stronger foundations for Muslims to understand their heritage and develop

their identity, encourage positive interaction between Muslims and other groups, and

promote multiculturalism.83 Most of the costs for the event (just over GBP 1 million)

were covered by the Qatari National Council for Culture, Arts and Heritage, an arm of the

Qatari government.84 Opened on 6 July 2006 by then-London mayor Ken Livingstone

and the Conservative lord Sebastian Coe, the event was widely covered by the British

media. Andrew Murray, national chair of the StWC (and director of campaigns and

communications for the Transport and General Workers’ Union), wrote an article titled “We

need a new alliance: Muslims and the left in Britain have much to celebrate together.”85 In

it he describes IslamExpo as a “marvellous cultural and political festival” and dwells on the

main points of the “common agenda”: anti-imperialism; equality of individuals, undivided

on grounds of race; freedom; and civil liberties.

In 2008, as part of the internal British debate on the place of Islamist-government

cooperation, the then minister of the Department of Communities and Local Government

(DCLG), Hazel Blears, instructed that no minister should attend the second IslamExpo (also

funded by Qatar). She explained:

As a minister dealing with this every day, I can tell you there is no easy answer

to the questions of when, who and how to engage with different groups.

When my predecessor Ruth Kelly became Secretary of State, she made it clear

that the Government would not do business with any groups who weren’t

serious about standing up to violence and upholding shared values, and that

has been our approach ever since.

Take the Islam Expo at the weekend. I was clear that because of the views of

some of the organisers, and because of the nature of some of the exhibitors,

this was an event that no Minister should attend. Organisers like Anas Altikriti,

who believes in boycotting Holocaust Memorial Day. Or speakers like ‘Azzam

Tamimi, who has sought to justify suicide bombing….86

Seumas Milne, The Guardian’s associate editor and perhaps the most senior British

journalist who supports the Islamist line, wrote in his column about this decision that the

“organisers of IslamExpo – who have shown themselves to be committed to pluralism and

ready to engage in a dialogue with their harshest critics – have been handed the political

and moral high ground. The New Labour and Tory frontbenchers…on the other hand,

have been left looking craven, small-minded and unable to face up to some of the most

pressing demands of our time.”87 In the last few years, the BMI has participated in several

campaigns that spoke about peace, tolerance, and countering racism.

In July 2006, leading figures of the BMI also launched a new Arab TV channel, Al Hiwar

TV,88 aiming to target “Arab audiences across the world with a special emphasis on

Europe’s growing Arab contingent.”89 Broadcasting from London, the channel offers a

variety of programs to teenagers, adults, and older persons. The programs, so far mostly

on the level of studio discussion, touch upon the daily issues of Muslims in Europe, the

abovementioned religious conception of fiqh al-’aqqaliyyat, a special weekly Palestinian

Panorama, and more. People such as Tamimi and Altikriti lead the channel, joined by

others such as Zahir Birawi, who serves as its head of programs.90 A special weekly

program called Reviews (muraja’at) presents interviews with various Arab personalities

who have played a historic role in “struggle, thinking or politics” regarding all aspects of

ideology. Within this framework many prominent Muslim Brotherhood leaders around the

world have been interviewed. At the beginning of 2007, as part of the efforts to release

the BBC correspondent Alan Johnston who was being held in Gaza, Mayor Livingstone

chose Al Hiwar to make an appeal for him. The channel was estimated on that occasion to

have “around 2 million viewers across Europe, the Middle East and north Africa.”91

In October 2009, Rachid al-Ghannouchi, a frequent guest in the channel’s programs, said

that a Quranic phrase,92 “to strike terror into the [hearts of the] enemies,” referring to the

treatment that unbelievers should receive, “is amazing, because preparing power and

strength does not mean to kill the others but rather to prevent them from attacking or

carrying on aggression against you. That is why I quite like the Qassam rockets. During

the war they did not kill anyone on the other side, they scared them only. It is a civilised

weapon as it serves the purpose, it creates balance in power because Allah says not to

exaggerate killing….” Ofcom, the British TV regulator, ruled that “Given the programme

essentially permitted a guest in a discussion to praise the use of bombs, without

challenge, Ofcom believed that there was insufficient justification for including the

comments. As a consequence, the broadcaster failed to comply with generally accepted

standards in breach of Rule 2.3 of the Code.”93

2. The Palestinian Return Centre (PRC)

The PRC presents itself as “an independent consultancy focusing on the historical, political

and legal aspects of the Palestinian Refugees.”94 Specializing in the “research, analysis, and

monitoring of issues pertaining to the dispersed Palestinians and their internationally

recognized legal right to return,” the PRC offers “expert advice to various actors and

agencies on the question of Palestinian Refugees within the context of the Nakhba – The

catastrophe following the forced displacement of Palestinians in 1948 – and serves as an

information repository on other related aspects of the Palestine question and the Arab-

Israeli conflict.”

The PRC states eight aims for its activity, which cover the issue of the right of return

from current, historical, humanitarian, legal, and political perspectives; endeavoring

to strengthen a distinct Palestinian identity while preventing attempts to resettle

Palestinians in other countries; and supporting the work of existing organizations such as

UNRWA. The PRC is reported to have participated in the Durban Anti-Racism Conference

in August 2001 under the United Nations’ auspices. In the conference, which equated

Israel with South Africa’s apartheid, the PRC delegation took part in the work of the

“refugees and displaced committee.”95 It is also a member of the Palestinian BDS National

Committee (BNC).96

The PRC was officially established in 1996 by Prof. Salman Abu-Sitta,97 who writes

extensively about Palestinian-refugee issues. Abu-Sitta is reported to have phrased the

motto of the global Right of Return Movement, saying that it was an “inalienable and

sacred right,” and he made his life’s mission “documenting the nakba” and “ensuring as

well that the memories and identity of the occupied homeland are never lost.” Abu-

Sitta often equates Israelis with the Nazis, and asserts that the “Palestinian Holocaust

is unsurpassed in history.” “For a country,” he further states, “to be occupied, emptied

of its people, its physical and cultural landmarks obliterated, its destruction hailed as a

miraculous act of God, all done according to a premeditated plan, meticulously executed,

internationally supported, and still maintained today, is no doubt the ugliest crime of

modern times.”98

While Abu-Sitta seems not to be playing any official role in the PRC today, the current

trustees – Majed al-Zeer, Dr. ‘Arafat Shukri (also known as ‘Arafat Madi), Zaher Birawi,

Ghassan Fa’war, and Majdi Aqil – reflect a clear Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated background.

At least some of them have also been described in the past by Israeli sources as Hamas

members. A few are also members of Interpal, a UK-based charity, and member of the

Qaradawi-initiated Union of Good, which has been designated by both Israel and the

United States for channeling money to Hamas.99 Subhi Saleh, an independent Egyptian

MP identified with the Brotherhood, states in his CV that he is an “adjunct fellow” (‘udh

murasil) of the PRC.100

The current leadership remains faithful to the unconditional right of return, and recently

launched an attack on the outgoing director of UNRWA’s office in New York, Andrew

Whitely, who in a conference called on Palestinians to “acknowledge the fact that the

probability of their returning to ‘Palestine’ was low,” saying “they would do better to

abandon the ‘cruel illusions’ that they would someday return to their homes [i.e., in

Israel],” and “to start debating their own role in the societies where they are.”101 The

PRC responded by sending a letter to UNRWA’s commissioner general to remind the

organization “of its responsibility taking particular note of the historical context in which it

emerged,” saying that “Palestinian refugees all across the world are outraged and bitterly

disappointed by the immoral and irresponsible comments. Mr. Whitely, holding such a

responsible post in New York, should have known better than to be a mouth piece of

Israeli propaganda,” and that “the right of return is legally guaranteed by all international

laws and this right is natural, non-negotiable and inalienable.”102

In April 2010, it is worth noting, the PRC held a poll in association with two organizations

– in Lebanon and Syria – on UNRWA’s image as perceived by Palestinian refugees in those

two countries. The poll found that while 92 percent of those asked supported UNRWA’s

continued provision of its services, the wide majority were not satisfied with the services

it currently offers in any area.103 On the other hand, the PRC seems to be important to

UNRWA. In December 2009, for example, the PRC hosted a conference titled “UNRWA and

the Future of Palestinian Refugees,” which was also attended by UNRWA officials.104

The PRC works in both the civil and political areas. Described by Dr. Ghada Karmi, a

prominent Palestinian, fiercely anti-Zionist writer, as “one of the most successful Arab

organisations in Britain,” it publishes research-oriented material, provides much data on

its own website, and also has established a Palestinian cultural center in London, “the first

of its kind.”105 On the political side, it conducts lobbying work on Palestinian issues and

seems to be rather close to the Labour Friends of Palestine. Recently the PRC launched

