For nearly 40 years, the United States has fancied itself the most important “third party” in the Israel-Arab peace process. Some administrations have adopted ambitious approaches to peacemaking in which the US president or the secretary of state, or both, have involved themselves directly and in detail in negotiations. Other administrations have adopted less ambitious approaches, often the result of circumstances assessed to be unpropitious for achieving progress toward peace. US failures in the peace process during the past decade or more have given rise to the possibility of a gradual but fundamental reassessment by the US of its primary mediating role. If this gradual shift proves real, it will have profound consequences for Arabs and Israelis.

Several factors accounted for the US role in previous Arab-Israel peace efforts. First, Washington perceived such engagement as being vital to its national self-interest, that is, it was a means of extending US power and prestige and blocking the aggressive aims of adversaries such as the Soviet Union or, more recently, Iran. Second, the US believed that peace was desirable, possible and necessary for the long-term wellbeing of the Middle East, a region of significant strategic importance. Third, the US has enjoyed a special relationship with Israel, and always perceived a strong interest on the part of Israeli governments to reach peace accommodations with all its neighbors.

In seeking to fulfill these self-interests, the US always brought important assets to the table in its role as a mediator. American offers of economic and military assistance often helped seal a deal between the parties. Similarly, US political assurances were taken very seriously by all the parties, especially those that related to final-status issues such as the question of Palestinian self-determination, the necessity of a viable and territorially contiguous Palestinian state, the future of settlement blocs, the fate of Palestinian refugees, the issue of Jerusalem, and the best ways of enhancing security for Israel and its neighbors. The US also often brought ingenuity, creativity or muscle to the table, attributes that were no less important than the tangible economic, military and political commitments it was prepared to make.

Given this extended period of US primacy in mediation and the panoply of skills and assets the US mustered in support of its mediating role, the central question now is why the US no longer seems interested in helping the parties get to negotiations, implement agreements already reached and bring forth new agreements on the road to a final peace settlement. Has the US lost interest in the peace process? Has the US assessment of peace – its desirability, possibility and necessity – changed? And if the US does not play a key mediating role, can a peace settlement be reached?

For the current administration, two primary considerations have underpinned a reticence to get too deeply involved in peacemaking. President George W. Bush believed that his predecessor, President Bill Clinton, had weakened the power of the presidency through repeated, failed efforts at peace. Bush assessed that presidents have only so much political capital to spend and from the outset he had other priorities. In this respect, 9/11 only reinforced Bush’s predispositions in that he saw the Israel-Palestine conflict through the prism of terrorism-counterterrorism.

These considerations could have been subjected to review after the death of Yasser Arafat, when an opportunity arose to invest heavily not only in stopping the violence but also in getting Palestinians and Israelis back to the negotiating table. However, the Bush administration remained on the sidelines, supportive of Israel’s disengagement policy, active in trying to resolve relatively small on-the-ground problems, but reluctant to touch more important issues, particularly those associated with final status.

It is this reticence – when the parties themselves and the Arab world appears anxious for a helping hand to back peacemaking – that suggests that the Bush administration is changing the US strategic outlook, not just hesitating to get involved while the two sides fight. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s latest foray into the Israel-Palestine dispute initially appeared to counter this strategic shift, but its lackadaisical style and limited ambition actually reinforce the trend of US policy.

With US elections in November 2008, the parties in the region will need to factor into their own strategies this evolving but increasingly clear American approach. They will face two stark choices between now and election time: either go it alone in bilateral engagements and bilateral negotiations, or find an alternative third party to provide the off-the-table benefits previously provided by the US. Neither of these appears very realistic, and thus the peace process has a vacancy for a mediator.

Daniel Kurtzer, the former United States ambassador to Egypt and Israel, currently holds a chair in Middle East policy studies at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.