We are starting to see how the contending Palestinian groups are dealing with the Hamas takeover of the government.
Hamas does not expect to change everything overnight. After all, its members often say that 20 years will be needed to wipe out Israel. Since it believes its goal and methods have divine sanction, Hamas is not too concerned with the time needed, international opinion, or any sufferings this plan inflicts on Palestinians.
What it is trying to do now is establish hegemony over the Palestinian movement in a way that would ensure Hamas will be the permanent leader. Since Hamas’s campaign is ahead of schedule–it did not expect to do so well in the election–this can proceed in a step-by-step fashion. Nor does Hamas really worry about winning the next vote, which might never be held or at least, like the previous “four-year term” of parliament, take ten years to happen.
A key aspect of Hamas’s strategy is ensuring that the educational system will raise a generation that would reject any peace or compromise with Israel, extol terrorism, and vote Hamas.
Hamas knows that its effort faces two barriers. First, while its program of destroying Israel and using terrorism is popular, Islamization is far less supported by the Palestinian majority. At the same time, even the smallest improvements in government performance and reduced corruption can be used to show that Hamas is superior to Fatah. Islamist measures, then, should advance gradually and mostly by local councils.
The priority will be on the anti-Israel struggle, virtually outlawing moderation and enthroning the Hamas perspective of a long-term, life-or-death struggle in which no real compromise is possible. Hamas wants to make itself leader of the whole people and “national” cause rather than just an Islamist party in a way parallel to how Chinese, Cuban, and Vietnamese Communists achieved similar outcomes. Since there is basically no political difference between Hamas and Fatah except for Islamism, this should not be too difficult.
But Hamas’s second big problem is more serious: the institutional competition with Fatah. How is Hamas going to form a government and get control of the mechanisms of power–money, jobs, and guns–without triggering a civil war with Fatah. For example, the firing of any Fatah supporter from any job, and certainly the overstuffed security forces, could set off a major crisis. Here, too, Hamas will have to go carefully. And, again, the best approach is to focus on what unites Palestinians, i.e., hating and wanting to attack Israel.
Other reasons why Hamas is going to continue with a very hard line include a personal competition for power in which militancy is the greatest asset and a “terrorism race” in which Hamas and Fatah battle to see who can stage the most successful attacks. Prediction: a shadowy Islamist group will emerge to claim “credit” for attacking Israel which consists of Hamas people but lets Hamas deny responsibility (and presumably let Western governments and media accept that denial).
At the same time, Hamas leaders will continue to make very extreme statements in Arabic. Recent examples from Hamas leader Mahmud Zahar include: “Those who built their structure on the basis of the Quran…cannot budge because of promises from America or a dollar from Europe,” Or, “Our program is to liberate Palestine, all of Palestine.”
At the same time, though, Hamas will try to create an illusion of moderation among foreigners. Its current “moderate” plan states that if Israel concedes everything (withdraws from all of the West Bank and east Jerusalem, while letting all Palestinian refugees come live in Israel) in exchange Hamas will not attack Israel until it wants to do so while reserving the right to commit genocide on Israel.
And even this offer does not mean Hamas would make any effort to stop others–Fatah, Islamic Jihad, and Hamas people operating “unofficially”–from staging terror attacks during this time. Or, in Zahar’s words, “Anyone who thinks the calm means giving in is mistaken. The calm is in preparation for a new round of resistance and victory.” As for previous Palestinian commitments, he explains that Hamas is entering parliament, “To eliminate any traces” of the Oslo agreements. This means that all previous concessions made by Israel have achieved no reciprocal steps by the Palestinians.
For its part. Fatah also has a multi-layered strategy but it is in far worse shape. The election defeat has solved none of its problems. All the establishment leaders are still in place, the bitter factional strife is completely unresolved, and Fatah is stuck with a weak, discredited Abu Mazin as its standard bearer.
Abu Mazin can still be put up as a moderate face, a way to attract international money and support. The message is simply: “Hamas are the bad guys; we are the good guys.” Some last-minute attempts have been made to ensure that Abu Mazin still controls the media and can appoint a court that might veto what the Hamas-dominated parliament passes.
But the main two elements of Fatah strategy remain terrorism and patronage. Fatah will fight desperately to hold onto jobs and money, with the implicit threat of a civil war if its interests are neglected. At the same time, its gunmen will try to launch attacks on Israel to prove that it is the superior fighter.
Nevertheless, Fatah leaders are still living in a dream world, having no sense of how to organize and compete politically. Without control of the budget and government agencies, how well will Fatah hold onto its supporters? I’d put my money on Hamas to emerge victorious in this battle while it is also setting back hopes for peace, resolving the conflict, and creating a Palestinian state for many decades.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary Center university, visiting professor at American University and member of SPME. His co-authored book, Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography, (Oxford University Press) is now and his latest book, The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East, will be published by Wiley in September are available at SPMEMart spme.org/spmemart.html.Prof. Rubin’s columns can now be read online at http://gloria.idc.ac.il/columns/column.html ..