Abu-Sitta’s Atlas of Palestine (1917-1966) in an event that brought together “journalists,

academics and activists.”106

One of the most important of the PRC’s initiatives is the annual Palestinians in Europe

conference, first convened in London in 2003. Eight conferences have been held so

far in different European capitals; in the last few years the conference is said to be

jointly organized by the PRC and the General Secretariat of Palestinians in Europe

Conference. The conferences hosted a wide range of speakers, including some from the

Palestinian Authority, but also others known for their opposition to peace such as Farouq

al-Qaddumi. Hamas officials also were usually invited, but in most cases their entry was

denied. For example, in this year’s conference, Hamas legislator Dr. ‘Aziz Duweik was

mentioned, along with the Israeli Arab sheikh Ra’ed Salah, as being “at the forefront of

speakers at the conference…”;107 however, the latter’s visa was eventually revoked.108

In an interview to Al Jazeera in May 2010 (prior to this year’s conference), al-Zeer

described the PRC’s plans for the year, which included the launching of an annual “Nakba

48” month by eight Palestinian organizations “covering the map of the Palestinian

diaspora”: the PRC, the American Palestine Right to Return Coalition,109 three Syrian and

two Lebanese organizations, and the High Committee for the Defense of the Right of

Return in Jordan.110 One initiative by the Free Gaza Movement’s cofounder Paul Larudee,

organized jointly by the PRC, the American Palestine Right to Return Coalition, and the

Free Gaza Movement, includes a three-hour demonstration to be held in front of Israeli

embassies on 15 May (Israel’s Independence Day) in Western capitals, holding keys to

their homes in Palestine. The year 2011, Larudee added, will focus on fighting the Israeli

settlements and security fence, and on the Palestinian prisoners.111

A number of remarkable resolutions were accepted in the Palestinian conferences, such

as presenting Jerusalem as the Arab cultural capital across Europe in 2009, focusing on

the issue of the Palestinian prisoners in 2010, but even more notably, the formation of the

European Campaign to End the Siege on Gaza (ECESG) in late 2007 or the beginning of

2008,112 in order to “mobilize the greater European community in opposition to the siege

on Gaza.”113

The ECESG is “an umbrella body of non-governmental organizations across Europe that

advocates the fundamental right of the Palestinian people in Gaza to live in peace and

dignity without being subjected to any form of collective punishment such as the cutting

of supplies of food, fuel and medicine or their denial of free access to travel outside Gaza

Strip.”114 This group emerged in the headlines, having been one of the main organizers of

the Freedom Flotilla in May 2010. Its head is the aforementioned Dr. ‘Arafat Shukri (also

known as ‘Arafat Madi), the PRC’s operational director, and, at least until recently, it shared

the same contact details as the PRC. Shukri said in April 2010 regarding the flotilla that

“Conditions are ripe to make this flotilla the ‘tipping point.’”115 On its website, the ECESG

names thirty-four NGOs “forming the campaign,”116 the wide majority of which have

been analyzed by Israeli sources and found to be close to the Muslim Brotherhood and

the Union of Good.117 The website further names thirty individuals (“VIPs”) supporting

it, mainly members of parliaments and the European Parliament, who mostly seem to

belong to far-left parties.118

In January 2010, the ECESG initiated a visit of fifty MPs and MEPs to Gaza. Upon returning,

UK MPs issued an Early Day Motion to Parliament stating “that this house welcomes the

work” of the ECESG for organizing the delegation.119 The ECESG also lobbied against

Israel’s acceptance to the OECD,120 with no success.

3. The Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC)

The Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC) was established in 1982, at around the time

of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. It claims to be an independent, nongovernmental,

nonparty political organization with members from all faiths and political tendencies

across Britain, and increasingly throughout the world, who have all come together to

work for peace and justice for the Palestinian people. These include students, faith groups,

trade unions, and many other campaigning, cultural, and political organizations in Britain,

Europe, and worldwide.121

According to the PSC’s Memorandum of Association, it was set up to campaign for eight

purposes: the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people; the right of return for

the Palestinian people; the immediate withdrawal of the Israeli state from the occupied

territories; against the oppression and dispossession suffered by the Palestinian people;

in support of the rights of the Palestinian people and their struggle to achieve these

rights; to promote Palestinian civil society in the interests of democratic rights and social

justice; to oppose Israel’s occupation and its aggression against neighboring states; and

to oppose racism, including anti-Jewish prejudice and the apartheid and Zionist nature of

the Israeli state.122 It is, however, important to note that the PSC’s general stance regarding

Israel’s right to exist as an independent Jewish state is unclear. Nor does it make clear

whether it supports a one-state or two-state solution. Like other groups discussed, the

PRC often equates the conditions of the Palestinians with the Holocaust, speaking of

“ghettolike” conditions and so on.

The PSC is operated by an executive committee of twenty persons, elected at the annual

general meeting by the PSC’s members. Two other members, it is important to note,

represent the PSC’s Trade Union Advisory Committee, reflecting the PRC’s strong ties with

the British trade unions. The PSC maintains forty regional groups in England and Wales,

and independent groups in both Scotland and Ireland.

The Scottish PSC (SPSC) is worth highlighting here; it is considered more extremist than

its English counterpart, and its activists are far more likely to stray from anti-Zionism

into anti-Semitism. A good example is an article published by its chair, Nick Napier, after

the terrorist attack on the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva in Jerusalem in March 2008. The article

is titled “Mercaz HaRav – a training centre for illegal occupation, murder and ‘Arabs to

the Gas Chambers,’”123 and concentrates on claims of Jews stealing Palestinian organs

and using Arabs for medical experiments, all according to the alleged viewpoint of the

yeshiva’s founder, Rabbi A. Y. Kook, that Palestinians are nonhuman.

According to reports from the PSC’s 2010 annual general meeting, membership is just

over 4,400, marking an increase of about 1,000 from last year. This increase was attributed

to the reaction to Israel’s Operation Cast Lead.124

The Palestinian issue has long been embraced by the far left. In 1979, for example, Phil

Marfleet, who currently lectures on Third World Studies and coordinates the MA degree

in Refugee Studies at the University of East London, published a pamphlet titled Palestine

Lives. It is a Marxist historical account of the history of the land, describing how Zionism

was able to “force out” Palestinians who would not cooperate with it, with support from

the British capitalist establishment.125 It is the IMG that claims it was responsible for the

formation of the PSC.126 A large number of SWP activists were involved in the early stages

of the PSC, and by the 1990s the SWP had become the main force in the organization.

Former IMG activists, along with Socialist Action (SA) activists (SA was one of three

groups formed out of IMG members), began to get involved again in the late 1990s,

and at least two longstanding members of the current PSC Executive, Betty Hunter and

Bernard Regan, were IMG members. In addition, two of the four PSC employees have been

active within the SA’s ranks. In the last two years, some members of the PSC Executive,

in particular Tony Greenstein and Roland Rance, have tried to fight what they saw as

“increasingly successful attempts of a tiny group of what have been termed Political

Freemasons, Socialist Action (SA), to take over the political and administrative machinery

of PSC.”127 The SA’s involvement does not, however, seem to be as new as they claim.

The PSC is very active both in domestic and European politics, as well as in civil areas,

focusing on its appeal to boycott Israeli goods, especially settlement goods. It runs the

Boycott Israeli Goods (BIG) Campaign128 from its London office. The BIG Campaign now

also links to the website of the Global BDS Movement, and, as reported on its website,

PSC activists took a large part in the recent Global BDS action week in different meetings

and protests in front of supermarkets. The PSC lobbies British and EU politicians on a

regular basis, and has a group of MPs coordinating their activities with the organization

and raising relevant issues in Parliament, such as calling on Israel to end its “illegal

occupation” of the West Bank and Gaza, bringing those responsible for “war crimes” to

justice, working to end the siege on Gaza, calling on the government to ban the import of

settlement goods, and ending Britain’s arms trade with Israel. To the EU it calls to suspend

its Association Agreements with Israel.

As noted, the PSC is deeply involved with the British trade unions, and it is believed to

have taken part in a series of motions that several unions passed in the last three years.

The PSC has a Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) composed of representatives

of the national affiliates, which meets regularly to discuss and plan actions to build the

campaign for justice for the Palestinians.129 The PSC organizes delegations to the West

Bank. These focus on trade-union activists and officials, MPs, and other key political

pressure points. Returnees from the delegation trips have come back highly motivated,

and they are used as speakers at events for local branches to give eyewitness reports.

Eyewitness reports also came from activists who took part in the Freedom Flotilla in May

2010.

In these events, the speakers who participate are from main Islamist/Brotherhoodaffiliated

organizations such as the MAB, BMI, MCB, and Friends of Al-Aqsa. The PSC also

organizes an annual rally in Trafalgar Square to coincide with Nakba Day, marked on 15

May, and joined StWC and the other main bodies that mobilized demonstrations against

Israel in response to various Middle Eastern events.

