http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/Printer&cid=11227012190 83&p=1119925650416

The writer is the editor of www.ngo-monitor.org and director of the Program on Conflict Management, Bar Ilan University and a member of the Board of Directors of Scholars for Peace in the Middle East

The unilateral separation process is clearly the most traumatic and controversial decision that Israelis have faced since the Six Day War. The exit from Gaza and construction of a de facto border in Judea and Samaria without the compensation of a peace agreement are painful even for many who view this decision as necessary.

A wide-ranging public debate, including a referendum or national elections, could have reduced the friction in this process and clarified the issues at stake. But no election took place, while the debate began late and has been inarticulate, at best. Instead of a dialogue on the risks and benefits of disengagement, Israelis from across the political spectrum have been engaged in shouting matches. In all of the noise and emotion, no one is listening.

In a democracy, decisions of essential importance that will determine the future course of the nation require a truly open and wide-ranging public process. In Israel’s case, the questions related to the costs and benefits of disengagement need to be fully aired.

Is this decision “the least bad option,” in the absence of any realist prospect for a negotiated agreement? Or is the status quo better – including maintaining 8,000 Jewish civilians among a hostile Palestinian population of more than one million in Gaza? Will this move be seen by Palestinians as a victorious result of terror and rejectionism, and encourage more of the same? Will the IDF be able to respond to missile attacks with a freer hand after withdrawal, or will attacks increase as Gaza becomes Hamastan? And will this approach end the “demographic threat” to Israel, or simply postpone the confrontation for a few years?

INSTEAD OF presenting his views on these crucial questions, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has been largely silent. Whatever efforts were made to sell the disengagement on its merits came too late and only added to the confusion. And by blocking all efforts to test the legitimacy of the decisions through a referendum (a decision that should have been taken at least a year before the scheduled withdrawal from Gaza), the entire process has been tainted.

A similar path used by the Labor Party to gain approval for the Oslo “peace process” over 10 years ago ended in disaster. Instead, the government – including the army and the police – has tried to use force to block the inevitable public protests. The use of excessive police power to hinder peaceful assemblies, including blocking of buses carrying the protesters, was precisely the wrong response under the circumstances. Similarly, harassment of individuals handing out orange ribbons is unjustified. These actions raise serious questions about the degree to which the government is truly committed to free speech and legitimate non-violent dissent.

At the same time, the anti-disengagement forces also demonstrated the weakness of their ommitment to democracy and unwillingness to accept reasonable rules of the game. They allowed a small and violent group to act in their name and to lead the opposition to disengagement through clearly illegal and coercive means. The efforts to cause disruption by placing fake terror bombs in public facilities, such as Jerusalem’s Central Bus Station and the blocking of major roads, only succeeded in creating a great deal of anger. Similarly, the scenes of screaming and flailing protesters battling soldiers and police were totally counterproductive. Instead of winning support, these actions served to reinforce the image of an undemocratic minority seeking to impose its ideological views on the majority. It is too late to fix most of these failures.

The disengagement process is likely to go through without benefit of legitimacy, both with respect to the government and its opponents.

But for the future, when more difficult decisions will be required – including borders, crucial questions on Jewish tradition and the state in the constitutional debate, and other core issues – we need to develop institutions and processes which strengthen the democratic foundations of Israel.

Before we can debate the substance of these issues in a coherent and useful manner, we need to decide on the rules of the game in Israel’s developing democracy. The era of elite “top-down” decision-making and coercion, from both Left and Right, as well as from the religious and secular sectors, should have ended a long time ago.