It takes an unusual intensity of faith – or naivete – to believe that the cease-fire mandated by UN Security Council 1701 will actually end this conflict. The language calls for ending the flow of weapons from Iran and Syria to Hezbollah; for a demilitarized zone in Southern Lebanon to be enforced by the Lebanese Army and a “robust” international force; and for the return of the kidnapped Israeli soldiers, without the release of terrorists held in Israeli jails. These objectives will all be difficult to achieve, to greatly understate the case, and the results of previous efforts to implement similar agreements are not encouraging. Instead, cease-fires generally provide a temporary pause in which the parties rearm and prepare for the next round. In the past thirty years, in which Lebanon’s weak political structure has been exploited as a base for anti-Israel terror – first by the Arafat and the PLO, and then by Iran and Hezbollah – the UN has adopted dozens of resolutions and plans. All contained the right words, but were never implemented.

In 2000, when Israeli troops withdrew from all of Lebanon, as certified by the UN, the promised French-led European forces never arrived to patrol the border.

For the current effort to end differently, the rules of the game must change in a fundamental and unprecedented manner. The slim hopes for such a change come from the impact of the 31 days of destruction. The terms of negotiation after any war are determined by the distribution of power when it ends – the words that are used are, at best, decoration.

In this case, the question is whether the IDF has succeeded in weakening Hezbollah’s capabilities
to control Lebanon, and in preventing the terror organization from rebuilding its arsenal of missiles provided by Syria and Iran.

Within this framework, the UN, Lebanon, and the international forces have an opportunity to take
responsibility to implement the terms of the cease-fire resolution, but Israel must show a readiness to act on its own at the first sign of weakness or violations.

France and the other “guarantors” of the cease-fire will only take the risks necessary to implement it if they know that failure to do so will be catastrophic to their own interests.

The first test and clashes are likely to come quickly, as Lebanese civilians, no doubt mixed with some Hezbollah members carrying weapons and explosives, seek to return to the towns and villages in Southern Lebanon. Israeli troops which are located in these areas will seek to prevent this until the international force is in place, resulting in a very predictable and easily manipulated confrontation. The cease fire could break down immediately in the absence of a solution.

Another key issue is the future of the main Hezbollah leaders, and the ability of Israel to continue to impose restrictions on their movements. Between 2002 and 2005, Israel’s decision to keep PLO leader Yassir Arafat isolated and under house arrest, contributed significantly to the defeat of the Palestinian terror campaign.

If Hassan Nassaralah, the head of Hezbollah, is unable to surface in Lebanon for fear of an Israeli attack, his ability to rebuild his organization will also be impaired significantly.

Finally, the fate of the two Israeli soldiers whose kidnapping on July 12 triggered this war remains very uncertain. The UN resolution is particularly vague on this topic, and here again, the terms and outcome of the negotiations will depend on the power relationship. Israel is hoping to exchange
captured Hezbollah fighters for their release, but this would mean a defeat for Nassrallah. Similarly, Israeli agreement to release terrorists would be seen as weakness, although the costs were still far greater than Nasrallah anticipated in launching the attack. Either way, there is no straight forward solution.

The writer directs the Program on Conflict Management at Bar Ilan University and is the editor of www.ngo-monitor.org. He is a member of he Board of Directors of Scholars for Peace in the Middle East