4. Middle East Monitor (MEMO)

The Middle East Monitor (MEMO) is a PR and opinions website and activist entity

that emerged in mid-2009. Introducing itself, MEMO says that “The use or misuse of

information was always central to the conflict in the Middle East. There is an urgent need

for supporters of the Palestinian cause in particular to master the art of information

gathering, analysis and dissemination. This requires well organized, focused and targeted

operations. Such initiatives are virtually non-existent in the West today.” MEMO intends

not only to fill this gap, which others do as well, but it “seeks to go one step further; to

reach out to opinion makers and decision makers in a deliberate, organized and sustained

manner,” and “become an essential point of reference for journalists, researchers, human

rights organisations and NGOs as well as policy and decision-makers across the political

spectrum.”130

Under the title “Our Strengths,” MEMO says it intends to bring the Islamic point of view

to the coverage of Palestine, “something which none has undertaken in the West.” Its PR

strategy focuses on media, political, and community engagement, and it claims to provide

reliable primary sources of information, experienced and approachable specialists, and

in-person meetings with actors on the ground.

MEMO is led by Dr. Daud Abdullah, and Ibrahim Hewitt is senior editor of its website.

Abdullah was formerly deputy secretary general of the MCB and a senior researcher

in the PRC for Palestinian issues. Abdullah is a Muslim convert, born in Grenada, who

in 1976, after converting to Islam, joined the Islamic Party in Grenada, known as close

to the Brotherhood’s ideology.131 In 2009, he made the headlines in Britain when the

abovementioned Hazel Blears, then minister of the Department for Communities and

Local Government (DCLG), urged him to quit his role at the MCB, having signed the pro-

Hamas Istanbul Declaration, which also suggested that foreign navies might be attacked

if they halt arms smuggling to Gaza.132 His refusal to do so caused the minister to cut all

official government ties with the organization.133 Ibrahim Hewitt, a head schoolteacher,

served as chairman of Interpal for many years. The Honorary Advisers of MEMO are also

known Islamists or Islamist supporters such as the aforementioned Salman Abu Sitta,

Baroness Jenny Tonge, Oliver McTernan, and Tariq Ramadan.

MEMO’s work made headlines in Israel when in February 2010 it interviewed Col. (ret.)

Desmond Travers, coauthor of the Goldstone Report. In the interview Travers said,

for instance, that the number of rockets that had been fired into Israel in the month

preceding their operations was something like two.134

In addition to its website, MEMO initiates or joins various seminars and events on

relevant issues. Although most of the other organizations it shares platforms with are

either Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated or known as Islamist supporters, it seems to have

reached the level of more respected institutions such as, for example, Chatham House.135

As a media-oriented organization, MEMO’s staff is reported to have been interviewed by

various outlets, most of them Islamist. Here too, however, its people were also interviewed

by more mainstream outlets such as Channel 4 and Sky. MEMO also organizes trips

for journalists. The one in May 2010 to Syria and Lebanon, for example, resulted in an

interview of Hamas leader Khalid Mash’al by The Guardian.136

Another subject that MEMO focuses on is the legal battle and aspirations to bring “Israeli

war criminals” to justice. In December 2009, it held a seminar titled “Universal Jurisdiction

against Israeli War Criminals,”137 “a groundbreaking event which brought together people

from a wide variety of backgrounds and professions including academics, lawyers, peace

activists, an MP and many others, all of whom were united by a common interest, to see

justice served on behalf of the Palestinian people.”138 The seminar was reportedly attended

by all four barristers who were previously involved in issuing warrants against Israeli

seniors planning to visit the UK: solicitor Daniel Machover (son of Prof. Moshe Machover of

Matzpen), cofounder of Lawyers for Palestinian Human Rights; solicitor Tayab Ali; and

barristers Michel Masseh QC and Paul Troop. The event, described as a “great success,”139

was chaired by solicitor Sarah McSherry, an Executive Committee member of Lawyers for

Palestinian Human Rights.140 The Lawyers for Palestinian Human Rights’ website links to

many NGOs, including Israeli and Palestinian ones, with which it probably also cooperates

in various ways.141 In addition, as unveiled by Israeli sources, and also reported by The

Times, Hamas itself masterminds the efforts to have senior Israeli leaders arrested for

alleged war crimes when they visit European countries including Britain,142 via the Central

Committee for Documentation (tawthiq) and Prosecuting Israeli War Criminals, which it

set up in January 2009 under its Justice Ministry.143 In June 2010, MEMO also published a

briefing titled “Europe’s role in strengthening and protecting Universal Justice.”144

5. Viva Palestina

Viva Palestina is a UK charity registered in April 2009, founded by George Galloway

following Operation Cast Lead with two stated objectives:

1) Provision from the UK of food, medicine and essential goods and services needed

by the civilian population

2) Highlighting the causes and results of wars with a view to achieving peace.145

Viva Palestina works under the name Lifeline to Gaza; its main operation is organizing aid

convoys to “break the siege” imposed on the Strip by Israel. The latest “Lifeline for Gaza

global convoy” (number 5) arrived in Gaza toward the end of October 2010.146 Among the

charity’s trustees is Kevin Ovenden, a member, close to Galloway, of Respect’s leadership,

also described as the “organizer” of the convoys or “director” of the charity. Galloway,

who led the first three land convoys, is now described as “founder of the worldwide Viva

Palestina movement.”147 Viva Palestina’s website now refers to ten “partner” organizations

around the world,148 reflecting the alliance between Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated

organizations and far-left Western activists. Among these are the U.S. branch, a Canadian

organization, and other organizations from the Gulf, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Australia.

The Italian operation is conducted by its local International Solidarity Movement (ISM)

branch; in Turkey, it links to the IHH, which apparently started to play a major role in

the organization since the third convoy; and in Jordan to the local Lifeline for Gaza

Committee, which operates under the auspices of the Brotherhood-controlled trade

unions. In addition, Zaher Birawi takes part in all convoys as “official spokesman,” and

Muhammad Sawalha also appears as one of the organizers, under his title as vice-head of

the International Committee to Break the Siege on Gaza.

While participants in the first convoy (March 2009) met with Hamas’s PM Ismail Haniyyeh

quite openly, delivering the goods they brought with them as well as $25,000 in cash to

Hamas, seen as the democratically elected government of Palestine, participants in the

second convoy, especially Americans, were more cautious because Hamas is a designated

terrorist organization in the United States. One participant, for example, wrote:

VIVA PALESTINA members spent our 24 hours in Gaza as guests of the Palestinian

National Authority which provided bus service, hotel, meals, security (photo at right),

and a tour of Gaza. Noting that the Palestinian National Authority in the Gaza Strip is

Hamas, and supporting Hamas is illegal for Americans because the U.S. Government

considers Hamas a terrorist organization, I took care to distance myself from tour events

that were not humanitarian in nature. I sat in the bus during meetings with Prime

Minister Ismail Haniyeh, at the bombed Parliament building, and at the Ministry of

Detainees (the later [sic] with relatives of Hamas men who are prisoners in Israel).149

Nevertheless, close following of the convoys’ routes, welcome parties, and meetings

easily reveals that many of those were either with Hamas’s top leadership, other Muslim

Brotherhood-affiliated organizations, or far-left European politicians and campaigners.

Perhaps a new escalation in mobilizing Palestinian resistance can be traced in the

recent convoy, which, in Syria, was welcomed in a rally held by the Palestinian resistance

(muqawama) groups such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the

Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SNP).150

A brother of a participant in the third convoy (January 2010) expressed his thoughts on

the convoy’s organizers’ conduct, saying: “Whatever the views of the struggle between

Israel and Palestine, surely the arrival of a convoy of aid, helping those most in need,

and brought about almost entirely as a result of personal sacrifice and charity should be

celebrated?” For some, he continues,

this is not the case – and, looking at the past few weeks, it is not hard to find

the reasons behind that. Violence has sprung up not only between convoyers

and the Egyptians, but between Palestinians and Egyptians, leading to the

tragic loss of a border guard’s life on Tuesday night. In addition, the inability

of truly neutral players to get involved in events such as this – which highlight

the situation, as well as address the lack of necessities – has led to the efforts

of many being maligned by the association with extremism and antisemitism.

151

The events referred to in this post concern the conflict the convoy came into with the

Egyptian army, which descended into violence and ended with the killing of an Egyptian

border guard, resulting in Galloway’s being deported from Egypt and being declared

persona non grata.152 These events followed the convoy’s wish to enter Gaza through the

Port of Nuweiba, in the Sinai Peninsula, despite Egyptian instructions to cross through the

Port of El-’Arish. The clashes, as confirmed at the time by Al Jazeera, began in a rally called

for in the Palestinian side by Hamas, during which protesters started throwing stones at

the Egyptian side,153 which also exposed the close cooperation between the Egyptian

Brotherhood and Hamas.

The real purpose of these convoys was also revealed by Sawalha in an interview to

Hizballah’s magazine Al-Intiqad, soon after the return of the third convoy: “the Lifeline

Convoy tries to gather the free people of the world to bring them all together in service

of the idea of resistance [muqawama] and the people’s right to resist the occupation.”

