The Syrian crisis , erupting in March 2011 is a multi-faceted problem. Its timing is clearly connected to the eruption of the so-called ‘’Arab Spring”, but its fundamental causes, as well as its course and possible implications are uniquely bound with the political development of the Syrian state from its very inception.
On 31 January 2011, Bashar Assad granted an interview to the Wall Street Journal,in which he pontificated to Western governments , as well as to the Arab leaders, on the reasons why the Middle East had become restive to the point of implosion, as seen in Tunisia and Egypt, and why it could not happen in Syria where the people liked him because of his anti-US and anti-Israel stance. A few weeks later, the Syrian uprising started bringing to the fore problems which for decades had been dormant.
THE SYRIAN STATE UNTIL 1970-THE” SICK MAN OF THE MIDDLE EAST”
Since its independence in 1946, and until the rise of the Assad regime in 1970, Syria was the model country of chronic instability in the Middle East. It became independent while lacking a coherent society united by a system of common values. The population was divided between many rival religious and ethnic groups and Arab Sunnis , the largest group, constituting of only 55% of the population. Another problem was the existence of two historically competing centers of power: one in Damascus and the other in Aleppo, the two largest cities. Under these circumstances, the new state became the playground of pan-Arab rivalries, and the inability to maintain a united state finally led to the ill-fated , short-lived union with Egypt from February 1958 to September 1961.
Restoration of independence did not bring about any fundamental change to this state of affairs, until the rise of Hafiz Al-Assad to full power in 1970 in the name of the Ba’ath party, a rule which brought stability acquired through the use of unprecedented state-sponsored violence.
THE ASSAD-BA’ATH REGIME; THE OPPRESSION OF THE SUNNI-ARAB MAJORITY
In the last four decades, it has been common knowledge that the Alawite community numbering about 15% of the population was the dominant force in Syria, due to its over-representation in the armed forces and the Ba’ath party. This was the result of developments dating from the French Mandatory regime in the Levant, which favored the non-Sunni minorities and encouraged their enlistment to the armed forces. The French may bear some responsibility for the perpetuation of the sectarian divide , but they brought it about simply because they were aware of the strong, historically –held feelings of resentment between the Sunni Arab majority and the non-Sunni minorities. Thus, under French supervision, military service became the ladder by which the minorities could climb the socio-political ladder. The Ba’ath party was another such means, offering members of the minority communities the opportunity to get away from the religious ghetto enforced upon them by the Sunni Arab majority. In Iraq, another country where the Pan-Arab Ba’ath party rose to prominence, it derived most of its support from Sunni Arabs, but here again, this was a minority, since in Iraq the majority religious community are Sh’iite Arabs. So, paradoxically, the party claiming to be the best representative of Arab nationalism turned into the representative of minority interests and aspirations.
To understand fully what it meant to be an Alawite in pre-Ba’ath Syria, let us recall a British consular report from the 1870’s , ‘’they hate each other…Sunnis boycott the Shi’ites…both resent the druze…all despise the Alawites…”. This attitude was so deeply ingrained in the minds of so many Sunnis, from the time of the famous Fatwa[religious ruling], issued by the Damascene Sunni Alim[religious leader], Ibn Tayimiyya, in the late Fourteenth Century, forbidding his followers from marrying Alawites, as they are worse than the infidels.
On occasions, such as the Hammah events of 1964/5, the riots before the June 1967 war, the violence from 1976 to 1982, following Hafiz Assad decision to intervene in the Lebanese civil war against the Sunnis there, the great Hammah massacre of February-March 1982, in which thousands were slaughtered, and sporadic periods of violence since then, the Sunni –Arab majority exposed its deep-seated resistance to a regime which they considered illegitimate and which, for its part , proved its readiness to do whatever it took to remain in power.
THE CRISIS; IT IS A CIVIL WAR AND IT IS SECTARIAN -–AND THOSE WHO DENY IT
Political scientists and linguists can debate the exact meaning of the term, “civil war,” and so can diplomats and politicians, who argue that efforts to achieve a cease-fire in Syria are aimed at preventing a civil war, but the genie has long been out of the bottle, and its sectarian nature is obvious. The number of participants in the anti-regime demonstrations, the geographic spread of the violence, and the huge number of casualties [well over 10,000], all attest to this. A big debate is also taking place in the academic community, as to the role of sectarianism in the current uprising. Many experts, Arab and non-Arab, refer to the uprising as an expression of social grievances, protest against poverty and corruption and lack of democracy. In fact, all of the above has existed in Syria for many years. The neglect of water resources in the Sunni periphery led 2 million poor peasants to migrate to the big cities. The economy altogether was stagnant, and allegations about corruption were rampant. Corruption meant concentration of the dwindling resources of the state in the hands of the few, many from the minority sects, including Alawites and members of the Assad clan. To this extent, those arguing that the implosion had a socio-economic dimension are right. They have yet to explain why, in that case, the Alawite North-West, the Druze South[near Sunni Dara’a where it all began] the Salamiyya enclave of the Ismailli [near Sunni Homs, the so-called capital of the uprising ], and the Kurdish North-East are totally or relatively peaceful.
Some words about the Kurds are in place here. The Kurds were slow to react to the uprising, reminiscent of the passivity of Arab Sunnis to their oppression, particularly when in 1986 and 2004 the regime was engaged in brutal suppression of Kurdish resistance. So, while the Kurdish provinces are in a state of active agitation, their political leaders exhibit a lot of suspicion towards the Sunni-Arab leadership of the uprising.
The Assad regime itself has come up with a slogan ‘’TaifiSuri”, which means ‘’my community is Syrian”, as a counter-slogan to the sectarian abuse heaped on the Alawites by Sunnis in Syria and outside. Publications by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood emphasize the point by referring to the ‘’true” Muslims who rebel against the infidels, and by calling upon Alawites to dissociate themselves from Assad in order to prevent a full-scale Sunni revenge against them when the final collapse of the regime will occur. It is also important to refer to statements against the Alawites by prominent Sunni Ulama [religious leaders], outside of Syria, such as the Saudi Sheikh Al-Qarni and most significantly, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qardawi, the famous fiery preacher from Al-Jazeera, considered the mostadhered to Sunni leader in the Middle East.
Under these circumstances, it is somewhat out of context, to say the least, to read other Arab commentators, trying to disclaim the obvious sectarian natureof the struggle. WadahKhanfar, a Palestinian, until recently, the CEO of Al-Jazeera, published an op-ed in the Washington Post[18 March 2012], in which he claimed that”modern Syria has never witnessed primary religious conflict”! Well, with such weird statements, no wonder that the Sunni Qatari governmentfired him from his position. It is a wonder though, and maybe not, that the Washington Post published this article. Some call it Political Correctness.
THE FUTURE AND SECTARIANISM:
A Syrian opposition writer Mustafa Khalifa wrote in his essay, “What if Bashar Assad wins?”, that if that happens [which he doubts, and so does the author], ‘’the regime will try to reshape the Syrian society into one that would guarantee the permanence of the regime forever…the first phase depends on gradual reduction of the religious majority in the society, or reducing the number and proportion of the Sunni community”! The writer goes on to specifically mentioning ‘’genocide”, in that regard.
And what if Assad loses, as seems very likely, though not in the immediate future. Can we expect the Opposition to refrain from ‘’reducing” the number of members of the minority communities, especially the Alawites? This is an open question, but itsvery existence shows that in Syria sectarianism, was ,is and will continue to be the name of the game.
Dr . Josef Olmert teaches Middle East Politics at the University of South Carolina. He publishes on Middle Eastern Affairs.
