http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/06/obama-and-netanyahu-speeches-constituencies-peace/
One of the joys of traveling in the Middle East is the possibility that one can be on the spot to observe the reactions of the residents of the region to important events as they actually happen, instead of being dependent on newspaper or television reporting of the reactions. Thus, I was fortunate to be in Israel as U.S. President Barak Obama gave his speech on U.S. relations with the Muslim world, and in Egypt when Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu gave his speech on achieving an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. While each speech was aimed at multiple constituencies, there might be just enough overlap between them to jump-start the stalled Arab-Israeli peace process.
President Obama’s speech on U.S. relations with the Muslim world had a major impact, both in Israel and in the Arab world. It is clear that the main goal of Obama’s speech was to turn a new page in U.S.-Muslim and particularly U.S.-Arab relations, and if the reactions of the individuals whom I interviewed in Egypt (in Cairo and Alexandria) are any indication, his words were greeted with great enthusiasm, as he went out of his way to demonstrate respect for Islam.
However, despite the assertions of some right-wing Israeli and American commentators, Obama did not pander to his Muslim audience. He emphasized the need to combat Islamic violence, to stop stereotyping both the United States and Israel, and to accept the Holocaust as a fact. While he also emphasized the need to allow greater roles for women in Muslim society and for democracy-in this he did not go as far as some of my interviewees had hoped-overall his speech was very well received.
As far as Israel was concerned, Obama reiterated the U.S. commitment to Israeli security, but he also made very clear that Israel’s responsibility in moving the peace process forward included accepting a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and stopping the construction of settlements. That Obama’s words were clearly understood in Israel became apparent not only in Netanyahu’s concession on a two-state solution, but also in the words of a security guard whom I interviewed at the West Bank settlement outpost of Kedar Bet (near Maaleh Adumim). When I asked him if Kedar Bet would grow across the valley to meet the already established settlement of Kedar (this is a frequent pattern for settlement growth), he replied: “It all depends on the President of the United States.”
As the security guard’s words indicated, a second audience of Obama’s words was the Israeli body politic. However, in measuring the impact of Obama’s speech on Israel, one must take into consideration the shift to the right of the Israeli public over the past few years, which was reflected in major gains for right-wing parties, and especially Likud, in the election of last February 10 which brought Netanyahu to power as the head of a right-of-center coalition. Essentially, many Israelis, having experienced unilateral withdrawals from Southern Lebanon (2000) and Gaza (2005), which instead of bringing peace brought barrages of Hezbollah and Hamas rockets, were quite sympathetic to Netanyahu’s election position which opposed withdrawals from the West Bank. Such withdrawals, he argued, would result in Hamas rocket attacks against Tel Aviv and Ben-Gurion airport. Thus Obama’s call for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had a negative resonance for many in the center and right of the Israeli political spectrum, and a June 19 poll in the right -of-center Jerusalem Post found that 50 percent of Israelis now considered Obama to be more pro-Palestinian than pro-Israeli. (Only 6 percent considered him to be more pro-Israeli, while 36 percent said his policies were neutral and 8 percent did not comment.)
Nonetheless, despite support from a significant part of the Israeli public for his hard-line policies, Netanyahu could not simply ignore Obama’s speech. Israel is dependent on the United States for $3 billion in annual military aid, for protection in the United Nations against the numerous anti-Israeli resolutions introduced by Israel’s enemies, and, above all, for U.S. support for an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear installations, if the Israeli government deems it necessary–a possibility now somewhat more likely following the Iranian regime’s brutal crackdown on demonstrators after the disputed June 12 Iranian presidential elections.
Consequently, Netanyahu adopted what might be termed a “minimax” strategy: doing the minimum necessary to satisfy the United States-agreeing to a two-state solution, albeit with reservations-while retaining the maximum support in his coalition government. Thus, Netanyahu’s speech was a careful balancing act between the United States and the center-right portions of his coalition government, and the Israeli prime minister’s speech, consequently, precipitated multiple reactions. It was welcomed both by coalition member Labor-the leftist element of Netanyahu’s government-and also by the main opposition party, Kadimah, which may now, at least in part (the faction led by Shaul Mofaz), be prepared to join the coalition. Rightist elements of Netanyahu’s own Likud Party were more reserved in their support, although he sought to win them over with his positions that any Palestinian state would have to be demilitarized, that Jerusalem would remain united under Israeli rule, that no Palestinian refugees could be resettled in Israel, and that Israeli settlers, whom he described as “an integral part of our people, a principled, pioneering and Zionist public” had to be allowed to live “normal lives.”
These positions, together with Netanyahu’s call for the Palestinians to recognize Israel as “the state of the Jewish people,” succeeded in neutralizing, at least in the short run, much of the opposition in his coalition government. Indeed, Netanyahu’s approval ratings shot up after his speech. On the far right of the Israeli political spectrum, however, there were strong protests against Netanyahu’s speech, both by a coalition member, the Jewish Home Party, and by the opposition National Union Party, as well as by some settler leaders such as Rabbi Dov Lior.
Obama, for his part, appeared willing to accept the “half a loaf” which Netanyahu offered-acquiescence in the establishment of a Palestinian State-and, at least initially, appeared to disregard the other elements in Netanyahu’s speech, including his rather vague call for “normal life” for the settlers. Indeed, Obama called Netanyahu’s speech “an important step forward.” By contrast, The response in the Arab world to Netanyahu’s speech was almost universally negative, except for a few commentators writing in Al-Ahram and the Egyptian Gazette, who saw the possibility of building on Netanyahu’s commitment to a two state solution.
The Palestinian leadership on the West Bank, in what I think was a major tactical error, totally rejected the speech which it claimed offered no hope for moving the peace process forward. The lines of the Arab critique of Netanyahu’s speech were as follows: 1) a Palestinian state’s sovereignty would be limited by demilitarization; 2) no Arab could accept Jewish sovereignty over East Jerusalem, including the Dome of the Rock and the Al-Aqsa Mosque; and 3) Israel was evading its responsibility for the 1948 Palestinian exodus by claiming no Palestinian refugees could be resettled in Israel. Most of all, the Arabs seemed angered by Netanyahu’s demand that Israel be recognized as a Jewish state. noting that such a recognition (they claimed) would make them Zionists and would also jeopardize the position of the Israeli Arabs in Israel.
Given the contrasting views on Netanyahu’s speech, is there any hope for moving the peace process forward? The answer is a qualified “yes,” but it is highly dependent on the actions of Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, who, unfortunately, is not a strong leader. If the July talks in Cairo to set up a national unity government between Hamas and Fatah fail-as many such unity talks have failed in the past-and if Abbas comes to the belated realization that the United States won’t simply “deliver” Israel, as Abbas may have naively thought after his visit to Washington in late May and the Obama speech in Cairo, then Abbas may agree to resume negotiations, building on the two-state solution which Obama pressured Netanyahu to accept. Given the fact that Palestinian elections, both for the Legislative Council and for the Palestinian Executive, are due in January 2010, Abbas may wish to demonstrate some progress in his talks with Netanyahu before the elections.
Netanyahu, for his part, has already made some gestures to Abbas by removing a number of roadblocks and check points on the West Bank to make travel in the region easier, and by agreeing to halt, on a trial basis, Israeli raids into a number of West Bank cities, thus enhancing both the role and the prestige of Palestinian police units. Whether Abbas will be willing to resume talks remains to be seen, and it may well be that Obama, who so far has primarily prodded the Israelis, may find it necessary to pressure Abbas into resuming peace talks.