Interviewed in Beirut during a conference organized by the Arab-International Forum

for Support of the Resistance, he further explained: “What makes this conference so

special is that it transforms the issue of resistance into a general conception and culture

of the nation…not everyone is able to practice resistance directly, but people are able to

help it in its different forms.” He added: “The nation today…is divided into two cultural

trends, one is the resistance trend, and the other is the trend of submission, which holds

most of the gates, institutions and parties; behind it stand many countries supported

by the West”.154 In the same interview he further announced the preparations for a sea

convoy (May’s Flotilla), adding “this time we want to confront the Zionist enemy directly.”

6. The Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC)

The Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) was set up in 1997 as an “independent, notfor-

profit, campaign, research and advocacy organization based in London, UK,” aspiring

to fulfill “the Qur’anic injunctions (4:75) that command believers to rise up in defence

of the oppressed.” The IHRC also holds a consultative status with the United Nations

Economic and Social Council.155

According to its website, the IHRC runs a series of projects. Some of these deal with

issues concerning Muslims in Britain, antiterror laws, and their own expectations from

their government. Another project is the annual Islamophobia Award, “to acknowledge –

through satire, revue and comedy – the worst Islamophobes of the year.”156 However, the

large majority are projects dealing with boycotting Israeli goods and commemorating

events related to the Palestinians. One of these events, the Genocide Memorial Day, had

been marked in January 2010 to coincide with the anniversary of the “Gaza massacre and

its fallen victims.”157 The event was supported by several Islamist and far-left organizations

as well. However, the most important annual event organized by the IHRC is of Al-Quds

Day in the last Friday of the month of Ramadhan, first held in Iran in 1979 following a call

from Ayatullah Khomeini, who said that “It is not an exclusive day for Quds itself. It is a day

for the oppressed to rise and stand up against the arrogant.”158 Along with other Islamist,

far-left, and anti-Zionist organizations, the IHRC is usually the main organizer of the

annual march that takes place in London.

On the whole, the IHRC is considered supportive of the Iranian regime, and usually

refrains from harsh criticism of its human rights abuses. On the June 2009 events, for

example, the IHRC press release acknowledged that most protests were peaceful, but “also

contained violent fringe elements including organised groups committed to violence and

instability in the region.” The IHRC further said it was “concerned with the allegations of

external forces in the promotion of violence and feels that such involvement is counterproductive

and damaging to civil society in Iran.”159

For the IHRC, “Zionism” does not mean Israel alone but relates to “Zionist” influence

around the world. For example, in May 2009, the heads of the American charity Holy

Land Foundation (HLF) were sentenced to very long prison terms for channeling

money to Hamas. The IHRC’s press release on the issue was titled “Ghassan Elashi, and

the HLF, hostages to Zionism in the USA.”160 In November 2010, an event was held in

the Venezuelan embassy in London titled “The Outbreak of the Intifada: Turning Back

the Empire.” The IHRC reported that “Zionist-Apartheid bullying…through their press,

attempted to sabotage the day and bully the organisers. Their attempts utterly failed.”161

7. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)

The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) was established in 1957 by left-wing

activists, and for many years has been dominated by the far left. It claims to be Europe’s

largest single-issue peace campaign. Its website says that it “campaigns non-violently to

rid the world of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and to create

genuine security for future generations.” The CND further says it “opposes all nuclear

and other weapons of mass destruction: their development, manufacture, testing,

deployment and use or threatened use by any country” and refers to four strategic

objectives, as decided by delegates to its annual conference: the elimination of British

nuclear weapons and global abolition of nuclear weapons; the abolition of other threats

of mass destruction or indiscriminate effect; a nuclear-free, less militarized, and more

secure Europe; and the closure of the nuclear power industry.162

The CND is built up as a network of regional organizations, local groups, and individual

members from across Britain. It has a national office in London, regional offices in

several cities, and independent campaigns in Scotland and Ireland. In addition, there

are student CND groups, another group within the Labour Party, a Christian group, and

other homogeneous groups. The different member groups of the campaign operate

independently in local campaigns or on specific aspects, and join national events such as

rallies. At the CND Annual Conference delegates from local groups, regions, and specialist

sections, as well as individuals, elect a chair, three vice-chairs, and a treasurer; they then

debate and decide on general campaigning policies and priorities for the year ahead.163

Two of the CND’s past campaigns are famous for having been influential. In the 1960s,

it waged its first campaign for unilateral disarmament by Britain at a time when the

prospect of a nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union seemed

real enough; and another campaign in the early 1980s when Cruise missiles were

deployed in Britain and Germany in a U.S. endeavor to gain a first-strike capacity against

the Soviets. During the 1960s and 1970s, CND members were subject to surveillance by

MI5, which regarded the campaigns as being operated by a “subversive group.”164

For many organizations and movements that operated in the Cold War context, adapting

to the new realities of the post-Cold War world posed a challenge. One of the subjects

that started to occupy the minds of some CND members during the 1990s was Israel’s

secret nuclear arsenal, which “casts a long shadow over Middle East politics.”165 As for the

CND’s leadership, the 9/11 bombings and the War on Terror enabled it to turn to more

political issues, similarly to the position the Campaign took in opposing the Vietnam War.

The CND’s 2001 Annual Conference, which took place just a few days after 9/11, “was

overwhelmingly united in condemning the terrorism, but also in condemning state

terrorism too.” Moreover, “CND’s view was that the criminals who perpetrated the crime

should be brought to justice, but we completely opposed plans to launch a military

attack on Afghanistan in response.”166 So the campaign extended its activities to include

opposition to U.S. and British policy in the Middle East. According to the StWC’s conveyors,

the great majority of the CND leadership and membership, particularly in London,

immediately flung itself into the antiwar movement and “never looked back.”167 The CND

joined the StWC and the MAB (and later the BMI) to organize more than twenty antiwar

marches. In addition, the CND says it has also linked with peace and antiwar campaigns

internationally, with the aim of coordinating international opposition – such as the Global

Day of Action against the war in Iraq on 15 February 2003.

This cooperation, as well as the fact that the CND itself refused to criticize Palestinian and

pro-Palestinian terrorism or the use of Holocaust and Nazi imagery in its condemnations

of Israel, brought the Jewish Board of Deputies to complain in a letter in January 2003

about the CND’s association with unrestrained anti-Israeli hatred, connecting Middle

Eastern events to the level of anti-Semitic attacks in Britain.168 The CND promised that the

next demonstration “would be free from inappropriate slogans and chants,” adding that a

CND representative’s equating Israel’s actions with Nazi Germany was not acceptable.169

8. Jews for Justice for the Palestinians (JfJfP)

Jews for Justice for Palestinians (JfJfP) is a network of Jews who are British or live in Britain,

practicing and secular, Zionist and not. The group, described by the Jewish press in the

UK as being “on the very margins of the Jewish community,”170 opposes “Israeli policies

that undermine the livelihoods, human, civil and political rights of the Palestinian people,”

yet also “supports the right of Israelis to live in freedom and security within Israel’s 1967

borders.”171 The organization claims to have garnered over 1,500 signatories from the

academy, physicians, several rabbis, and an MP, and on its website adds new signatories

on a monthly basis.172 Some of the signatories are known anti-Zionist figures, or members

of far-left parties covered in this report.

JfJfP says it works “to build world-wide Jewish opposition to the Israeli Occupation, with

like-minded groups around the world,” and is

a founding member of European Jews for a Just Peace, a federation of Jewish

groups in ten European countries whose principles include: condemnation of

all violence against civilians in the conflict, no matter by whom it is carried

out; recognition of Israel’s 1967 ‘green line’ borders; commitment to the

Palestinians’ right to a state in the territories currently occupied by Israel in

the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza; calling on Israel to acknowledge its

part in the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem and its obligation to

negotiate a just, fair and practical resolution of the issue.

On its website the organization mainly links to local Palestinian campaigns, as well as to a

campaign for boycotting Israeli goods and stopping arms trades with it.

Under “Related Organisations” it links only to the Israeli Committee against House

Demolitions (ICAHD). Established in 1997 by Israeli professor Jeff Halper as a “nonviolent,

direct-action organization…to resist Israeli demolition of Palestinian houses in the

Occupied Territories,” today, according to its website, ICAHD runs additional campaigns

related to international BDS actions, as well as against arms trade with Israel. Halper is

Part III: Who are the “mainstreaming agents”?

We saw that the main organizations and groups involved in Israel’s delegitimization

efforts come from small, ideologically motivated circles. True, their devotion to their

causes and enthusiasm for change are remarkable. However, these are still not enough.

In order to gain more credibility, these groups must be portrayed as working from the

“mainstream” to promote justice and human rights. This can be achieved with the help of

“mainstreaming agents” in various fields.

