Why not champion the right to live in the face of terrorism? In October 2004, Kenneth Roth, the head of Human Rights Watch, flew from New York to Jerusalem for a day to publicize a 135-page report entitled Razing Rafah – a scathing condemnation of the Israeli government’s policies along the border between Gaza and Egypt. Roth’s claims were immediately repeated on wire services, television and radio news broadcasts, and in newspaper stories around the world.
The tragedy is that the credibility of HRW and the human rights movement is being undermined. And without credibility, the activities of HRW, Amnesty International, and Oxfam have no impact in a complex debate taking place in Israel. The issue is how to balance the core human right – the right to life in the face of a terrorist onslaught – with the rights of noncombatant Palestinians.
But this is not a problem that concerns HRW.
It has long departed from its origins as Helsinki Watch with its campaigns for freedom in the former Soviet Union on behalf of Prisoners of Zion such as Anatoly Sharansky. As the Cold War ended, officials, including Roth and activists Joe Stork and Sarah Leah Whitson, adopted a new agenda, exploiting the rhetoric of universal human rights to promote narrow political and ideological preferences.
In this framework, human rights are filtered through the subjective distinction between “victims” – say Palestinians or Irish Republicans – and “colonialist oppressors” – Zionists, Irish Unionists, and Americans.
As a result, in the past four years, despite terror attacks that clearly violate any common-sense concept of basic human rights, HRW’s reports and press releases have focused – by a ratio of over six to one – on allegations against Israel.
Roth has claimed a “two-to-one” ratio – which, even if true, would be morally unjustified. Reflecting the lack of a political agenda in Africa, HRW issued far fewer reports these past four years on the mass killing in the Sudan than on the Arab-Israel conflict. Roth says he “does not do comparisons” of this sort.
BY FOLLOWING this political path Roth became a major public figure and commentator. HRW has evolved into a superpower with an annual budget of over $20 million and a staff of over 200.
In September 2001, HRW emerged as a key player during the nongovernmental organization sessions of the infamous Durban anti-racism conference, which were hijacked to demonize Israel.
Anne Bayefsy and other witnesses have described how HRW officials refused to act when
members of the Jewish caucus were evicted. And three years later, HRW joined the
movement to boycott Israel – another step in the “South Africa strategy.”
In contrast, the murder of over 1,000 Israelis did not lead Roth and HRW to call for corporate sanctions against the Palestinian leadership.
To avoid serious debate and criticism of these dubious practices, Roth chooses his platforms carefully, steering clear of confrontations with well-informed critics able to refute his claims. Although Roth told Natan Sharansky that he was too busy to participate in the Global Forum on Anti-Semitism, he had time for friendly journalists at the American Colony Hotel – an unofficial Palestinian press center – a few days earlier.
And in the interview with the Post, Roth emphasized how he “grew up on his father’s stories of life in Nazi Germany until he fled in summer 1938” – his standard response when confronted with the evidence of anti-Israel political bias. But such assertions do not address the substance or the evidence. And many of Roth’s other claims, such as the statement that “out of our staff of 200 people we have one researcher on Israel/Palestine” are less than half-truths.
These incidents demonstrate the continued impact of the human rights halo effect, which protects Roth from serious investigation.
Like other powerful organizations, HRW and its leaders should be subject to a system of checks and balances to ensure that the claimed objectives – moral and otherwise – are consistent with the choice of issues, the presentation of evidence, and the hiring process.
Governments at all levels include independent comptrollers, and news organizations have ombudsmen, but prior to the establishment of NGO Monitor in the wake of the Durban conference no such mechanism existed to watch the watchers in the realm of human rights.
NGO Monitor’s analyses provide a foundation for assessing the credibility of NGOs active in the Israeli-Palestinian and other political conflicts, but its scope is still limited.
This work needs to be supplemented by parallel activities run by the NGO network itself. By dedicating a portion of funds to a system of independent controls, and by demanding transparency and accountability, philanthropies and individual donors to groups such as HRW can begin to restore lost credibility.
Perhaps in this way the lost moral force of the human rights movement, reflecting exploitation of universal principles in support of private political biases, can also be repaired. The writer is editor of NGO Monitor and director of the Program on Conflict Management at Bar-Ilan University. He is a member of the Board of Directors of Scholars for Peace in the Middle East.