I. Politics

Politicians from all over the spectrum cooperate and promote some of the

lobbying work that we have followed, through lobbying groups within the three

major UK parties. Among them, the most important group is probably Labour

Friends of Palestine & the Middle East (LFPME), established in 2008. Its main

policy pamphlet, “Stop building hatred,”174 focuses on Israel’s ”illegal settlements“

(covering the areas of the Gaza Strip, West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan

Heights), as well as U.S. aid to Israel in both military and civilian measures.

The LFPME’s website, however, tells a different story. A historical timeline it provides, titled

“Palestine’s modern history,” can only be described as completely one-sided. Starting with

the Balfour Declaration in 1917, in which “The colonial British government decrees that

Palestine will be a future homeland of the Jews,” it goes on to survey the most important

events. The 1948 war, for instance, is described thus: “The state of Israel is declared.

Expulsions and ethnic cleansing begin. When the British leave in May 1948 a third of

the Palestinian population has already been evicted. The result is the first Arab-Israeli

war, which lasts from May 1948 until January 1949.” The Six Day War in 1967 is portrayed

as “Israel occupies the Sinai Peninsula (belonging to Egypt), the West Bank (previously

administered by Jordan) and the Golan Heights (belonging to Syria).” More recent

episodes completely ignore Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza Strip, and Operation

Cast Lead is referred to as “November 2008: Israel breaks the ceasefire with Hamas and

follows it with a well-planned three week assault on the Gaza Strip.”175

Members of the LFPME (which claims to have the support of more than sixty MPs) issue

motions on different issues concerning the situation in Gaza, Israeli settlements, and trade

agreements; they also participate in relevant events either organized by groups referred

to in this report or by the LFPME itself. In addition, the LFPME says it is “well represented”

in the Britain-Palestine All Party Parliamentary Group (BPAPPG or APPG). The APPG

is chaired by MP Richard Burden (Labour), and its official secretariat is managed by the

influential Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding (CAABU),176

also known to be working closely with the above-described Palestine Solidarity

Campaign. In the last few years, several delegations went to Gaza on behalf of the APPG;

all seem to have been coordinated with CAABU.

II. Media

The best way for small and rather marginal groups, such as those mostly engaged with

Israel’s delegitimization campaign, to gain exposure is through the media. Britain today

is a major capital for world media, and serves as the base for the BBC, the largest global

media network, for important economic papers such as the Financial Times, and for the

popular Guardian’s website’s open platform “Comment is Free” (CiF). This is in addition

to being the capital for international Arab media outside the Middle East. In the last few

years, other leading Islamist outlets were also established in the country, such as the Al

Jazeera English channel, the aforementioned Al Hiwar TV channel, the Iranian English

channel Press TV, and more. Leading Brotherhood figures make use of all these channels,

have written articles on CiF for a long time, and are regularly interviewed by different

outlets of the Arab and Islamist media. The far left, on the other hand, is represented in

main papers such as The Guardian and The Independent, and sometimes in other papers

and channels such as the BBC that are not automatically identified as leftist or liberal.

Activists from both groups appear and engage in debates, usually describing themselves

as human rights, welfare, or community representative bodies. Thus, marginal groups

such as the Muslim Public Affairs Committee (MPAC UK), featured in the 2007 report of

the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism, are frequently invited to attend

BBC discussions on relevant issues, as organizations aiming to “empower” Muslims in the

country. The BBC also uses Abdel Bari ‘Atwan (see “The academy”) as commentator on

Middle Eastern issues. However, as far as anti-Israeli and other joint “red-green” activities

that might be perceived as controversial are concerned, usually the Islamists give

interviews to the Arab and Islamist media while the far-left activists turn to Western outlets.

In addition, activists from both sides widely use new-media outlets, opening notice

boards, Facebook, and Twitter pages, and often also give interviews to news websites.

III. Trade unions

The British trade unions are very important players in the country’s civilian infrastructure.

They represent millions of workers in various fields, who serve as a great potential – via

their leaders – to “mainstream” political causes such as those of the “antiwar movement.”

Traditionally the trade unions were closer to the Labour Party, out of which the farleft

groups we surveyed have developed. In addition, some of the leaders of the StWC

themselves represent different trade unions, and, as described by Murray and German, the

StWC core leadership came to be when they approached each other as representatives

of their unions during the first meeting.177 On the other hand, the Middle Eastern Muslim

Brotherhood has been close to trade unions for many years, whether in Egypt, where it is

identified with leading the syndicates of free professions such as the journalists’, doctors’,

lawyers’ associations and so on, or in Jordan, where it controls the syndicates even more

openly. Thus, as already discussed, the trade unions are a strategic and easy target for

organizations such as the PSC.

IV. The academy

When considering the academic world, it should first be remembered that today the influence

of anti-Zionist scholars such as Edward Said, Noam Chomsky, and others is very significant.

Along with them, Israeli anti-Zionist scholars working in Britain should also be noted, such

as Prof. Ilan Pappe, as well as Palestinian scholars such the aforementioned Dr. Ghada Karmi,

who express the “Palestinian narrative” and are also usually active in various lobbying groups.

Academic unions were the first to initiate boycotts of Israeli institutions, with the SWP being

the driving force behind the September 2007 initiative (until it backed off).178

The students themselves, thanks to their relatively young age, enthusiasm, and traditional

political involvement, are a primary target audience for the anti-Zionist campaigners.

Thus, far-left groups such as the SWP and SA have active student societies, in addition

to the StWC and Respect, which operate student societies on important campuses.

The PSC also appeals to students through targeted publications and other means. On

the other hand, there are Palestine societies in leading academic institutions, as well as

Islamic societies, which mostly come under the wing of the Federation of Student Islamic

Societies in the UK & Ireland (FOSIS). FOSIS was established in 1962 to serve as the “voice”

of the Muslim students in Britain. Several indications connect its historical roots to Islamist

scholars identified with the Muslim Brotherhood and its Indian “cousin,” Abu al-A’ala al-

Mawdudi’s Jamaat-e-Islami.179 Frequently campuses, as part of academic freedom, provide

a platform for controversial issues and figures. In February 2010, for example, the police

said it would investigate ‘Azzam Tamimi after he had praised Hamas and called for the

state of Israel to come to an end.180 In December 2010, a talk with Abdel Bari ‘Atwan, editor

in chief of the London-based Al-Quds Al-Arabi, was reported to have degenerated into an

extremely hostile atmosphere for Jewish and Israeli students.181 Official Israeli speakers, on

the other hand, are often subject to organized activities that prevent them from speaking.

In February 2010, Prof. Benny Morris, a well-known Israeli revisionist political historian,

had his talk at Cambridge University canceled following pressure from the Islamic Society

and members of staff, who accused him of being an “Islamophobe.”182

The FOSIS website provides a summary of student activism across British campuses in

2009, in the aftermath of Operation Cast Lead, when students occupied buildings in

Britain’s leading universities out of solidarity with the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. These

activities reached the London School of Economics, King’s College, Oxford University,

Edinburgh University, Nottingham University, and the School of Oriental and African

Studies (SOAS), among others. At SOAS the student activists worked with the StWC. At

Manchester University the Israeli deputy ambassador to the UK, Talya Lador-Fresher, was

attacked by an organization called Action Palestine, which works with other groups

such as the PSC and StWC. The BBC and The Guardian covered the wave of protests across

Britain. What the protests demonstrated was an ability of these groups to bring out

supporters across British campuses and to obtain media coverage for their cause.

This was followed by another disturbing trend, the proposals at British universities to

“twin” themselves with the Islamic University of Gaza, which was used as a military

site by Hamas during Operation Cast Lead. The idea was raised at the London School of

Economics. In 2008, the head of the Islamic Law Department of the Islamic University

of Gaza, Yunis al-Astal, called for mahraqa (burning or Holocaust) of the Jews. Al-Astal is

also a member of the Hamas parliament and is viewed as part of the Hamas leadership in

Gaza. It is extremely doubtful that British students knew about al-Astal’s views, but their

readiness to adopt a stronghold of Hamas indicates how successful the Islamist efforts in

Britain had become.

V. Israel’s lack of a PR strategy

Notwithstanding the delegitimizing tendencies that have developed against Israel, it does

not appear that Israel itself has formulated a coherent strategy to tackle these tendencies.

There is insufficient understanding of the British and European civil society structures,

and hardly any official use of new-media outlets. Instead Israel seems to stick to military

measurements such as threat assessments and the like. The best case study for this claim

is Israel’s treatment of the May 2010 Freedom Flotilla. Despite the fact that the main

organizers of the flotilla openly spoke about their intentions, no official Israeli bodies have

either exposed them or dealt with the identities of the organizers, and their affiliation with

the far left and the Muslim Brotherhood.

As uncovered by Israeli sources, media outlets that accompanied the flotilla did not

include any major, “mainstream” agencies.183 It was only Israel’s military action that

brought worldwide interest in the flotilla, and even then the flotilla participants were

mainly described as “peace” or “humanitarian” activists. A simple search, for example,

would have found that the Free Gaza Movement (affiliated with the International

Solidarity Movement, ISM) has received a large donation of 300,000 Euros from the

Perdana for Peace Global Movement, established by the anti-Semitic/anti-American,

former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad.184

VI. The Global Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) Movement

The Global BDS movement operates its own website, and toward the UN Durban Review

Conference in November 2008, the Palestinian BDS National Committee (BNC) had

published a position paper titled “United against Apartheid, Colonialism and Occupation:

Dignity & Justice for the Palestinian People,” endorsed by “hundreds of international civil

society organizations and networks.”185 Yet it seems that the BDS itself is not an organized

movement but, instead, a concept formed between 2005-2007 on the South African

model, intended to “strengthen and spread the culture of Boycott as a central form of

civil resistance to Israeli occupation and apartheid.”186 The Global BDS campaign is meant

to coordinate between various Palestinian bodies on the issues of boycotting Israel

by political, economic, and cultural means, and rejects any attempt for normalization

between Israel and Palestine. The figure most identified with the BDS initiative is the

Israeli Arab citizen Omar Barghouti. According to Prof. Rachel Giora, an Israeli supporter

of the BDS, the emergence of the Israeli BDS movement has mostly been reactive to

Palestinian and international calls, illustrated by different motions that she lists. According

to her, “The major role of the Israeli BDS movement has been to support international BDS

calls against Israel and legitimize them both as clearly not anti-Semitic, as not working

against Israelis but against Israeli governmental policies, and as supporting a legitimate

nonviolent means by which Palestinian civil society can reclaim and re-own its people’s

rights and freedoms.”187

With what seems to be a growing momentum of equating Israel with South Africa’s

apartheid system, the BDS campaign has the potential to persuade more relevant

organizations from around the world to adopt its principles, as indeed occurs in Britain

with major groups such as the PSC. Since commercial companies usually do not report

on sanctions or lack of cooperation on a political basis, it is difficult to assess the number

of cases involved. So far, in Britain, the primary manifestation seems to have been the

voluntary guidance issued in December 2009 by the government’s Department for the

Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), which recommends a different labeling

for Israeli and Palestinian products made in the West Bank,188 a call now also referred to

the EU by the current shadow foreign secretary Yvette Cooper.189

In any case, it is clear that BDS supporters and promoters tend to exaggerate and “dress

up” commercial decisions in BDS clothes.

A few recent cases of this tendency were described by the American Jewish Committee’s

Ben Cohen on Huffington Post.190 Cohen also quotes John Haber, who writes and acts to

stop the BDS campaign, as saying:

Having failed to get a single college or university to divest in the Jewish state,

having lost their few attempts to win a divestment victory with municipalities and

unions, and now having lost the support of the Mainline Protestant community

(once the flagship for the BDS enterprise), “Team Divestment” has been reduced

to manufacturing pretend victories where none exist. The strategy seems to be to

anticipate likely financial decisions (such as companies trying to get rid of their Israel-

Africa shares as fast as possible, given the company’s huge losses and exposure in

the real estate markets), send out press releases claiming that these normal business

transactions actually represent political choices on the part of large institutions, and

hope someone in the media takes the bait.191

Mapping the Main Forces behind Global Delegitimization

of Israel in the UK

Mainstreaming Actors

Muslim

Brotherhood

Muslim

Association of

Britain

Federation of

Student Islamic

Societies

Palestinian

Return Center

British Muslim

Initiative

Universities

Stop the War

Coalition

Delegitimization

of Israel

Mass Media

/ NGO

Community

Socialist Workers

Party

Palestine

Solidarity

Campaign

International

Marxist Group

Pro-Palestinian

Anglican Church

Initiatives

Political

Echelons

Trade Unions

Islamic Human

Rights

Commission

Iranian Influence

Endnotes

1 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TB1bgzbW9Yw.

2 Hasan al-Banna, Majmu’at rasail al-imam al-shahid Hasan al-Banna, Beirut (undated), pp. 100-101.

3 British National Archives, FO 371/110840, Report on Islamic Conference in Jerusalem: meetings of

Moslem Brotherhood and its activities in various Middle Eastern countries, 1954.

4 Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, Indianapolis, American Trust Publications, c1993, pp. 6, 155.

5 Ibid., p. 102.

6 Dore Gold, Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism, Washington, DC,

Regnery, 2003, p. 90.

7 The University of al-Madinah might be defined as a sort of melting pot of modern Islamism. From the

Indian subcontinent, for example, Abu al-A’ala al-Mawdudi, founder of Jamaat-e-Islami, is also said to

have “played a part” in its inception, see Syed Vali Reza Nasr, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism,

Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 166, n. 71.

8 United States Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, Information on U.S.

Agencies’ Efforts to Address Islamic Extremism, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (September 2005), p. 6,

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05852.pdf; ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN EUROPE:

HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EMERGING THREATS OF THE

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ONE HUNDRED NINTH

CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION APRIL 27, 2005, p. 44, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/

hfa20917.000/hfa20917_0.HTM.

9 http://www.alnefisi.com/Default.aspx?Pages=item&id=62.

10 Reuven Paz, Qaradhawi and the World Association of Muslim Clerics: The New Platform of the Muslim

Brotherhood (PRISM Series on Global Jihad, no. 4/2, November 2004), pp. 1-2, http://www.e-prism.org/

images/PRISM_no_4_vol_2_-_Qaradhawi.pdf.

11 This article elicited many waves in the Arab media, see, for example, ‘al-Nafisi yad’u ila hal tanzim al-

Ikhwan al-Muslimin wa-yushidu bi-najah al-Islamiyyin al-Qatariyyin fi dalika,’ Majallat al-’Asr (Kuwait),

11/2/2007; Mshari Al-Zaydi, “Should the Muslim Brotherhood disband?,” al-Sharq al-Awsat (London),

25/2/2007.

12 Lorenzo Vidino, “Aims and Methods of Europe’s Muslim Brotherhood,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology,

vol. 4 (2006), p. 25, quoting Besson, la Conquete de l’Occident, p. 37.

13 David Rich, “The Very Model of a British Muslim Brotherhood,” in Barry Rubin, ed., The Muslim Brotherhood:

The Organization and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan,

2010, p. 119; Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2004, p. 254.

14 Shammai Fishman, Fiqh al-Aqalliyyat: A Legal Theory for Muslim Minorities, Washington, Hudson Institute,

2006, p. 1, http://www.currenttrends.org/docLib/20061018_MonographFishman2.pdf.

15 Steve Merley, The Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe, Nefa Foundation, 2008, p. 3,

http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefafioereport1008.pdf.

16 The ECFR draft constitution: http://www.e-cfr.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=20.

17 Launching the International Union for Muslim Scholars, IslamOnline.net, 11/07/2004,

http://web.archive.org/web/20071028010045,

http://www.iumsonline.net/english/articles/2004/07/article02.shtml.

18 “Leading Sunni Sheikh Yousef Al-Qaradhawi and other Sheikhs Herald the Coming Conquest of Rome,”

MEMRI, Special Dispatch No. 447, 6 December 2002.

19 Hamas Charter, chapter 1, article 2, #3:04-CR-240-G, US v. HLF, et al.

20 http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/palcommbylaws.pdf.

21 http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/HLF/U.S._v_HLF_TrialBrief.pdf.

22 “Treasury designs the Union of Good,” 12/11/2008, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1267.htm.

23 http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=342910&version=1&template_

id=36&parent_id=16.

24 http://www.iumsonline.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=973:2010-07-10-23-06-

44&catid=6:data&Itemid=83.

25 “Leading Kuwaiti charity marks 25th anniversary, Amir attends ceremony,” Kuwaiti News

Agency (KUNA), 10/5/2010, http://www.kuna.net.kw/NewsAgenciesPublicsite/ArticleDetails.

aspx?id=2082137&Language=en.

26 http://marebpress.net/articles.php?id=7338.

27 Jim Higgins, More Years for the Locust: The Origins of the SWP, London, IS Group, 1997, ch. 3.

28 Ian Birchall, History of the International Socialists – Pt. 1: From Theory to Practice (originally published in

International Socialism 76, March 1975), http://www.marxists.de/intsoctend/birchall/theoprac.htm.

29 Nira Yuval-Davis, Matzpen: The Socialist Organization in Israel (Hebrew), Jerusalem, Hebrew University,

1977, p. 40.

30 Ibid., p. 41; Nitza Erel, Matzpen: The Conscience and Fantasy (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, Resling, 2010, pp. 31, 295.

31 Haim Hanegbi, Moshe Machover, and Akiva Orr, The Class Nature of Israeli Society, London, Pluto Press,

1971; the book is part of a series published by the New Left Review, a journal edited by Tariq Ali that is

strongly sympathetic to Maoism.

32 Jim Higgins, More Years for the Locusts (online version), ch. 14, http://www.marxists.org/archive/

higgins/1997/locust/chap14.htm.

33 Werner Cohn, ”From Victim to Shylock and Oppressor: The Image of the Jew in the Trotskyist Movement“,

London, Journal of Communist Studies, vol. 7, no. 1, March 1991.

34 Nick Cohen, “Why Ken Livingstone is not fit for Office,” The Observer, 20 January 2008.

35 http://www.contemporarywriters.com/authors/?p=auth164.

36 The institute, set up to support the civic structure of the Afghan mujahedeen (or what the Muslim

Brotherhood refer to as da’wah institutions), was headed by Prof. Khurshid Ahmed, currently vicepresident

of Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan (his own curriculum vitae states that he is “Ex-Adviser to the

Mujahedeen Leadership of Afghanistan”), http://www.soas.ac.uk/politics/events/muslimgovtconf/

participants/#KemalalHelbawy.

37 Though in fact still widely involved in Brotherhood issues, and frequently referred to by the Arab media as

“Ikhwani leader.”

38 Sawalha was called a “Hamas activist” by Israeli sources, see http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_

multimedia/English/eng_n/html/hamas_e095.htm; he is listed as an unindicted co-conspirator, and

“member of the US Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestine Committee” in the Holy Land Foundation case (Case

3:04-cr-00240 Document 656-2) and was named by IslamOnline as “UK Official [masul] of the Political

Committee of the International Muslim Brotherhood organization,” see http://www.hurryupharry.org/wpcontent/

uploads/2008/07/sawalha.JPG.

39 Farzana Shain, “Uneasy Alliances: British Muslims and Socialists since the 1950s,” Journal of Communist

Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 25, no. 1 (March 2009), p. 3.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., p. 5.

42 Chris Harman, The Prophet and the Proletariat, London, International Socialism, 1994.

43 Ibid., p. 7.

44 Ibid., p. 15.

45 Ibid., p. 6.

46 Alex Callinicos, “Obituary: Chris Harman 1942-2009,” Socialist Worker online, 14/11/2009, http://www.

socialistworker.co.uk/art.php?id=19504.

47 Andrew Murray and Lindsey German, Stop the War: The Story of Britain’s Biggest Mass Movement, London,

Bookmarks Publications, 2005, p. 4.

48 Ibid., p. 10.

49 Ibid., pp. 21, 36.

50 Ibid., p. 47.

51 Ibid., pp. 168, 172-173, 176.

52 “MAB Demonstration in solidarity with the Palestinian people draws nearly 100,000,” Muslim Association

of Britain Press Release, 13/4/2002.

53 Ibid.

54 Rich, pp. 122-123.

55 Richard Phillips, “Standing together: The Muslim Association of Britain and the anti-war movement,”

Race & Class, vol. 50, no. 2 (October 2008), p. 104.

56 Rich, p. 124.

57 Stan Crooke, “The Politics of the Cairo Declaration,” New Politics, vol. 9, pt. 3 (Summer 2003).

58 Murray and German, pp. 208-209.

59 Respect website, 9 December 2006.

60 Neil Davidson, “Leadership, membership and democracy in the revolutionary party,” 17 December 2008,

www.socialistunity.com.

61 Shain, p. 104.

62 http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2004/jul/13/religion.world.

63 http://www.therespectparty.net/founding.php.

64 http://www.therespectparty.net/constitution.php.

65 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/election2010/results.

66 http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jan/03/supportingkenlivingstoneas.

67 http://muslimsforken.blogspot.com.

68 http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/may/04/wegotoutthevote.

69 http://solomonsmindfield.blogspot.com/2010/02/why-we-are-resigning-from-swp-open.html.

70 Arun Kundani, “Islamism and the roots of liberal age,” Race & Class, vol. 50, no. 2 (October 2008), p. 61.

71 Salma Yaqoob, “British Islamic Political Radicalism,” in Tahir Abbas, ed., Islamic Political Radicalism: A

European Perspective, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2007, pp. 279-280.

72 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmhaff/165ii/165we38.htm;

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070417/halltext/70417h0004.htm;

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmhaff/165ii/165we04.htm;

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm080625/halltext/80625h0001.htm;

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmhaff/165/165ii.pdf;

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmordbk1/70109w01.htm;

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/vo031218/debtext/31218-18.htm.

73 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm101122/text/101122w0003.

htm#10112234000037.

74 Anthony Brown, “Muslim Association of Britain exposed,” The Times, 11/8/2004.

75 http://www.bminitiative.net/BMI/EN/details.aspx?ID=261&table=sub.

76 http://mabonline.net/?page_id=2.

77 Rajib al-Basil, “al-Rabita al-Islamiyya Loby Muslimay Baritania”; available online on www.daawa-info.net/

article.php?id=235.

78 Ibid.

79 “Who speaks for British Muslims?,” The Economist, 17 June 2006.

80 Rich, p. 127.

81 Anas Al-Tikriti, “Live Dialogue,” IslamOnline.net, 5 May 2008 (no longer available).

82 “About BMI,” www.bminitiative.net.

83 “About Islam Expo,” http://islamexpo.info/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=84&Item

id=151.

84 Rich, p. 129.

85 Andrew Morray, “We need a new alliance: Muslims and the left in Britain have much to celebrate

together,” The Guardian, 11/7/06, http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/andrew_murray/2006/07/

muslims_and_the_left.html.

86 Martin Bright, “Hazel Blears and IslamExpo,” New Statesman, 18 July 2008, http://www.newstatesman.

com/blogs/martin-bright/2008/07/hazel-blears-muslim-islamexpo. Ismail Patel, a BMI spokesman

who served as director of the 2008 IslamExpo, also leads a small group called Friends of Al-Aqsa, and

sometimes joins different anti-Israeli activities under this rubric.

87 Seumas Milne, “IslamExpo has gained the moral high ground,” The Guardian (Comment is Free), 14 July

2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jul/14/islam.communities.

88 www.alhiwar.tv

89 “Al-Hiwar TV to Target Europe’s Arab Diaspora,” Layalina Productions, PR II.14 (24 June-7 July 2006);

available online on http://www.layalina.tv/press/PR_II.14.asp#article11.

90 Birawi is also chair of the Board of Trustees of the Palestinian Return Centre (PRC), spokesman for the

Lifeline for Gaza convoys (among them the Freedom Flotilla), and spokesman for the Palestinian Forum

in Britain (PFB), another Brotherhood front, which, according to the Egyptian paper Al-Masry Al-Youm

(24/4/2010), is currently under investigation on suspicion of helping launder money for the Brotherhood

in Egypt, see http://www.almasry-alyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=252391.

91 Jemima Kiss, “Livingstone urges Johnston’s release,” The Guardian, 24/04/2007,

http://media.guardian.co.uk/broadcast/story/0,,2064442,00.html.

92 Quran 8:12.

93 http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/enforcement/broadcast-bulletins/obb143.

94 http://www.prc.org.uk/newsite/en/about-us.html.

95 http://www.prc.org.uk/index.php?module=centre_activities&id=8f642f79798a5e69a824ce28a4d766a4&

offset=10.

96 http://bdsmovement.net/?q=node/222.

97 “The way home,” Al-Ahram Weekly, no. 576, 7-13 March 2002.

98 Salman Abu Sitta, Palestine Right of Return: Sacred, Legal, and Possible, London, Palestine Return Centre,

http://www.palestineremembered.com/Acre/Right-Of-Return/Story445.html.

99 http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js672.htm.

100 http://www.sobhisaleh.com/sob7icv.aspx.

101 http://www.crethiplethi.com/unrwa-director-calls-on-palestinians-to-acknowledge-they-will-not-returnto-

their-homes-in-israel/israel/2010.

102 http://www.prc.org.uk/newsite/en/Center-News/672-prc-condemns-statement-by-unrwa-director-innew-

york.html.

103 http://www.alzaytouna.net/english/Docs/2010/poll-unrwa-2010-s-l.pdf.

104 http://www.prc.org.uk/newsite/en/Conferences/398-prc-conference-on-future-of-palestinian-refugeesstarts-

in-london.html.

105 http://www.palestine-family.net/index.php?nav=5-205&cid=490&did=4456.

106 http://www.prc.org.uk/newsite/en/WorkShop/683-prc-hosts-releasing-atlas-palestine-evening-inlondon-.

html.

107 http://www.palestine-info.co.uk/en/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2bi1s7Bz

hLSSAx3v9GzBb25sam%2feIlpv3dFiq9nu7eN%2bxEBSMidNSEio34ydRJa4sMxInCVZGQpp%2bvfe3ejnoK6

6LN34U2D%2bb%2b1lgm3IwZTZV4n8c%3d.

108 http://english.moqawama.org/fastnewsdetails.php?fstid=497.

109 http://www.al-awda.org.

110 http://www.group194.net/index.php?mode=article&id=18330.%C7%E1%E1%CC%E4%C9%20

%C7%E1%DA%E1%ED%C7%20%E1%E1%CF%DD%C7%DA%20%DA%E4%20%CD%DE%20

%C7%E1%DA%E6%CF%C9%20%E1%E1%C7%CC%C6%ED%E4%20%C7%E1%DD%E1%D3%D8%ED%E4

%ED%ED%E4/%20%C7%E1%C3%D1%CF%E4.

111 http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/BDEC89A6-ABA3-48F7-9A63-94196E8DE103.htm.

112 http://www.alhiwar.net/ShowNews.php?Tnd=6419.

113 http://www.uruknet.info/index.php?p=m65425&hd=&size=1&l=e.

114 http://www.savegaza.eu/eng/index.php?view=17.

115 http://www.intifada-palestine.com/2010/01/50-european-mps-to-visit-gaza.

116 http://www.savegaza.eu/eng/index.php?view=13.

117 http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/ipc_e131.pdf.

118 http://www.savegaza.eu/eng/index.php?view=22.

119 http://www.general-election-2010.co.uk/uk-party-political-news/european-campaign-to-end-the-siegeon-

gaza.

120 http://www.uruknet.info/index.php?p=m65425&hd=&size=1&l=e.

121 http://www.palestinecampaign.org/Index5b.asp?m_id=1&l1_id=2&l2_id=41.

122 http://palestinecampaign.org/Index5b.asp?m_id=1&l1_id=2&l2_id=10.

123 http://www.scottishpsc.org.uk/Settlers/mercaz-harav-a-training-centre-for-illegal-occupation-murderand-

qarabs-to-the-gas-chambersq.html.

124 http://azvsas.blogspot.com/2010/02/palestine-solidarity-campaign-beyond.html.

125 Phil Marfleet, Palestine lives, London, Socialist Workers Party, 1979.

126 Proposal To The Centre Committee For The Creation of An Arab Commission of the IMG, IMG Archive,

University of Warwick Modern Records Centre, 1978-81 file (exact date unknown).

127 http://azvsas.blogspot.com/2009/09/two-psc-executive-members-resign-as.html.

128 http://www.bigcampaign.org.

129 http://www.palestinecampaign.org/Index5b.asp?m_id=1&l1_id=7&l2_id=34.

130 http://www.middleeastmonitor.org.uk/about-us.

131 http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/6D10A93E-2557-40F5-A97E-60F01A402B1E.htm.

132 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/08/daud-abdullah-gaza-middle-east.

133 http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2009/03/23/blears__letter.pdf.

134 http://www.sott.net/articles/show/202529-Exclusive-Middle-East-Monitor-interview-with-Colonel-

Desmond-Travers-Co-author-of-the-UN-s-Goldstone-Report.

135 http://www.alzaytouna.net/english/Docs/2010/MEMO_Annual_Report_2010.pdf, p. 28.

136 Ibid., p. 40.

137 http://www.middleeastmonitor.org.uk/staff-login/329-invitation-to-our-seminar-quniversal-jurisdictionagainst-

israeli-war-criminalsq.

138 http://www.middleeastmonitor.org.uk/media-review/event-review/335-seminar-on-the-universaljurisdiction-

on-israeli-war-crimes-a-great-success.

139 http://www.middleeastmonitor.org.uk/media-review/event-review/335-seminar-on-the-universaljurisdiction-

on-israeli-war-crimes-a-great-success.

140 http://www.middleeastmonitor.org.uk/news/europe/375-human-rights-lawyer-speaks-out-on-arrestwarrant-

for-the-leader-of-the-israeli-opposition-and-david-milibands-proposed-changes-to-the-law-ofuniversal-

jurisdiction.

141 http://www.lphr.org.uk/links.php.

142 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6963473.ece.

143 http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hamas_e091.pdf.

144 http://www.middleeastmonitor.org.uk/downloads/briefing-paper/europes-role-in-strengthening-andprotecting-

universal-justice.pdf.

145 http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/Showcharity/RegisterOfCharities/CharityFramework.aspx?Registe

redCharityNumber=1129092&SubsidiaryNumber=0.

146 The May 2010 Flotilla is often referred to as “Lifeline for Gaza number four”; Viva Palestina was not a main

organizer of the flotilla but, instead, sent a delegation headed by Kevin Ovenden.

147 http://www.georgegalloway.com.

148 http://www.vivapalestina.org.

149 http://mondoweiss.net/2009/08/mission-accomplished-a-report-on-the-viva-palestina-usa-convoymission-

to-break-the-israeli-siege-of-gaza.html.

150 http://www.alrafi3.com/forum/showthread.php?p=124881; http://www.paldf.net/forum/showthread.

php?t=684353; http://kiaoragaza.wordpress.com/2010/10/06/%e2%80%98these-are-people-who-stolea-

whole-country-why-stop-at-stealing-our-underwear%e2%80%99.

151 http://hurryupharry.org/2010/01/08/viva-palestina-a-personal-view.

152 “MP Galloway deported from Egypt,” The Guardian, 8/1/2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/

feedarticle/8889508.

153 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o75D299ctuc.

154 http://www.alintiqad.com/essaydetails.php?eid=25549&cid=8.

155 http://www.ihrc.org.

156 http://www.ihrc.org.uk/activities/projects/7899-islamophobia-awards.

157 http://www.ihrc.org.uk/activities/alerts/9205-update-event-alert-uk-genocide-memorial-day-.

158 http://www.ihrc.org.uk/activities/projects/9428-al-quds-day.

159 http://www.ihrc.org.uk/show.php?id=4251.

160 http://www.ihrc.org.uk/publications/briefings/9409-ghassan-elashi-and-the-hlf-hostages-to-zionism-inthe-

usa.

161 http://www.ihrc.org.uk/news/articles/9489-zionist-apartheid-bullying-fails-at-intifada-event-atvenezuelan-

embassy-london.

162 http://www.cnduk.org/index.php/about/general/about-cnd.html.

163 http://www.cnduk.org/index.php/about/general/cnd-s-structure.html.

164 https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/myths-and-misunderstandings.html.

165 Murray & German, p. 56.

166 http://www.cnduk.org/index.php/campaigns/anti-war/anti-war.html.

167 Murray & German, pp. 56-57.

168 http://www.somethingjewish.co.uk/articles/173_cnd_challenged_over_.htm.

169 http://www.somethingjewish.co.uk/articles/170_cnd_reassures_board_.htm.

170 Miriam Shaviv, “Miliband’s mum: backer of Jews for Justice for Palestinians,” Jewish Chronicle, 26/9/2010,

http://www.thejc.com/blogpost/milibands-mum-backer-jews-justice-palestinians.

171 http://jfjfp.com/?page_id=2.

172 http://jfjfp.com/?page_id=391.

173 http://www.almasry-alyoum.com/printerfriendly.aspx?ArticleID=197210.

174 http://www.labourfriendsofpalestine.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/stop-building-hatredpamphlet8.

pdf.

175 http://www.labourfriendsofpalestine.co.uk/?page_id=75.

176 http://www.caabu.org/resources/britain_palestine_appg.

177 Murray & German, p. 49.

178 Ronnie Fraser, “The Academic Boycott of Israel: A Review of the Five-Year UK Campaign to Defeat It,”

http://www.jcpa.org.il/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=3&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=254

&PID=0&IID=1744&TTL=Post-Holocaust_and_Anti-Semitism.

179 See, for example, Marika Sherwood, “Malcolm X in Manchester and Sheffield,” p. 31, www.workershistory.

org/linked_docs/NWLHJ27_Sherwood.pdf; Ziauddin Sardar, “Searching for secular Islam,” http://

newhumanist.org.uk/798/searching-for-secular-islam; Ziauddin Sardar, Desperately Seeking Paradise,

London, Granta Books, 2004, pp. 24-25, 28; Rich, p. 118.

180 http://www.thejc.com/news/uk-news/27149/police-investigate-azzam-tamimi-soas-talk.

181 http://www.ujs.org.uk/news/563/ujs-and-lse-israel-society-statement-on-abdel-bari-atwan-talk-at-lse.

182 http://cambridgetab.co.uk/news/10623.

183 http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/ipc_e127.pdf, p. 13.

184 http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6534NF20100604; Mohamad is known for his 2003 statement

that “Jews rule the world by proxy,” see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-PJ9u8h3Gzw and, regarding

the 9/11 attacks, that “if they [the U.S.] can make Avatar, they can make anything,” see

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ZewcnqiZzc.

185 http://bdsmovement.net/?q=node/222.

186 http://bdsmovement.net/?q=node/126.

187 http://usacbi.wordpress.com/2010/01/26/milestones-in-the-history-of-the-israeli-bds-movement-a-briefchronology.

188 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/10/guidance-labelling-food-israeli-settlements.

189 http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/dec/04/yvette-cooper-israeli-settler-labelling-imports.

190 Ben S. Cohen, “Another Israeli divestment hoax”, 19/11/2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ben-scohen/

another-israel-divestment_b_786196.html.

191 http://www.divestthis.com/2009/09/tiaa-cref-divestment-hoax-are-you.

http://www.jcpa.org/text/Mapping_Delegitimization.pdf

Ehud Rosen: Mapping the Organizational Sources of the Global Delegitimization Campaign against Israel in the UK